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Biﬀ and George from ‘Back to the Future’ meet again at a game theory class in college.
At the end of the term, the class is due to take an exam with grades marked decreasing
from 6 to −6. George, the nerd, attends readings on a regular basis whereas Biﬀ, the
bully, can choose to either study hard or skip readings. If Biﬀ decides to study hard,
he attends readings and prepares for the exam all by himself. On the other hand, he
can spend his days at the beach and ask for George’s help some two weeks before the
actual exam. George can then choose to either even things out with Biﬀ or try to
complete his own preparations. Strategy choices are italicized.
In case Biﬀ chooses to study on his own, George is allowed undisturbed preparation,
resulting in grades of −2 and 6, respectively. In case George chooses to even things
out, he spends lots of time eliminating Biﬀ’s deficiencies and fails to accomplish his
own preparations. Hence, Biﬀ obtains a 0 whereas George scores a mere 4. In the
event of George trying to complete his own preparations, he is bullied by Biﬀ’s gang
(they steal George’s glasses, slap his head, etc.). This distraction, eventually, results
in the giving of grades −4 and 2 for Biﬀ and George.
Find the pure strategy Nash equilibria. Check them for subgame perfection and com-
pare your results.
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1. Introduction
1.1 Motivation
What determines the optimal degree of fiscal decentralization? An intense discussion
concerning the current developments in Europe, Canada, and the Russian federation
recalls that this question is of significant interest, both from an academic and non-
academic point of view.
From an economic perspective, a viable guideline for assigning fiscal prerogatives is
due to reflect a trade-oﬀ between the various layers’ respective pros and cons with
regard to the exercise of policies. In this line, decentralized regimes are acknowledged
to implement policies in a way that accounts for the well-being of local residents, thus
tending to neglect externalities on other localities. On the other hand, an abuse of
political power at the federal layer may bring about a distribution of policy benefits
that is excessively biased in favor of politically powerful regions. Intuitively, neither a
centralized nor decentralized regime shows great promise for meeting the requirements
of universally eﬃcient policy-making. Hence, the normative case for policy assignment
is determined by both institutional aspects as well as by characteristics of the policies
to be assigned.
A body of fiscal federalism literature has, so far, analyzed the problem of assigning
public good policy prerogatives within a federal hierarchy, putting forth some well-
established answers to our initial question. The existing literature has, though, fo-
cussed on deriving policy guidelines in static frameworks. In such a framework, neither
regime is likely to yield eﬃcient policy outcomes, as, following a one-shot perspective
of methodological individualism, the pursuit of short-run self-interest emerges as the
9
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dominant prediction concerning political behavior. Yet, policy implementation in the
European Council can, for example, rather be characterized by a ‘norm of voluntary
unanimity’, i.e. proposals requiring a mere qualified majority of votes are usually
agreed on unanimously. In fact, these proposals are voted against by a mere 1.8 %
average of Council votes.1 This number challenges the standard theoretical prediction
that policies are implemented in a way to serve the preferences of the bare majority
of votes required for adopting a policy proposal.2 Similarly, the free-riding problem
associated with voluntary decentral public good provision may be overcome in spite
of the downbeat theoretical prediction emerging for the prisoner’s dilemma structure.3
The question emerging from these observation is straightforward. What institutional
and non-institutional facets of policy-making may prevent political actors from imple-
menting ineﬃcient policies?
The challenge for this dissertation is to explain apparently cooperative patterns of polit-
ical behavior on a theoretical basis. Due to the one-shot perspective of policy-making,
establishing the basic setup for the existing fiscal federalism literature, the latter finds
it hard to do just that. Building on the prediction that both centralized and decentral-
ized political regimes entail ineﬃcient policy outcomes, static guidelines assign policies
to the layer that minimizes the respective ineﬃciencies. The, beyond dispute, most
popular guideline states that policies lacking (entailing) significant spillovers on other
localities should be decentralized (centralized). On behalf of similar recommendations
addressing other policy characteristics, this guideline is based on exactly such a com-
parison of ineﬃciencies. These guidelines fail, though, to capture dynamic aspects
of policy-making such as forward-looking behavior, both at a federal and sub-federal
layer. Our approach rather builds on the conviction that eﬃciency-sustaining coop-
1This number is based on 398 European Council decisions on policies requiring qualified majority
(December 2000 - December 2003). We summed up the weighted averages of nays over all decisions
and related this number to the total of decisions. The Summary of Council Acts is released on a
monthly basis at http://register.consilium.eu.int/isoregister/frames/introacfsEN.htm.
2See, e.g. Riker and Ordeshook (1973).
3See, e.g. Axelrod (1984) for numerous empirical examples.
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eration among political decision makers may overcome short-run ineﬃciencies in the
course of repeated political interaction. We, therefore, argue that a viable guideline
for policy assignment is supposed to capture a regime’s ability to cope with negative
short-run interests.
Motivating our dynamic approach of modeling fiscal federalism frameworks, a look at
actual federal legislatures tells us that there is rather repeated political interaction
among representatives. Table 1.1 depicts the number of European Summits attended
by average heads of state and government from the respective member states of the
European Union.4 Accordingly, an average Danish statsminister politically interacts
with representatives from other European member states on at least 24 occasions before
finally leaving oﬃce.
AT BE DE DK ES FI FR GR IE IT LU NL PT SE UK
S 38 96 96 96 63 38 96 78 96 96 96 96 63 38 96
H 3 6 3 4 2 4 3 7 7 15 4 5 2 2 5
S/H 12.7 16.0 32.0 24.0 31.5 9.5 32.0 11.1 13.7 6.4 24.0 19.2 31.5 19.0 19.2
S: # of European Summits attended by heads of state and government from the respective nation
H: # of diﬀerent heads of state and government since nation joined the European Union
Table 1.1: European Summits
Similar numbers for the United States of America reveal that the average incumbency
of representatives in the present US Congress amounts to 4.6 terms.5 These numbers
certainly motivate a ‘more-than-one-shot’ perspective of policy-making. As the latter
has been neglected by the existing fiscal federalism literature, one might ask what
happens to the guidelines for policy assignment if we allow for dynamic interaction. Of
course, this kind of neglect is innocuous in case the emerging guidelines are invariant
with respect to the temporal framework. Yet, our repeated game analysis shows that
4See European Commission (2003). Table 1.1 comprises a total of 96 summits, ranging from the
first European Summit (March 10-11, 1975, Dublin) to the 2003 summit in Brussels (October 16-17).
5See Amer, M. (2004), p. 4.
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the transition from a static to a dynamic perspective of policy-making may significantly
modify the prediction concerning federal and decentral policy equilibria and, more
importantly, reverse some well-established guidelines for policy assignment.
1.2 Aims and Structure of the Dissertation
This dissertation aims at identifying determinants of cooperative public good provision
in dynamic frameworks. We develop political economy based models of fiscal federalism
and establish normative benchmarks as well as equilibrium predictions for both policy-
making under a centralized and decentralized regime. In the tradition of Oates’ (1972)
seminal fiscal federalism treatise, our models analyze the regimes’ pros and cons for
various facets of institutional policy-making. Yet, placing emphasis on the dynamic
structures of policy-making, we introduce guidelines for policy assignment to layers of
a federal system in repeated game settings. The bottom line for this thesis is to analyze
the impact of factors like public good spillovers, regional preference heterogeneity, and
the number of federal member states on the regime-specific ability to yield eﬃcient
public good policies. Let us illustrate the thread of this dissertation.
The next chapter starts with a representation of the genuine fiscal federalism framework
à la Oates (1972). Section 2.2 illustrates the basic normative guidelines for policy
assignment, for instance the celebrated decentralization theorem, in a formal framework.
The literature survey in section 2.3 classifies and highlights some contributions that
can be related to Oates’ work.
Chapter 3 introduces our political economy framework and analyzes the optimal as-
signment of spillover policies in an economy with 2 regions. Our static perspective
(section 3.3) confirms the above-mentioned standard fiscal federalism result, in partic-
ular the positive correlation between spillovers and the optimal degree of centralization.
Allowing for dynamic interaction, this very guideline for policy assignment is, though,
reversed in section 3.4 as eﬃcient public good policies are then easier to sustain under
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a decentralized (centralized) regime in case spillovers are large (small).
Chapter 4 applies the framework of chapter 3 to a setting with interregional preference
heterogeneity. As a major result, both regimes fail to yield eﬃciency-sustaining coop-
eration in the repeated game setting if the regional preferences for public goods diﬀer
substantially.
Chapter 5 extends the basic framework to a n-region economy, thus enabling us to
analyze the impact of federal enlargements on the prospects of attaining eﬃciency.
Varying the degree of spillovers as well as the type of public good funding, we apply
the extended basic framework to diﬀerent problems of public good allocation. In each
case, enlargements induce two countervailing eﬀects on the ability to maintain eﬃciency
in a federal legislature. Yet, cooperation necessarily breaks down in large legislatures
whereas, at the same time, eﬃciency can be sustained at the decentral layer.
At last, chapter 6 endogenizes the very impact of repeated interaction on cooperation
by allowing for (political) decision makers that face strategy-contingent re-election
probabilities. Concluding our determinants of eﬃcient public good provision, we show
that cooperation can, quite generally, be attained if politicians face a high likeliness of
joint future interaction. Chapter 7 summarizes our results.
2. Oates and Fiscal Federalism
2.1 Fiscal Federalism According to Oates
The initial point for Oates’ analysis is characterized by the opinion that “we need to
understand which functions and instruments are best centralized and which are best
placed in the sphere of decentralized levels of government. This is the subject matter
of fiscal federalism.”6 In his seminal work, Oates (1972) places emphasis on the opti-
mal assignment of public good policies. His respective guidelines, the decentralization
theorem in the first place, have undisputedly prepared the ground for a well-founded
understanding of federal structures. In particular, the joint normative analysis of
(de)centralization’s pros and cons sheds light on the problem why the administration
of public good policies should be centralized at all.
As argued by Tiebout (1956), decentral structures may already yield an eﬃcient allo-
cation of public goods. However, for a decentralized regime to yield eﬃcient policies,
Tiebout’s model requires that (i) individuals must be costlessly mobile among juris-
dictions and (ii) local public goods do not induce spillovers on other jurisdictions.7
Whereas the first assumption may have its virtues for an intranational perspective
of fiscal federalism, it appears inappropriate for an international context. In this
line, Alesina, Angeloni and Schuknecht (2001) challenge the explanatory power of the
Tiebout-based branch of the fiscal federalism literature. In their words, the Tiebout
6Oates (1999), p. 1120.
7Furthermore, public goods must be provided at minimum average costs, a suﬃciently diﬀerentiated
supply of political jurisdictions is due to be costlessly available, and individuals are supposed to obtain
full information about the implemented policies. See Crémer, Estache and Seabright (1996), pp. 41,
for an extensive critique of Tiebout’s approach.
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approach “heavily emphasizes individual mobility across jurisdictions, a phenomenon,
which applies only to a limited extent to the European Union.”8 Assumption (ii) fur-
thermore reduces the possible validity of the Tiebout hypothesis to pure local public
goods.
In support of the Tiebout approach, Coase (1960) suggests that decentral regimes
may overcome externality problems associated with interjurisdictional public good
spillovers. His argument is essentially based on the fact that externalities leave an
additional overall surplus to be allocated. Whenever mutual free-riding induces juris-
dictions to underprovide public goods, these regions might benefit from extending the
level of provision. An eﬃcient decentral implementation of public good policies can be
achieved if a contractual agreement concerning the allocation of the respective costs
and benefits can be both negotiated and, furthermore, enforced by a third party at
no costs. Yet, the latter requirement has led to a rejection of the Coase solution in
a context of international externalities. This rejection is based on the fact that the
validity of international contracts (e.g. climate protection, disarmament) suﬀers from
the actual absence of operative supranational enforcement authorities.9
Oates’ (1972) framework builds on the conviction that a centralized administration
of public good policies aims to internalize interjurisdictional externalities whereas a
decentralized implementation of spillover policies entails insurmountable ineﬃciencies.
Restricting the analysis to immobile residents, he places less emphasis on the eﬀects of
interregional migration. Yet, his analysis allows for interregional public good spillovers.
Assigning policy prerogatives to a central layer may, therefore, yield benefits in terms
of policy coordination. On the other hand, Oates’ analysis interprets “a ‘centralized
solution’ to the problem of resource allocation in the public sector as one that empha-
8Alesina, Angeloni and Schuknecht (2001), p. 1. Giving support to this critique, cross-border
mobility of European Union residents is limited to 0.1 % a year (European Commission (2000), p.
18). Tassinopoulos and Werner (1999), cha. 4, discuss the determinants of the observable immobility
between member states of the European Union. In essence, the authors find that residents face
substantial mobility costs.
9See Inman and Rubinfeld (1998), pp. 7, for a detailed critique of Coase’s approach.
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sizes standardized levels of service across all jurisdictions”.10 Hence, centralization of
policies is a rather mixed blessing as the center internalizes public good spillovers but
fails to account for interjurisdictional heterogeneity.
Summarizing Oates’ ideas, a decentralized regime is considered as ‘closer to the people’
whereas central governance incorporates externalities. As the below formal represen-
tation of Oates’ model exhibits, the optimal degree of decentralization is determined
by a trade-oﬀ between these forces.
2.2 A Formal Representation of Oates’ Insights
Besley and Coate (1999) present a formal treatment of the fiscal federalism framework
à la Oates.11 The authors derive the genuine Oates (1972) results and go on to compare
the latter to results from a political economy setting. Whereas we shall discuss the
political economy results in section 2.3, the present section recaptures the Besley and
Coate (1999) presentation of Oates’ model.
2.2.1 Economic Environment
The economy consists of two geographically distinct regions i = 1, 2. Immobile regional
populations are normalized to 1, respectively. Individuals hold preferences over local
public goods g and private goods x. For an individual in region i, these preferences are
represented by utility
Ui (xi, gi, g−i) = (1− βi) lnxi + βi [(1− φ) ln gi + φ ln g−i] (2.1)
where φ ∈
£
0, 1
2
¤
and 0 < βi < 1.
12 The price for local public goods is set to p whereas
10Oates (1977), p. 4.
11We adapt their original notation in order to correspond to our notation used in subsequent chap-
ters. Unfortunately, the Besley and Coate (1999) article does not feature any kind of page numbering.
Where appropriate, the quotation, therefore, refers to overall contents.
12Observe that (2.1) represents Cobb-Douglas utility with 3 goods. In the original presentation
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the price for private goods is normalized to 1. Furthermore, individuals in both regions
are endowed with exogenous income ω.
According to (2.1), public goods may induce interregional spillovers. The degree of
spillovers is measured by the parameter φ. Restricting the analysis to φ ≤ 1
2
ensures
that individuals obtain at least as much a benefit from public good provision in their
home region as from provision abroad. For φ = 0, utility in region i does not depend
on public goods that are provided in the other region. In this case, g represents local
public goods. The polar case of φ = 1
2
implies that utility in region i is utmost aﬀected
by provision in the other region. Due to the strong complementarity between regional
public goods, individuals in one region then prefer equal levels of public goods in their
home region and abroad. Yet, these preferred levels diﬀer among regions whenever
β1 6= β2.13
Capturing the standard framework of Oates’ model, Besley and Coate go on to analyze
equilibrium policies under both a decentralized and centralized regime. As a benchmark
for policy evaluation, the authors employ a utilitarian welfare function
W+ =
2X
i=1
{(1− βi) lnxi + βi [(1− φ) ln gi + φ ln g−i]} . (2.2)
The next section presents the process of policy implementation under a centralized
regime.
of the model, there is intraregional preference heterogeneity as well. The latter is captured by a
cumulative distribution function Fi (β) on support
£
0, β¯
¤
, where β¯ < 1. We shall, though, restrict the
analysis to the case of interregional heterogeneity.
13Note that the case of φ = 12 does not imply a pure public good setting. In a pure public good
setting, regional utility rather depends on the aggregate public good quantity available in the entire
economy but not on the interregional distribution (see e.g. Samuelson (1954)). The utility in (2.1)
rather varies in this very distribution.
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2.2.2 Centralized Public Good Provision
Under a centralized regime, a benevolent central planner chooses public good quantities
for both regions. To this end, the planner levies lump-sum taxes
τCi =
p
2
(g1 + g2) , (2.3)
i.e. public good provision is financed via equal regional tax burdens. Following the
genuine Oates (1972) framework, Besley and Coate assume that the planner is restricted
to uniform provision levels gC1 = g
C
2 = g
C. Accordingly, the regional budget constraints
read as
ω = xi + pg. (2.4)
The benevolent central planner chooses regional public good policies gC in a way that
maximizes the overall welfare in (2.2) subject to both the regional budget constraints
and the uniformity constraint. Hence, the level of regional public good provision under
a centralized regime is characterized by
gC = argmax
g≥0
{(2− β1 − β2) ln (ω − pg) + (β1 + β2) ln g} . (2.5)
Whereas Besley and Coate determine the allocation in (2.5) algebraically, we shall
rather make use of some standard results for Cobb-Douglas utility.14 Accordingly, the
solution of (2.5) comprises the central planner spending fractions 2−β1−β2
2
and β1+β2
2
of income on regional private and public goods consumption, respectively. Hence, the
centralized administration of public good policies entails quantities
14See, e.g. Varian (1992), p. 111.
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©
gC , xC
ª
=
½
2− β1 − β2
2
ω,
β1 + β2
2
ω
p
¾
(2.6)
for both regions. Due to the uniformity assumption, the public good quantities in (2.6)
merely account for average regional public good preferences instead of reflecting the
region-specific tastes. Intuitively, there are welfare gains associated with a diﬀerenti-
ated public good provision. This fact is discussed in more detail in section 2.2.4.
Inserting (2.6) into (2.2), the welfare under a centralized regime reads as
WC = (2− β1 − β2) ln
(2− β1 − β2)ω
2
+ (β1 + β2) ln
(β1 + β2)ω
2p
. (2.7)
Note that WC does not depend on the degree of spillovers. Yet, this result is a mere
artefact of the utility in (2.1). Generally speaking, the Oates model does not put
any normative emphasis on how spillovers or preference heterogeneity aﬀect a single
regime. In fact, the relevant point is how a specific regime performs relative to the
other regime. The next section shall, therefore, derive the equilibrium welfare for the
decentralized regime.
2.2.3 Decentralized Public Good Provision
Under a decentralized regime, regional planners maximize the welfare in their respective
localities. Simultaneously, these planners choose regional public good quantities in the
course of a non-cooperative contribution game. Each region provides a quantity gi that
is financed via regional head taxes
τDi = pgi. (2.8)
Taking the other region’s provision of public goods g−i as given, the planner in region
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i divides regional resources among public goods gi and private goods xi. The Nash-
equilibrium quantities
©
gD1 , g
D
2
ª
for this game satisfy
gDi = argmaxgi≥0
©
(1− βi) ln (ω − pgi) + βi
£
(1− φ) ln gi + φ ln gD−i
¤ª
, (2.9)
i.e. expecting the other region’s optimal contribution, the planner in region i provides
a quantity gi in a way to maximize her region’s welfare. Figure 2.1 illustrates the
corresponding reaction curves for region 1 (solid line) and region 2 (dashed line) in a
symmetric scenario with identical regional preferences.
g2
g1
Figure 2.1: Reaction curves in the decentralized setting (source: own illustration)
In case region −i provides no public goods, the planner from region i is indiﬀerent
between all admissible public good levels. This artefact of Cobb-Douglas utility yields
a second (zero-provision) Nash-equilibrium that should be eliminated by restricting the
analysis to strictly positive quantities. More importantly, figure 2.1 illustrates that the
optimal quantity provided by region i neither decreases nor increases in the quantity
provided by region −i. Hence, regional public good quantities are neither strategic
substitutes nor strategic complements. This implies that the equilibrium regional pro-
vision is the same whatever quantity the other region provides.15 We, therefore, rather
15Due to the separability of utility, the β-continuum of regional reaction curves is characterized by
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interpret the problem in (2.9) as a standard household theory consumption decision.
Accordingly, a regional planner maximizes her region’s Cobb-Douglas utility subject to
the regional budget constraint. Making use of the well-known results for this type of
utility, the regional planners spend fractions 1−βi
1−βiφ
and βi(1−φ)
1−βiφ
of income on private and
public good consumption in their respective regions. Hence, the decentralized regime
entails quantities
©
xDi , g
D
i
ª
=
½
1− βi
1− βiφ
ω,
βi (1− φ)
1− βiφ
ω
p
¾
i = 1, 2. (2.10)
Contrasting the centralized setting, regional policies can now be tailored to cater region-
specific preferences. On the other hand, the voluntary contribution game induces a free-
rider problem, i.e. the average public good quantity is lower under the decentralized
regime.16 Deciding on public good provision in her own region, a regional planner
ignores the positive spillovers on the other region. In the presence of spillovers, the
decentralized equilibrium entails an ineﬃciently low level of provision because decision-
makers do not account for the mutually positive willingness to pay for the respective
public goods.
Substituting (2.10) into (2.2), the welfare under a decentralized regime reads as
WD =
2X
i=1
(
(1− βi) ln
(1− βi)ω
1− βiφ
+ βi
"
(1− φ) ln βi (1− φ)ω
(1− βiφ) p
+ φ ln
β−i (1− φ)ω¡
1− β−iφ
¢
p
#)
.
(2.11)
It can be shown that (2.11) decreases in spillovers. Once more, there is no immedi-
ate normative implication from this isolated fact. The relevant question is how both
parallel translations of the R2+-part.
16Observe that both regimes yield the same average quantities for φ = 0. Furthermore, both gD1
and gD2 decrease in φ, whilst gC does not depend on spillovers.
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regimes perform compared to one another.
2.2.4 Regime Ranking
Recall that both regimes are likely to entail ineﬃciencies for reasons of free-riding
(decentralized regime) and policy uniformity (centralized regime), respectively. The
regime ranking is, therefore, supposed to depend on the respective magnitude of the
distortion. Besley and Coate (1999) compare the regime-specific welfare terms in (2.7)
and (2.11). They summarize the results of the standard Oates model in the following
proposition.17
Proposition 1 If β1 6= β2, (i) either a decentralized regime is welfare-superior for all
values of φ, (ii) or there exists a critical level φˆ > 0 in a way that a centralized regime
is welfare-superior iﬀ φ > φˆ. (iii) If β1 = β2 and φˆ > 0, the centralized regime is
welfare-superior to the decentralized regime. If φ = 0, the two regimes generate the
same level of welfare.
We shall abstract from the formal proof and rather illustrate these results graphically.
0
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 f
WC-WD
Figure 2.2: Welfare gap in the Oates model (source: own calculations)
17Besley and Coate (1999), first proposition, section Oates’ Analysis.
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Figure 2.2 depicts the welfare gap, i.e. the diﬀerence between (2.7) and (2.11), as
a function of the spillover φ. Accordingly, the centralized (decentralized) regime is
welfare-superior for positive (negative) values of the gap. We assign values ω = 10,
p = 1, and β1 = 0.5 and depict the welfare gap for β2 = 0.5 (solid line), β2 = 0.8
(dashed line), and β2 = 0.97 (dotted line). Observe that the welfare gap increases
monotonically in spillovers for all three configurations. Analytically, this is due to the
fact that WC does not depend on spillovers whereas WD decreases in φ.
The solid line represents the case of identical interregional preferences. Illustrating part
(iii) of proposition 1, the centralized regime then dominates the welfare-ranking for pos-
itive spillovers whilst both regimes perform equally well in the absence of spillovers.
The intuition for this result is straightforward. For identical regional preferences, there
is no need to diﬀerentiate public good quantities as both regions prefer the same public
good quantity. Hence, uniform public good provision entails no ineﬃciencies at all
whereas the externality problem already arises for minor spillovers under the decen-
tralized regime. Centralization, therefore, welfare-dominates decentralization.
The vice versa result is illustrated by the fact that the decentralized regime welfare
dominates centralization for pure local public goods (φ = 0) in both heterogeneity con-
figurations whilst both regimes perform equally well for identical regional preferences.
Whereas the benevolent central entity now encounters costs in terms of neglected het-
erogeneity of regional preferences, there is no externality problem. Owing to the local
government’s superior ability to tailor taste-specific policies, heterogeneous regional
tastes, therefore, reject centralization from a normative point of view. This finding is
the very same as in Oates’ celebrated decentralization theorem. The latter states that
“in the absence of cost-savings from the centralized provision of a [local public] good and
of interjurisdictional externalities, the level of welfare will always be at least as high
(and typically higher) if Pareto-eﬃcient levels of consumption of the good are provided
in each jurisdiction than if any single, uniform level of consumption is maintained
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across all jurisdictions”18
The dotted line in figure 2.2 illustrates part (i) of proposition 1, demonstrating that
the decentralized regime may even welfare dominate centralization for any degree of
spillovers in a setting with high preference heterogeneity.
Finally, the dashed line represents the case of medium preference heterogeneity. Il-
lustrating part (ii) of proposition 1, the decentralized (centralized) regime then yields
a higher welfare for small (large) spillovers. Furthermore, there exists a critical spillover
level in a way that the decentralized (centralized) regime is welfare superior for spillovers
smaller (greater) than this threshold.
Summarizing Oates’ findings, as illustrated by Besley and Coate’s (1999) presentation,
spillovers and/or homogeneity among regional preferences give rise to a centralized
administration of public goods whereas decentralization is preferred in vice versa situ-
ations.
2.3 Related Literature
Inspired by Oates’ (1972) seminal analysis, a great many contributions to the literature
of fiscal federalism have analyzed the problem of assigning policy prerogatives to layers
of a federal system. Generally speaking, this subsequent literature acknowledges the
existence of regime-specific benefits. Accordingly, guidelines for optimal policy assign-
ment reflect a trade-oﬀ between the regimes’ comparative advantages. Yet, the recent
literature explicitly challenges the essentials of Oates’ conceptual framework for the
latter tends to neglect political economy considerations.
18Oates (1972), p. 54. See p. 35 of that source for an alternative formulation of the decentralization
theorem.
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2.3.1 An Oates Critique
Indeed, the case for decentralization is generally somewhat arguable in Oates’ frame-
work as, relaxing the assumption of policy uniformity, benevolent central governance
eradicates the case for decentralization. Due to the mere ability of policy replication,
the benevolent center can then never do worse than any decentralized regime. And
why would a benevolent entity, intrinsically striving for Pareto-improvement, ever im-
plement uniform policies if there are gains associated with diﬀerentiation? Obviously,
the implementation of uniform policies is not in the interest of the parties involved.
Lockwood (2002) summarizes the critique addressing benevolence-based frameworks
by arguing that “the challenge for these papers is to explain why decentralization might
ever be welfare-superior to centralization.”19 Following this line of critique and taking
methodological individualism seriously, we think that eﬃciency-seeking central plan-
ning should rather serve as a benchmark for policy evaluation than as a prediction of
actual institutional behavior. Furthermore, the case for uniform centralized public good
provision is rather unlikely to emerge in a political economy setting with self-interested
politicians.20
Albeit its potential shortcomings, Oates’ (1972) treatise has had a tremendous impact
on the literature of fiscal federalism. Our non-exhaustive literature survey starts with
a review of papers that are conceptually identical or similar to Oates’ framework.
We shall reduce the degree of similarity as we progress in the literature. A selection
of relevant political economy based contributions is presented in the last part of the
literature survey. These models diﬀer sharply from the genuine Oates framework and
actually prepare the ground for our own models.
19Lockwood (2002), p. 315, footnote 6.
20This latter point is discussed in more detail below.
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2.3.2 Benevolent Planners and Exogenously Uniform Policies
Establishing the survey, Alesina and Wacziarg (1999), cha. 4, present a standard Oates
framework. In their model, regional public goods and regional capital endowments
determine the level of regional production. Yet, localities may be endowed with het-
erogenous capital stocks and furthermore benefit from public good provision in other
regions. Following Oates’ (1972) framework, a benevolent central government accounts
for public good spillovers but is restricted to uniform regional expenditure levels for
the respective local public goods. On the other hand, decentralized provision entails
free-riding and, therefore, an ineﬃciently low level of public goods.
It comes to no surprise that the major results are essentially the same as in Oates’
model. In particular, Alesina and Wacziarg (1999), pp. 21-22, find that the regional
level of consumption is always higher under a centralized regime in case of identical
regional capital stocks. Furthermore, if there is heterogeneity among regional capital
endowments, there exists a critical degree of spillovers in a way that decentraliza-
tion (centralization) yields higher levels of regional consumption for spillovers smaller
(larger) than this critical level. Finally, the critical level of spillovers decreases in the
ratio of capital stocks, i.e. more heterogeneity requires a higher degree of spillovers to
make centralization worthwhile.
Whereas Alesina and Wacziarg (1999) derive Oates’ results in a clear-cut formal fash-
ion, their framework can be criticized for applying the same benevolent central entity
and exogenously uniform policies.
2.3.3 Benevolent Planners
The assumption of exogenous policy uniformity is relaxed in those fiscal federalism
models dealing with problems of asymmetric information (e.g. Caillaud, Jullien and
Picard (1996), Klibanoﬀ and Poitevin (1999), Gilbert and Picard (1995)). Yet, fol-
lowing the standard principal-agent literature, these models assume that the center
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pursues eﬃciency aims. In Caillaud, Jullien and Picard (1996), regional governments
hold better information about relevant characteristics and actions of regional firms
than the benevolent central government. The respective information is relevant for an
eﬃcient design of incentive contracts concerning region-specific production. Regional
production induces interregional externalities that are ignored by regional governments
whereas the central government aims to internalize the respective spillovers.
An optimal assignment of responsibilities always includes activity by regional govern-
ments as the latter are more eﬃcient in extracting relevant information from regional
firms. The case for central government activity merely arises for substantial spillovers
but vanishes entirely for small spillovers.
This guideline for policy assignment is the very same as in Oates (1972). At first
glance, it comes to a surprise that such a guideline emerges in an asymmetric informa-
tion framework. The so called revelation principle, i.e. the standard contract theory
result for principal-agent models, can be interpreted in a way that it is always the
highest layer that should be involved in extracting relevant information.21 Indeed, the
case for decentralization in Caillaud, Jullien and Picard (1996) is driven by the fact
that communication in terms of inter-governmental exchange of information between
the central entity and regional governments is ruled out by assumption. If this was
not the case, the central government should be able to employ an adequate contract
to extract any additional information from the regional governments.
Hence, the Lockwood (2002) critique, as stated above, particularly applies to standard
asymmetric information frameworks. Whenever central governments act like eﬃciency-
seeking principals, any coexistence of federal layers with respect to the execution of
tasks appears to be dispensable.
21Roughly speaking, the revelation principle states that no other design of contracts can ever do
better than a special type of contract designed by a profit-maximizing principal. Applied to a fiscal
federalism framework, this principle gives rise to an assignment of responsibilities to the welfare-
maximizing federal layer as the centralized regime should be at least as capable of extracting relevant
information as any decentralized regime. See Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green (1995), p. 493, for an
exposition of the revelation principle.
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2.3.4 Exogenously Uniform Policies
A diﬀerent branch of the literature sticks to Oates’ assumption of policy uniformity but
replaces the center’s eﬃciency aims by political economy motivations. Crémer and Pal-
frey (1996) build on a positive framework and assume that individuals face uncertainty
with respect to the implementation of policies both at the central and regional layer.
The authors derive individual regional preferences for the issue of joining a federation.
They assume that a centralized policy outcome must be the same for all member states
and argue that the latter fact makes it easier for risk-averse individuals to anticipate a
centralized policy outcome. As their major result, regions with polar tastes maintain
their sovereignty whereas regions with moderate tastes favor unification.
In a similar contribution, Bolton and Roland (1997) restrict the centralized regime
to exogenously uniform redistribution policies for all member states. In equilibrium,
centralization occurs only for moderate interregional income disparity. This is due to
the fact that large interregional income disparities entail high levels of redistribution.
Intuitively, the richer region usually favors a regime of separation.
The explanatory power of those models relying on Oates’ assumption of exogenous
policy uniformity is challenged by the literature of distributive politics. As a major
critique, policy uniformity is not explicitly derived from a political process. Indeed,
the literature of distributive politics shows that political interaction may bias the dis-
tribution of legislative benefits in favor of regions forming minimum winning coalitions
(e.g. Buchanan and Tullock (1962), Riker and Ordeshook (1973)) and exerting agenda
power (Baron and Ferejohn (1989)). Drawing on exogenous uniformity as the major
source of centralization’s deficits, the results in Oates (1972) and similar frameworks,
therefore, tend to omit a convincing explanation of why the center fails to account for
regional tastes.
Furthermore, the assumption of outright uniform spending levels is not necessarily
confirmed empirically. Boadway and Wildasin (1984), pp. 537, e.g. argue that US
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federal spending eﬀorts depend on various measures like regional per capita income
and local tax raising eﬀorts. Referring to federal spending in sub-federal layers, the
authors argue that “[t]he allocations are determined on a state-by-state basis” (p. 538)
and that federal spending, quite generally, entails “a tendency to treat lower-income
states more generously” (p. 539).
On the other hand, some distributive politics contributions (Weingast (1979), Weingast,
Shepsle and Johnsen (1981)) promote the idea that the allocation of legislative benefits
may very well turn out uniform.22 This literature does, by no means, rule out that
a uniform allocation may emerge as a result of a political process. Yet, imposing
exogenous policy uniformity, as does Oates’ approach, does not pay attention to the
strategical process of policy formation.
2.3.5 Exogenous Advantages
A certain branch of the fiscal federalism literature has built on exogenous regime-
specific advantages. Alesina and Spolaore (1997) consider the case of pure local public
goods. In their model, the center fails to account for regional preferences as fixed
costs of public good provision impede a spatially diﬀerentiated level of provision. The
optimal degree of decentralization is, therefore, determined by a trade-oﬀ between
economies of scale and preference heterogeneity. In this line, the paper by Bolton and
Roland (1997) assumes that a centralized regime is always more eﬃcient in executing
policies. The authors capture this assumption by the fact that centralization entails a
parametrized degree of eﬃciency gains. Referring to the results in Bolton and Roland
(1997), as stated above, these exogenous eﬃciency gains, in fact, constitute the richer
region’s sole rationale for ever opting for a centralized regime.
Our models shall abstract from exogenous advantages and rather focus on ‘non-technical’
determinants when considering a regime’s potential merits. On the one hand, this is
22As discussed below, Lockwood (2002) even demonstrates the latter result in a setting with impure
local public goods and spillovers.
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due to the fact that the formulation of Oates’ (1972) results explicitly rules out ex-
ogenous advantages such as cost-savings from centralizing public good provision (see
subsection 2.2.4 and the decentralization theorem quoted there).23 On the other hand,
we think that exogenous benefits serve as a rather dissatisfying ingredient for norma-
tive policy analysis as any regime’s superiority can be attained just by allowing for
suﬃcient benefits.24 In Alesina and Spolaore (1997), e.g. the normative case for cen-
tralization (decentralization) vanishes entirely for suﬃciently small (high) fixed costs
of public good provision.
2.3.6 The Political Economy of Federal Institutions
The fiscal federalism literature shares a common view of sub-federal policy-making
in the sense that decentralization entails a pursuit of regional interests and thus a
neglect of interregional externalities. Yet, it is fair to say that the literature has not
yet come up with a standard centralized framework. The present subsection of our
survey shall, therefore, highlight those recent contributions we consider most adequate
for analyzing policy implementation at the federal layer. The respective branch of the
literature has focussed on deriving normative guidelines for policy assignment based
on political economy frameworks. Indeed, democratic federal institutions are supposed
to consist of regional representatives pursuing regional or personal aims. This implies
that the aggregation of regional preferences at the central layer does not per se follow
a norm of eﬃciency but is rather subject to political economy considerations. As the
latter entail multiple sources of ineﬃciencies, we shall present the most relevant of
these sources and highlight the results that emerge in the respective papers.
23Recalling the representation of Oates’ model in section 2.2, the respective costs of public good
provision public good provision were assumed to be the same for both regimes. This implies that none
of the regimes has a purely ‘technical’ advantage in the production of public goods.
24Yet, this is not to say that we generally doubt the existence of federal scale economies. Sandler
and Hartley (1995), e.g. argue that the same quality of national defence may be achieved at lower
costs if the issue is administrated at the central layer. The authors go on to present some empirical
evidence for this assertion.
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A common setup of centralized policy-making is characterized by joint taxation, i.e. all
regions of the federation bear an equal share of the costs of public good provision. As
politically powerful legislators, such as minimum winning coalitions or agenda setters,
do not act as benevolent planners, the actual benefits of public good provision may,
though, be concentrated in particular localities. This setting, in particular the imple-
mentation of a federal cost-sharing scheme, gives rise to a budget externality. Regions
aim to exploit the latter by pushing for a high level of public good expenditures for
their own region. This is due to the fact that regions are levied only a fraction of the
associated costs whereas obtaining the whole benefits.
The suggestion that federal cost-sharing arrangements induce ineﬃciently high levels
of local public good provision was prominently pronounced by the distributive politics
model of Weingast, Shepsle and Johnsen (1981). Budget externalities are since widely
regarded as a major source for ineﬃcient centralized policy-making. In Persson and
Tabellini (1994), e.g. the level of centralized local public good provision is subject to
regional lobbying eﬀorts. The authors demonstrate the budget externality eﬀect in a
framework with symmetric regions by showing that the regional quantity of local public
goods is ineﬃciently high under a centralized regime and, in particular, strictly higher
than under a decentralized regime.
Incorporating distributive politics and fiscal federalism literature, Lockwood (2002) an-
alyzes the allocation of public goods in a minimum winning coalitions framework. In
the absence of spillovers, public goods are allocated to a bare majority, i.e. public good
benefits are restricted to powerful regions. This result is well understood from the liter-
ature of distributive politics. Yet, the presence of public good spillovers may imply that
provision is extended to an even larger number of regions. This is due to the fact that
regions within the coalition then enjoy benefits from funding projects in regions outside
the coalition. For a member of the coalition, such a funding turns out worthwhile if the
received spillover outweighs the member’s additional tax share. Centralization may,
therefore, entail a desirable allocation of public goods because this allocation is favored
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by politically powerful regions. In a scenario with substantial spillovers, there may
even be public good provision in every region. Decentralization, on the other hand,
yields eﬃcient results only in the absence of spillovers whereas spillovers entail the
familiar underprovision. In line with Oates’ guideline, centralization, therefore, turns
out preferable for high spillovers whereas decentralization is preferred for per se locally
concentrated benefits.
In the political economy framework of Besley and Coate (1999), centralized public
good provision is characterized by an uncertainty with respect to the actual composi-
tion of the minimum winning coalition. Risk-averse regional voters seek to exploit a
budget externality by misrepresenting the region’s ‘true’ valuation for public goods in
the course of strategical delegation. At the same time, strategical delegation serves as
an insurance against political risk stemming from ex-post uncooperative behavior at
the federal layer. If regions hold similar preferences, there is a tendency towards over-
spending as each region seeks to attract a larger share of central spending by delegating
a public good lover. Results are less clear-cut in case regions diﬀer in the respective
preference for public good. Heterogeneity intensifies the perturbing policy variance for
individuals. For the low-preference region, exploiting the budget externality conflicts
with the desire to understate the region’s public good preference, thus giving rise to
sophisticated strategical considerations. Under a decentralized regime, the eﬀects of
strategical delegation are eliminated, and regional voters elect the ‘true’ preference-
type representative. Yet, decentralized provision, once more, suﬀers from free-riding.
Summarizing their basic results, Besley and Coate (1999) confirm Oates’ results.
In an extension of their political economy model, Besley and Coate (1999) capture the
idea of cooperative legislative behavior by allowing for welfare-maximizing central leg-
islatures. The authors show that strategical delegation entails severe ineﬃciencies even
if the center pursues eﬃciency aims. However, the benevolence-based part of the Besley
and Coate paper faces the familiar critique concerning the case for decentralization in
benevolence-based frameworks of centralized policy-making. Building on this latter
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part of the Besley and Coate model, Dur and Roelfsema (2003) show that strategical
delegation on the part of regional voters can be eliminated by imposing a simple tax
scheme on public goods. The reason is that taxes raise the perceived regional costs of
public good provision, thus eﬀectively deflating the delegation of high-preference rep-
resentatives. Given such a taxation scheme, the centralized allocation of public goods
is always welfare-maximizing. Not only does this type of taxation scheme25 induce
eﬃcient public good policies; it is even politically feasible as there are mutual gains
associated with eliminating the consequences of strategical delegation. As the decen-
tralized regime entails the familiar free-riding ineﬃciencies, regions, therefore, willingly
agree to reap the ubiquitous benefits of centralized public good provision. Whenever
the central authority pursues eﬃciency aims, as for example in Cheikbossian (2000), a
mutually beneficial taxation scheme similar to the one derived in Dur and Roelfsema
(2003) is supposed to remedy problems of exploiting budget externalities in the course
of strategical delegation.26
Building on a pure public goods framework, Ellingsen (1998) emphasizes a neglect of
minority preferences resulting from majority voting in federal legislatures. Contrasting
distributive politics models, political power cannot be abused to restrict public good
provision to powerful regions due the non-excludabilty characteristic of pure public
goods. Yet, employing a majority rule, federal legislatures exclusively account for the
federal majority’s taste. On the other hand, the familiar externality problem emerges
under a decentralized regime. Whereas the consequences of free-riding in terms of
retained contribution to the public good are worst for similar preferences, the excessive
emphasis on majority preferences militates for substantial preference heterogeneity.
Accordingly, heterogeneity (homogeneity) among minority and majority preferences
favors a decentralized (centralized) regime.
25The explicit scheme is derived on pp. 13-14 of the Dur and Roelfsema (2003) paper.
26In Cheikbossian (2000), exogenous policy uniformity mitigates centralization’s common pool prob-
lem.
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Concluding the non-exhaustive list of sources for centralization’s ineﬃciencies, let us
review two prolific papers that, in a way, depart from this subsection’s political econ-
omy framework of fiscal federalism. Lülfesmann (2002) analyzes guidelines for policy
assignment in a property-rights framework. In his setting, ex-post eﬃcient public good
policies can be costlessly negotiated under both a centralized and decentralized regime
in the course of generalized Nash-bargaining solutions. Yet, ex-ante investments de-
termine the size of the public good benefits. In the absence of significant spillovers, a
centralized regime entails less incentives to exert value-increasing investments. This is
due to the fact that the ‘disagreement’ policy entails (does not entail) public good pro-
vision under the decentralized (centralized) regime. In a scenario with minor spillovers,
investing regions, therefore, accrue a higher proportion of benefits under a decentralized
regime whereas the vice versa result emerges for substantial spillovers. Accordingly,
small (large) spillovers entail higher incentives to exert investments under decentral-
ization (centralization), thus rendering the respective regime socially preferable.
Finally, a central government might face less incentives to foster regional tastes when
facing respective disutility of eﬀort. Seabright (1996) shows that regional politicians
face better incentives to account for their constituents’ needs. On the other hand, cen-
tralized policy-making entails an internalization of spillovers. Yet, representatives are
tempted to excessively cater the needs of those regions that are most likely responsible
for their re-election. Heterogeneity among regions even intensifies the latter eﬀect as
politicians are then induced to bunch their eﬀorts on similar regions. Spillovers, on the
other hand, imply that a certain level of eﬀort exerted in one region may be enjoyed by
other regions, too. Increasing the marginal re-election benefits from exerting regional
eﬀorts, spillovers and regional homogeneity, therefore, give rise to a centralization of
policies whereas decentralization is preferred in vice versa situations.
Notwithstanding the variety of modelling approaches, as reviewed in the present sec-
tion, the basic Oates (1972) insights emerge in all existing contributions to the literature
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of fiscal federalism, albeit for diﬀerent reasons.27 Yet, these contributions share a one-
shot perspective of policy-making. Following the idea that political decision makers
usually interact on several occasions, our analysis introduces a repeated game frame-
work of fiscal federalism. Our models aim at both scrutinizing Oates’ guidelines and
developing new guidelines for further institutional facets, like the number of federal
member states, in a dynamic perspective. We shall start our analysis by reviewing
Oates’ guidelines for assigning spillover policies.
27To the best of our knowledge, no contribution has yet challenged Oates’ basic insights.
3. Spillovers
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Depending on the extent of interregional spillovers, which layer of a federal system
should be assigned the right to execute public good policies? Since the seminal work
of Oates (1972), it is widely accepted that „local governments will be most eﬃcient
for those services [. . . ] which have no significant positive or negative spillovers onto
non-residents. For goods with significant [. . . ] spillovers, allocation by the central gov-
ernment is preferred.“28 In Oates-based frameworks, this result is driven by a trade-oﬀ
between decentralization’s externality problem and policy uniformity imposed on cen-
tralized public good provision. In the presence of positive spillovers, regional govern-
ments underprovide public goods due to free-riding opportunities. Benevolent central
entities rather account for spillovers but fail to cope with interregional preference het-
erogeneity. Decentralized regimes should, therefore, provide public goods that lack
significant externalities, e.g. local public goods, as free-riding entails substantial (neg-
ligible) ineﬃciencies in case of significant (minor) spillovers. Centralization, on the
other hand, is favored for high spillovers, e.g. for pure public goods, as the costs of
policy uniformity vanish for inherently uniform policies.
Whereas the subsequent literature has widely acknowledged the decentralized frame-
work and its results, Oates’ approach has been criticized for leaving out explicit
political-economy considerations in modelling federal policy-making. What happens
to the guideline for policy assignment if there are rather means but no intrinsic incen-
tives for beneficial policy coordination at the federal layer? Incorporating distributive
28Inman and Rubinfeld (1998), p. 11. We shall refer to this statement as the Oates guideline.
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politics and fiscal federalism literature, Lockwood (2002) finds that a member of a
minimum winning coalition may choose to fund projects in regions outside the coali-
tion if the spillovers for that member outweigh its additional tax burden. In case of
significant (marginal) spillovers, provision is, therefore, extended (restricted) to regions
outside (inside) the coalition, and centralization (decentralization) is preferred. The
latter regime ranking à la Oates has proved robust for its basic tenor prevails in a broad
range of convincing public good frameworks. The respective literature includes prop-
erty rights (Lülfesmann (2002)), asymmetric information (Caillaud, Jullien and Picard
(1996)), strategical delegation (Besley and Coate (1999)), and incomplete contracts
(Seabright (1996)).
The existing fiscal federalism literature has, though, focussed on analyzing one-shot set-
tings, i.e. political decision-makers are usually predicted to pursue short-run interests.
Hence, both centralized and decentralized regimes are likely to entail ineﬃciencies,
and the regime-specific magnitudes determine the ranking among institutions. We,
rather, argue that politicians are likely to perceive the benefits from reaping the possi-
ble eﬃciency gains. Furthermore, political decision-makers tend to interact on several
occasions, thus motivating a ‘more-than-one-shot’ perspective of policy-making that
may allow for self-sustaining cooperation.29 The point of departure for this chapter is,
therefore, to review the Oates guideline in a repeated game setting. We address the
question whether a centralized or decentralized regime is more likely to overcome the
above ineﬃciencies by providing the eﬃcient public good policies. Just like in familiar
one-shot frameworks, it can be shown that the answer hinges on the extent of interre-
gional spillovers. Yet, our analysis demonstrates that the transition from a static to a
dynamic perspective of policy-making may actually reverse the Oates guideline.
The remainder of this chapter30 is organized as follows. Section 3.2 sets out the eco-
nomic environment and derives the benchmark for optimal public good provision. Fol-
29See the numbers presented in the introduction to this thesis.
30Parts of this chapter are based on Koppel (2004b).
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lowing the fiscal federalism literature, section 3.3 derives a rule for optimal policy
assignment in a static setting. To this end, we compare public good provision under
both a centralized and a decentralized regime in respective one-shot settings. At the
federal layer (subsection 3.3.1), public goods are financed via common taxation, and
provision ensues in the course of an agenda game played among regional representa-
tives. In the decentralized scenario (subsection 3.3.2), public goods are financed at
the regional layer, and regional governments play a non-cooperative game of voluntary
public good provision. The regime ranking in subsection 3.3.3 confirms the standard
Oates guideline for policy assignment with spillovers.
Section 3.4 introduces repetition of political interaction. In subsections 3.4.1 and 3.4.2,
the respective stage games are played over an infinite number of periods. Subsection
3.4.3 derives a guideline for optimal assignment that is based on the regimes’ ability to
yield the eﬃcient public good policies. This guideline stands at odds with the Oates
guideline as the former usually calls for an assignment of policies to the central (decen-
tral) layer if spillovers associated with public good provision are small (large). Section
3.5 concludes.
3.2 Economic Environment
Throughout this chapter, the economy consists of 2 geographically distinct regions. An
individual in region i ∈ {1, 2} is represented by utility
Ui = β ln [gi + φg−i] + xi (3.1)
where xi and gi denote a private good and an impure local public good provided in
region i. Immobile regional populations are normalized to unity, respectively. The pa-
rameter φmeasures the degree of interregional spillovers, i.e. residents enjoy symmetric
benefits from public goods that are provided in the other region. These spillovers are
assumed to satisfy 0 < φ < 1. Local public goods are captured by the limiting case of
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φ → 0. Individuals then only care about the public good in their own region. Given
the restrictions imposed on φ, residents’ preferences with regard to the provision of an
additional unit of g are biased in favor of their respective home region. Only in the
polar case of pure public goods, as characterized by φ→ 1, individuals are indiﬀerent
between both public goods. Prices for public goods and private goods are set to p and
1, respectively. Furthermore, individuals in both regions are endowed with the same
exogenous income ω. The latter is assumed suﬃcient to allow for positive private good
consumption.
3.2.1 Eﬃciency Benchmark
For further reference in subsequent sections of this chapter, we derive the benchmark
of optimal public good supply. We make use of the fact that for quasi-linear utility,
both a Paretian analysis and the maximization of public good surplus yield eﬃcient
public good quantities.31 As the aggregate budget constraint reads as
ω1 + ω2 = x1 + x2 + p (g1 + g2) , (3.2)
the eﬃcient public good policies {g∗1, g∗2} for the utility in (3.1) maximize the aggregate
public good surplus32
S+ = β ln [g1 + φg2] + β ln [g2 + φg1]− p (g1 + g2) . (3.3)
Diﬀerentiate (3.3) with respect to g1 and g2 and rearrange the respective first-order-
conditions to obtain
31Appendix 3.A.1 demonstrates this equivalence for the present economic environment.
32Throughout this thesis, we drop exogenous incomes when considering surplus and payoﬀmeasures,
i.e. we consider net values.
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g∗1 = g
∗
2 = g
∗ =
β
p
. (3.4)
Straightforward computations are relegated to appendix 5.A.2.33 Having calculated
the eﬃciency benchmark, let us now turn to the static perspective of institutional
policy-making.
3.3 Static Spillover Setting
3.3.1 Centralized Regime
Under a centralized regime, public good policies are decided in a federal legislature con-
sisting of one outcome-motivated representative from each region. The term ‘outcome-
motivated’ indicates that a representative’s objective corresponds to the objective of
residents in her constituency. Hence, she derives the same utility as the latter from
public good provision. As there is no intraregional heterogeneity, we can abstract from
considering a possible pre-stage with regional voters choosing their representative in
the course of an explicit voting procedure.
The legislative process within one period is characterized as follows. With equal prob-
ability, one of the representatives (the agenda setter) is assigned agenda power with
respect to a proposal over sets of region-specific public good policies. The status quo
policy entails no public good provision at all. Once the proposal has been put to the
vote, the legislature votes between the proposal and the status quo according to a speci-
fied voting rule. This type of legislative decision-making is labelled closed-rule voting.34
33In chapter 5, we extend the analysis to a n-region economy. In order to avoid dispensable calcu-
lations, we derive the generalized results there. Evaluating the latter for n = 2 yields the results for
the present chapter.
34Under a closed rule, representatives cannot alter the proposal once it has been put to the vote.
Contrasting this procedure, open-rule voting allows for an amendment of the original proposal (see
Baron and Ferejohn (1989)). Proposals resulting in the course of closed rule voting procedures are
often called take-it-or-leave-it proposals (see e.g. Persson (1998)). We shall use both terms in a
synonymous way.
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We assume a unanimity rule, i.e. a policy proposal is accepted iﬀ no representative
vetoes its implementation.
Following the standard assumption of fiscal federalism literature, centralized public
good provision is financed via identical head taxes, i.e. regional lump-sum burdens
amount to
τ iC =
p
2
(g1 + g2) . (3.5)
As the regional budget constraint under the centralized regime reads as
ωi = xi + τ iC , (3.6)
the regional public good surplus, given the taxation scheme in (3.5), can be expressed
as
SiC = β ln [gi + φg−i]−
p
2
(gi + g−i) . (3.7)
Let a denote the agenda setter’s region. In the stage game equilibrium, the agenda
setter maximizes her region’s surplus subject to the other representative’s approval and
proposes quantities
{ga, g¬a} =
½
2β
p
; 0
¾
(3.8)
for her region and the other region, respectively. The other region’s representative
accepts this proposal as it leaves her better oﬀ than the status quo policies.
Substituting (3.8) into (3.3), the aggregate public good surplus under a centralized
regime reads as
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S+C = β
µ
ln
2β
p
+ ln
2βφ
p
¶
− 2β. (3.9)
As we assume identical preferences for the public good, the agenda equilibrium is
symmetric with respect to agenda power, i.e. the aggregate public good quantity and
the aggregate surplus under centralization do not depend on who is assigned agenda
power.
3.3.2 Decentralized Regime
A regional government consists of an outcome-motivated representative from the re-
spective region. Under a decentralized regime, public goods are provided and financed
at the regional level. Hence, regional governments levy regional taxes
τ iD = pgi. (3.10)
As the regional budget constraint under the decentralized regime reads as
ωi = xi + τ iD, (3.11)
the regional public good surplus for the taxation scheme in (3.10) can be expressed as
SiD = β ln [gi + φg−i]− pgi. (3.12)
Both representatives are assumed to choose policies simultaneously and in a way to
maximize (3.12) with respect to their region’s contribution. The stage game Nash-
equilibrium policies {ge1, ge2}, therefore, satisfy
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gei = argmaxgi≥0
SiD
¡
gi, ge−i
¢
. (3.13)
As is readily shown in appendix 5.A.2, the reaction curves read as
gi =
β
p
− φg−i. (3.14)
Figure 3.1 exemplifies the reaction curves for β = p = 1, φ = 0.3 (solid lines), and
φ = 0.7 (dashed lines) and depicts the respective symmetric Nash-equilibria.
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Figure 3.1: Nash-equilibria of the voluntary contribution game
Observe that the optimal level of public goods provided by region i decreases in the
level of region −i’s contribution, i.e. regional public goods are strategic substitutes.
Equate the reaction curves in (3.14) to obtain stage game Nash-equilibrium quantities
ge1 = g
e
2 = g
e =
1
1 + φ
β
p
. (3.15)
Reflecting mutual free riding, the decentralized public good quantities are lower than
the eﬃcient policies in (3.4).
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Substituting (3.15) into (3.3), the aggregate surplus under a decentralized regime reads
as
S+D = 2β ln
β
p
− 2β
1 + φ
. (3.16)
Inspection of (3.16) reveals that S+D increases in φ, i.e. the decentralized regime’s
absolute performance increases spillovers. Once more, this information has no meaning
in itself as a sensible guideline for policy assignment is supposed to reflect how a regime
performs compared to the other regime.35 Let us, therefore, compare the regimes’
relative performance.
3.3.3 Regime Ranking in the Static Spillover Setting
Depending on the extent of interregional spillovers, which regime should be assigned
the right to execute public good policies from the one-shot perspective? The following
proposition is readily established.
Proposition 2 In the static setting, there exists a critical spillover level φ¯ in a way
that a centralized (decentralized) regime is surplus-superior for spillover levels greater
(lesser) than φ¯.
Proof. Denote the surplus gap, i.e. the diﬀerence between (3.9) and (3.16), as
S+C − S+D = β
µ
2 ln 2 + lnφ− 2φ
1 + φ
¶
, (3.17)
and observe that (3.17) converges to −∞ for φ → 0 and to 2 ln 2 − 1 > 0 for φ → 1.
Hence, the surplus gap is negative for small spillovers and positive for large spillovers.
Furthermore, define φ¯ so that S+C
¡
φ¯
¢
= S+D
¡
φ¯
¢
. Finally, diﬀerentiate (3.17) with
respect to φ to obtain
∂(S+C−S
+
D)
∂φ =
β(1−φ)
(1+φ)φ > 0.
35Note, for example, that the surplus under a centralized regime increases in φ, too.
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Two ineﬃciencies drive the results in proposition 2. A decentralized regime entails
free-riding among regions. The degree of underprovision as well as the resulting ef-
ficiency losses turn out more severe as spillovers increase. The externality and thus
decentralization’s ineﬃciencies disappear, though, in the limiting case of infinitesimal
spillovers.
On the other hand, centralization induces distortions because the agenda equilibrium
merely reflects the agenda setter’s preference for the public good.36 Yet, as there is no
preference heterogeneity among regions, the respective distortion decreases unambigu-
ously in spillovers and disappears in the limiting case of pure public goods.
Figure 3.2 illustrates the results in proposition 2 by depicting (3.17) for β = 1.
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Figure 3.2: Surplus gap in the static spillover setting
Note that proposition 2 is in line with the Oates guideline for policy assignment, i.e.
substantial (marginal) spillovers favor (reject) centralization. In an Oates framework,
though, centralization always outperforms decentralization as long as there is no het-
erogeneity among regions. The simple reason is that the uniform policy employed by
36This finding supports the view that “[l]ocally chosen representatives may place parochial interests
above the collective interest in eﬃcient public good provision.” (Inman and Rubinfeld (1997), p. 61).
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the benevolent decision maker does not encounter ineﬃciencies associated with a ne-
glect of regional heterogeneity whereas decentralization’s free-riding ineﬃciency still
emerges. In an Oates model, decentralization, therefore, requires heterogeneity to ever
dominate centralization. In our model, the Oates guideline likewise emerges in a static
setting with identical preferences. This is due to the fact that centralization’s inef-
ficiencies rather stem from political economy considerations, i.e. from the distorted
representation of regional preferences in the course of an asymmetry of political power.
As was shown in the proof of proposition 2, the surplus gap increases monotonically
in φ. This monotonicity is not a standard result of static fiscal federalism models.
Yet, as was shown in section 2.3, the existing literature has already brought up vast
support for the polar results by stating that a centralized (decentralized) regime should
be assigned policies entailing substantial (marginal) spillovers.37
Our basic purpose for this section was to build a static framework that is able to
replicate the standard Oates guideline. Building on this static framework, the following
section shows that this very guideline may be reversed in a repeated game setting.
3.4 Repeated Spillover Setting
Fool me once, shame on you.
Fool me twice, shame on me.
attributed to the Chinese
The purpose for this section is to analyze an optimal assignment of spillover poli-
cies in a dynamic framework. We shall now ask whether eﬃcient public good policies
are easier to sustain under a decentralized or under a centralized regime. This question
is somewhat diﬀerent from the initial static game problem. In particular, it cannot be
addressed at all in a static model. The intuitive reason is that there is generally no
37In this context, Rubinfeld (1987) shows that a decentralized provision of local public goods yields
eﬃcient results in the static perspective in case the regional median voter corresponds to the average
regional individual.
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eﬃciency-sustaining cooperative behavior in non-cooperative one-shot models.38 We
shall introduce a regime ranking that reflects the layers’ ability to provide the eﬃcient
public good policies in a dynamic setting. Based on the theory of repeated games, we
derive necessary regime-specific conditions for yielding eﬃciency-sustaining cooperative
outcomes and analyze the spillover’s impact on the ability to maintain cooperation.
In the repeated setting, representatives play the respective games of subsections 3.3.1
and 3.3.2 over an infinite number of periods. The representatives share perfect recall,
i.e. in period t, both of them are fully aware of all previous strategy choices comprised
in the game’s history
ht =
©
(g1, g2)1 , . . . , (g1, g2)t−1
ª
. (3.18)
Furthermore, representatives have a common discount factor 0 < δ < 1 that measures
the degree of patience with regard to future payoﬀs. In order to derive clear-cut
results, we abstract from both polar (im)patience. Binding contracts are not possible.
Otherwise, representatives were able to enforce cooperation via exogenous mechanisms.
We are, though, interested in finding endogenous mechanisms that enable self-enforcing
cooperation.
Following the standard literature on infinitely repeated games (e.g. Friedman (1971)),
we assume that representatives employ trigger-strategies in order to resolve short-run
incentives to deviate from cooperation.
3.4.1 The Dynamics of Centralization
For the repeated game of centralized decision-making, suppose that, just like in the
stage game of subsection 3.3.1, agenda power is assigned with equal probability in the
first period. In subsequent periods, agenda power rotates among representatives, i.e.
38Pecorino (1999) makes this point in a repeated game of voluntary public good provision.
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whoever is assigned agenda power in the first period returns to agenda power in the odd
periods whereas the other region’s representative holds power in the even periods.39
This type of modelling is inspired by European Council decision-making procedures.
The latter feature a rotating presidency, i.e. “each EU country in turn takes charge
of the Council agenda and chairs all the meetings for a six-month period, promoting
legislative and political decisions”.40
Let us now turn to the problem of maintaining cooperation, considering the case of
cooperative legislative behavior. If both representatives employ trigger-strategies, the
representative that is assigned agenda power in the first period proposes the cooperative
quantities (3.4). A representative holding agenda power in period t > 1 proposes the
cooperative policies if all agenda setters did so in all previous periods. In case of a
whatsoever deviation from the cooperative quantities, agenda setters propose the stage
game equilibrium quantities (3.8) in all subsequent periods, i.e. there is infinite Nash-
reversion. Furthermore, representatives exposed to agenda power accept a proposal if
it leaves them at least indiﬀerent to the status quo policy of no public good provision.
The trigger-strategy for a representative from region i can be described by:
propose (g∗, g∗) if i = a ∧ t = 1
propose (g∗, g∗) if i = a ∧ t > 1 ∧ ht =
©
(g∗, g∗)1 , . . . , (g
∗, g∗)t−1
ª
propose (ga, g¬a) if i = a ∧ t > 1 ∧ ht 6=
©
(g∗, g∗)1 , . . . , (g
∗, g∗)t−1
ª
accept proposal if SPRiC ≥ S
SQ
iC ,
(3.19)
The superscripts PR and SQ denote proposal and status quo policies, respectively.
The present repeated game of centralized public good provision diﬀers from standard
repeated games as representatives play two diﬀerent stage games. We shall, therefore,
39Hence, the randomized assignment of agenda power now rather serves to resolve the first period’s
deadlock.
40http://europa.eu.int/institutions/council/index_en.htm#presidency, Homepage of the European
Union, last visit: January, 29th, 2004. As presented in chapter 5, the results derived in the current
subsection carry over to a n-region economy.
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first of all derive a general necessary condition for maintaining cooperation in this
game.
Given the strategies in (3.19), representatives receive cooperative payoﬀs π∗ in all
periods if the legislature pursues cooperation.41 If an agenda setter chooses to defect
from cooperation, she cannot do better than to propose stage game equilibrium policies.
Bearing in mind the triggered retaliation, she proposes the quantities (3.8) and earns
payoﬀs πa in the period of defection as well as in any other subsequent period that
she is assigned agenda power, but she receives payoﬀs π¬a in all of the other periods.
Accordingly, π¬a and πa alternate in periods subsequent to defection.
Cooperation can be sustained if the discounted payoﬀs from defection do not exceed
the discounted payoﬀs from cooperation. Straightforward computations42 show that
the necessary condition for maintaining cooperation in the repeated centralized game
reads as
δ [π∗ − π¬a] ≥ πa − π∗. (3.20)
Next, define δC as the critical value of δ in a way that (3.20) is satisfied as a strict
equality. This critical discounting parameter can then be expressed as
δC =
πa − π∗
π∗ − π¬a . (3.21)
Recall that δ ∈ (0, 1). Equation (3.21) then implies that the payoﬀ ranking must satisfy
πa > π∗ > π¬a. Intuitively, the notion of agenda power, in particular the ultimatum
game-like structure of policy-making, implies such a payoﬀ ranking.43
41Due to the payoﬀ symmetry, we drop the index i.
42See appendix 3.A.2.
43The genuine treatment for a one shot ultimatum game deals with the problem of splitting a fixed
amount of money among two agents. One of the agents (the proposer) oﬀers a certain split. The
other agent (the responder) can choose to either accept or deny the proposal. Acceptance implies to
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Cooperation can be maintained as a Nash-equilibrium of the repeated game if the
necessary condition for maintaining cooperation is satisfied for both representatives.
As the payoﬀ structure is symmetric, the critical discounting parameter is the same for
both representatives, i.e. cooperation can be maintained if δ ≥ δC.
As the volatility of political power in this subsection induces an asymmetry of stage
games, condition (3.20) diﬀers from standard conditions resulting from an employment
of trigger-strategies in standard repeated games (see e.g. the next subsection).
In order to obtain the specific value for δC, first insert (3.8) into (3.7). An uncooperative
representative holding agenda power in a certain period then receives payoﬀs
πa = β ln
2β
p
− β (3.22)
whereas the representative that is exposed to agenda power receives
π¬a = β ln
2βφ
p
− β. (3.23)
If an agenda setter abstains from using agenda power and rather proposes the eﬃcient
quantities of (3.4), payoﬀs amount to
π∗ = β ln
β (1 + φ)
p
− β (3.24)
split the money according to the proposal whereas rejection leaves both agents empty-handed. In the
subgame perfect prediction for such an ultimatum game, the proposer obtains (essentially) the whole
stake (see Selten (1975)).
Güth, Schmittberger and Schwarz (1982) test the one-shot ultimatum bargaining empirically. They
find that the actual split is biased substantially in favor of the proposer. In line with subsequent
ultimatum experiments (see Roth (1995) for an overview), the authors conclude from the data that
responders are more prone to reject an ‘unfair’ proposal if their respective costs, in terms of lost payoﬀ,
are rather small (Güth, Schmittberger, and Schwarz (1982), p. 384). Indeed, these costs of rejection
are rather immense in our agenda model. The latter is, therefore, best-suited for capturing situations
that are characterized by substantial default costs.
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for both representatives.
There is a point worth mentioning. Referring to the potential benefits from employing
a high quorum for policy implementation, it is sometimes argued that “decisions in
supranational bodies often require unanimity, thus forcing legislators to cooperate.”44
Our centralized framework rather exemplifies that the quoted implication does not
necessarily emerge in a political economy based model. Employing a unanimity rule,
we demonstrate that an agenda setter may well be able to implement her favored
policies. Indeed, our static setting shows that a unanimity rule may even entail an
utmost uneven allocation of benefits as is the case for low spillovers.45 Hence, there
is no straightforward correlation between unanimity voting and the distribution of
legislative benefits.
In our framework, the case for cooperation arises if the latter is self-enforcing in the
sense that, once regions have agreed on the cooperative scheme, none of the regions
faces a unilateral incentive to deviate from it. Observe that πa > π∗ > π¬a, i.e.
cooperation can never be an equilibrium of the stage game. Yet, representatives do
better under a cooperative legislature, as the latter entails higher average payoﬀs (π∗ >
1
2
πa+ 1
2
π¬a). Specifically, this result is due to the fact that (i) the average regional public
goods quantities under an uncooperative legislature equal the cooperative quantities
and (ii) the utility in (3.1) implies risk-aversion and thus a preference for consumption
smoothing over time.
Equation (3.21) implies that, in order to overcome short-run incentives to abuse agenda
power, a critical degree of patience must be met. Hence, insert (3.22), (3.23), and (3.24)
into (3.21) to obtain
44Dur and Roelfsema (2003), p. 2. The authors justify their framework of benevolent centralized
policy making by this statement.
45Recall that 3.22 and 3.23 represent the stage game equilibrium payoﬀs.
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δC =
ln 2
1+φ
ln 1+φ
2φ
. (3.25)
What impact do spillovers now have on the legislature’s ability to maintain cooperative
outcomes? We state the following proposition.46
Proposition 3 Under the centralized regime, (i) the eﬃcient public good quantities
can be provided for suﬃciently small spillovers, (ii) the likeliness to provide the eﬃ-
cient public good quantities decreases in spillovers, and (iii) the eﬃcient public good
quantities cannot be provided for suﬃciently large spillovers.
The proof is somewhat tedious and therefore relegated to appendix 3.A.3. It can
be shown that δC increases monotonically in φ, i.e. cooperation becomes less likely
sustainable as spillovers increase. Furthermore, limφ→0 δ
C = 0 and limφ→1 δ
C = 1,
where 0 < δ < 1 holds by assumption.
In order to capture the underlying intuition, consider first a stage game policy analysis.
The one-shot equilibrium (3.8) merely reflects the agenda setter’s preference for the
public good. For local public goods (φ → 0), the other region is excluded completely
from legislative benefits. Yet, the respective distortion decreases in spillovers and
vanishes in the limiting case of pure public goods (φ → 1) because the region that is
exposed to agenda power increasingly enjoys spillovers from the agenda setter’s region.
Consider now the repeated game setting. Observe that the public goods are provided at
the same (fixed) aggregate level both under a cooperative and uncooperative legislature,
whereas an uncooperative agenda setter always channels twice the cooperative quantity
of public goods to her own region. Accordingly, the limiting case of no spillovers (φ→
0) entails maximum gains from abusing agenda power because the agenda setter then
enjoys no benefits at all from public good provision in the other region. Yet, these gains
46Proposition 3 likewise emerges if agenda power is assigned randomly with equal probability at the
beginning of each stage game in the repeated centralized game.
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are bounded above because there are still positive benefits in the cooperative situation.
On the other hand, being exposed to agenda power implies a complete exclusion from
legislative benefits. This eﬀect entails infinite costs from abusing agenda power and,
therefore, prevails even for utmost impatient representatives. Hence, cooperation can
be sustained for suﬃciently small spillovers.
An increase in spillovers entails two opposing eﬀects. Facilitating eﬃciency-sustaining
cooperation, the gain from abusing agenda power, as measured by πa − π∗, decreases
in spillovers. This is due to the fact that an agenda setter now more and more enjoys
public good provision in the other region. Hence, she forfeits less surplus by allocating
public goods to the other region, too. On the other hand, the costs of defection,
π∗ − π¬a, decrease even stronger in spillovers because the region that is exposed to
agenda power enjoys more and more benefits from provision in the agenda setter’s
region, thus suﬀering disproportionately less from an uncooperative legislature. In the
limiting case of pure public goods (φ→ 1), the diﬀerence between gains and costs from
abusing agenda power, eventually, vanishes completely because a region can no longer
be excluded from legislative benefits. As a consequence of discounting, an agenda setter
cannot resist to realize the gains, i.e. cooperation cannot be sustained at all for φ→ 1.
The findings in proposition 3 exhibit an interesting analogy to results from the uni-
versalism literature of distributive politics. In Weingast’s (1979) minimum winning
coalitions model, representatives face uncertainty with respect to the actual compo-
sition of the coalition. Fearing the consequences of being excluded from legislative
benefits, representatives comply with a norm of cooperative benefit distribution when-
ever they average higher payoﬀs under a cooperative legislature. In a static setting, any
incentive to cooperate is, though, viable only from an ex-ante perspective.47 Weingast
(p. 253) therefore adds that “a universalistic rule must [...] give individual legislators
an incentive to follow the rule at all times.” In this regard, we show that the repetition
47Note that π∗ > 12 (π
a + π¬a) is always satisfied in our setting. Yet, contrasting the results in
Weingast (1979), this condition is not suﬃcient for achieving cooperative outcomes.
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inherent in legislative interaction, in particular the volatility of political power, may
yield ex-post-viable incentives for cooperative behavior by entailing a threat of punish-
ing any pursuit of short-run interests. Measured by the consequences of being excluded
from legislative benefits, this very threat is most (least) eﬀective for local (pure) public
goods as legislative benefits then can (cannot) be forced to concentrate within specific
regions.
The strategies in (3.19) yield a subgame perfect Nash-equilibrium.48 This is a desirable
property as the following deliberation highlights. Consider the following alternative
strategies. Agenda setters always propose cooperative quantities, and representatives
exposed to agenda power reject any other than the cooperative proposal. Certainly,
cooperation is always a Nash-equilibrium under these strategies. Facing the threat
of rejection, agenda setters cannot do better than to propose cooperative quantities.
On the other hand, representatives exposed to agenda power cannot do better than
to accept the cooperative quantities. These strategies are, obviously, mutually best
responses and cooperation, therefore, constitutes a Nash-equilibrium of the repeated
game. Yet, the strategies employed to sustain cooperation, in particular the announced
punishment for defection from cooperation, build on incredible threats. Once an agenda
setter has launched another proposal, say the agenda quantities of (3.8), it is not in
the interest of the responder to turn down this proposal, as she actually earns a lower
payoﬀ by rejecting the proposal. Her threat of turning down the proposal is, therefore,
not credible. In the subgame perfect equilibrium, the agenda setter anticipates that a
responder will accept any proposal that leaves her at least as well oﬀ as the status quo.
In essence, subgame perfection implies that strategies not only induce Nash-equilibria
in the whole game but also in every subgame.49
In order to derive a sensible regime ranking for this section, let us now analyze the
48We employ subgame perfect strategies in all subsequent chapters.
49See Binmore (1992), pp. 47-48, for an instructive introduction into the concept of subgame
perfection.
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decentralized regime in a repeated game setting.
3.4.2 The Dynamics of Decentralization
In the repeated decentralized setting, representatives play the stage game of subsection
3.3.2 over an infinite number of periods and, like in subsection 3.4.1, employ trigger-
strategies in order to maintain eﬃcient outcomes.50
Deciding on region i’s contribution, the representative from that region chooses to pro-
vide the eﬃcient quantity (3.4) in the first period of the repeated game. In subsequent
periods, she continues to provide the eﬃcient amount if all representatives did so in all
previous periods, i.e. if the game’s history records nothing but cooperative quantities.
Whenever the history records a diﬀerent entry, there is infinite Nash-reversion, and
representatives contribute the stage game Nash-equilibrium quantities (3.15).
The trigger-strategy for a representative from region i can, therefore, be described by
gi =



g∗ if t = 1
g∗ if t > 1 ∧ ht =
©
(g∗, g∗)1 , . . . , (g
∗, g∗)t−1
ª
ge else .
(3.26)
If a representative rather defects from cooperation, she chooses her contribution to
maximize her short run advantage whilst anticipating the other region’s cooperative
contribution in the period of defection as well as the mutual return to stage game
Nash-equilibrium policies in all subsequent periods. The optimal contribution gdi for a
defecting representative is, therefore, characterized by
gdi = argmaxgi≥0
{β ln [gi + φg∗]− pgi} . (3.27)
50See Pecorino (1999) for a recent application of trigger strategies in the context of voluntary
contribution games with pure public goods.
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Solving (3.27), a defecting representative contributes
gd1 = g
d
2 = g
d =
(1− φ)β
p
. (3.28)
The straightforward algebra is relegated to appendix 5.A.2.
Given the trigger-strategies in (3.26), a representative receives cooperative payoﬀs π∗ in
all periods if there is mutual cooperation. If, on the other hand, a representative defects,
she receives payoﬀs πd in the period of defection and stage game Nash-equilibrium
payoﬀs πe afterwards.51
Again, cooperation can be sustained if the discounted payoﬀs from defection do not ex-
ceed the discounted payoﬀs from cooperation. The corresponding well-known condition
for maintaining cooperation in repeated games reads as52
δ
1− δ [π
∗ − πe] ≥ πd − π∗. (3.29)
Let δD denote the critical value of δ so that the latter condition is satisfied as a strict
equality. Straightforward manipulation then yields the familiar critical discounting
parameter
δD =
πd − π∗
πd − πe . (3.30)
Again, cooperation can be maintained if δ ≥ δD. Let us now consider the cooperative
payoﬀs. If representatives overcome the free riding problem and provide the eﬃcient
quantities (3.4), both representatives receive cooperative payoﬀs
51A standard result for infinitely repeated games reveals that, due to stationarity, a defecting agent
always chooses to defect in the first period. See e.g. Friedman (1990), pp. 88-89.
52The familiar algebra is found in appendix 3.A.2. See, e.g. Shapiro (1989), p. 364, for a similar
exposition.
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π∗ = β ln
β (1 + φ)
p
− β (3.31)
that, intuitively, correspond to (3.24). Furthermore, inserting (3.28) as well as the
other region’s cooperative contribution into (3.16), a defecting representative earns
payoﬀs
πd = β ln
β
p
− β (1− φ) (3.32)
in the period of defection. Finally, insertion of (3.15) into (3.16) yields the stage game
equilibrium payoﬀs
πe = β ln
β
p
− β
1 + φ
. (3.33)
In order to obtain the specific value of δD, insert (3.31), (3.32), and (3.33) into (3.30).
Straightforward manipulations then yield
δD =
φ− ln (1 + φ)
φ2
1+φ
. (3.34)
What does this term reveal about the correlation between spillovers and eﬃcient de-
central public good provision? It enables us to state the following proposition.53
Proposition 4 Under the decentralized regime, the likeliness to provide the eﬃcient
public good quantities decreases in spillovers.
It can be shown that δD increases monotonically in spillovers, i.e. cooperation in the
decentralized setting is harder to sustain for large spillovers. On the one hand, the
53The proof is relegated to appendix 3.A.4.
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costs of defection, as indicated by the degree of underprovision in the stage game
equilibrium compared to cooperation, increase in spillovers (simply compare (3.4) to
(3.15)). However, the gain from defection, as indicated by the degree of retained
contribution, increases even stronger (compare (3.28) to (3.4)).
Contrasting the centralized setting, there now exist admissible values of δ in a way
that cooperation can be maintained for large spillovers (limφ→1 δD = 2− ln 4 < 1). On
the other hand, cooperation now requires some patience in order to be maintained for
small spillovers )observe that limφ→0 δ
D = 1
2
).
The next subsection analyzes both regimes’ relative merits in the repeated game setting.
3.4.3 Regime Ranking in the Repeated Spillover Setting
Depending on the extent of interregional spillovers, which regime should execute public
good policies in the repeated game setting? Obviously, the answer to this question
hinges on the ability to maintain eﬃcient public good quantities. Let us, therefore,
first state the following proposition.
Proposition 5 In the repeated game setting, there exists a critical spillover level φˆ in
a way that the eﬃcient public good policies are easier to sustain under a centralized
(decentralized) regime for spillovers lesser (greater) than φˆ.
Proof. Recall that both δC and δD increase monotonically in φ. Furthermore, recall
that limφ→0 δ
C < limφ→0 δ
D, i.e. δC < δD holds for small spillovers. On the other
hand, limφ→1 δ
D < limφ→1 δ
C, i.e. δC > δD holds for large spillovers. Accordingly,
there exists a critical spillover level φˆ so that δC
³
φˆ
´
= δD
³
φˆ
´
.
In figure 3.3, the critical spillover level φˆ is depicted by the intersect of the critical
discounting parameters (3.25) and (3.34).
Consider φ < φˆ. Whenever cooperation can be sustained under a decentralized regime,
it can be sustained under a centralized regime, too. Furthermore, there exists a range
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Figure 3.3: Regime ranking in the repeated spillover setting
of δs in a way that cooperation can be sustained under centralization but not under
decentralization. Hence, cooperation is easier to sustain under centralization for φ < φˆ.
Vice versa, cooperation is easier to sustain under decentralization for φ > φˆ.
What guideline for policy assignment can be drawn from these results? From a stage
game perspective, the regime ranking is readily established. Recalling the regime rank-
ing in subsection 3.3.3, there exists a critical level of spillovers φ¯ in a way that the de-
centralized (centralized) regime is surplus-superior for spillovers smaller (greater) than
φ¯. From the repeated game perspective, the regime ranking hinges on the ability of
sustaining cooperation. Hence, we have to account for both spillovers and the degree
of discounting and diﬀerentiate between three cases. Referring to figure 3.3, area I
depicts those configurations of δ and φ that are characterized by δ < min
©
δD, δC
ª
.
In this case, cooperation can neither be sustained under a centralized nor under a
decentralized regime. Falling back to the stage game equilibria (3.8) and (3.15), the
standard Oates guideline prevails yet again.
For medium δs, i.e. for min
©
δD, δC
ª
≤ δ < max
©
δD, δC
ª
, only one regime yields
eﬃcient outcomes whereas the other entails the familiar eﬃciency losses associated
with the stage game equilibrium. Accordingly, the centralized (decentralized) regime
is surplus-superior for configurations of δ and φ that are located in area II (III). Re-
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versing the Oates guideline, public good policies should then be assigned to the central
(regional) layer in case of spillovers smaller (larger) than φˆ.
Finally, for max
©
δD, δC
ª
≤ δ, the eﬃcient outcomes can be sustained under both
regimes (area IV). Hence, no regime entails a higher surplus, and there is no straight-
forward guideline for policy assignment in this case. Nevertheless, we argue that there
are plausible reasons to stick to the guideline that emerges for medium δs. On the
one hand, following the subsidiarity principle of the Maastricht treaty, policies should
be centralized iﬀ there is an actual benefit from doing so. Taking this principle liter-
ally, policies should not be centralized if both regimes perform equally well. Indeed,
whenever a regime yields eﬃcient outcomes for medium δs, it likewise yields eﬃcient
outcomes for large δs and, therefore, performs at least as good as the other regime.
Now think of problems such as a small uncertainty with respect to δ, i.e. the exact
degree of patience may not be observable. Suggesting a diﬀerent guideline for medium
and large δs then runs the risk of suﬀering ineﬃciencies for δs in the neighborhood of
max
©
δD, δC
ª
without ever yielding an eﬃciency gain. This argument breaks the tie in
favor of the regime that was already assigned policies for medium δs. Intuitively, there
is no reason to jeopardize cooperation by changing the assignment rule if there is no
benefit from doing so.54
Summarizing our above results, the Oates guideline prevails iﬀ the stage game perspec-
tive proves relevant, as is the case for fairly impatient representatives (area I). Yet, the
Oates guideline is reversed for a broad range of circumstances (areas II, III, and IV)
in the repeated game setting.
54Although this plausibility argument is likewise based on robustness with respect to a small un-
certainty, it should not be confused with the trembling-hand refinement concept for Nash-equilibria
(Selten (1975)). The latter rather employs small probabilities of faulty strategy choices.
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3.5 Conclusion Chapter 3
This chapter reviewed the Oates guideline for assigning spillover policies to federal
layers in both a static and a repeated game setting. In the static setting, the standard
Oates guideline for policy assignment is confirmed. In the repeated setting, we ad-
dressed the question whether a centralized or a decentralized regime is more likely to
yield eﬃcient outcomes. Building on the respective one-shot games, our key findings
show that the eﬃcient policies are easier to sustain under centralization (decentraliza-
tion) if spillovers are small (large). The emerging regime ranking challenges the Oates
guideline by showing that a centralized regime usually yields a higher (lower) surplus
than decentralization if spillovers are small (large). These results are driven by the
eﬀect of spillovers on the payoﬀs π∗, πa, and π¬a in the centralized setting and on the
payoﬀs π∗, πd, and πe in the decentralized setting.
Our results (proposition 3) give a possible explanation for the universalistic distribution
of local public goods often found in real-life legislatures (see, e.g. the literature cited
in Weingast (1979)). In the absence of spillovers, exclusion from public good provision
implies complete exclusion from legislative benefits. If representatives are exposed to
political risk, say in terms of changing majorities, exclusion then serves as a severe
punishment for deviating from a cooperative benefit distribution. If representatives
hold a preference for benefit smoothing over time, the threat of exclusion induces
a compliance with cooperation. Spillovers, on the other hand, rather mitigate the
punishment eﬀect and hamper cooperation.
Unfortunately, a clear-cut regime ranking is rather unlikely to emerge if we allow for
aspects of interregional heterogeneity. The results in Ellingsen (1998) indicate that the
equilibrium structure of voluntary regional contributions to a public good is extremely
sensitive with respect to interregional heterogeneity of preferences and/or size.55 In
55Ellingsen (1998) employs quasi-linear utility and shows that only the region with the higher
aggregate marginal willingness to pay contributes under a decentralized regime whereas the other
region free-rides completely.
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this regard, marginal asymmetries entail discontinuities of both regional contributions
and (stage game) equilibrium surplus. These discontinuities are rather likely to pro-
duce ambiguous eﬀects on the ability to sustain eﬃcient outcomes in our decentralized
setting.
Let us, finally, consider the consequences of introducing a majority rule to our 2-region
framework of centralized policy-making. As Besley and Coate (2003), p. 2619, argue,
each representative can then be thought of as a separate minimum winning coalition.
Following this argument, the stage game policy-outcome in our model is the same under
a majority rule. Capturing volatility of political power in a way that representatives
belong to the minimum winning coalition only in certain periods, our results of cen-
tralized policy-making likewise emerge if the legislature applies a majority rule.
With regard to more general preferences, we should expect a negative correlation be-
tween quorum size and agenda power in terms of discretionary policy implementation
(see, e.g. Bednar, Ferejohn and Garrett (1996), proposition 1). From a one-shot per-
spective, reducing the quorum is, therefore, likely to increase the disparity of legislative
benefits. From a dynamic perspective, though, reducing the quorum entails rather op-
posing eﬀects. Ignoring the needs of the minority, an agenda setter is able to reap some
more legislative benefits whereas cooperative outcomes do not depend on the legisla-
tive rule employed. Hence, the gain from abusing agenda power is (weakly) higher
under a majority rule. On the other hand, a representative faces complete exclusion
from legislative benefits in case she is exposed to agenda power. Accordingly, the costs
from abusing agenda power increase, too. Considering the magnitude of both eﬀects,
the costs of abusing agenda power are likely to prevail. Hence, reducing the quorum
is supposed to serve as an eﬃciency-sustaining feature of policy-making in a dynamic
perspective. Further research might, therefore, consider the impact of legislative rules
on the prospects for sustaining legislative cooperation in more detail.
The results build on an absence of additional factors that might impede cooperation in
repeated games. In this regard, some well-known obstacles like renegotiation-proofness
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(Farrell andMaskin (1989)) or informational problems (Green and Porter (1984)) might
inhibit cooperation in repeated games. In this case, the stage game equilibria prove the
viable prediction, and the Oates guideline prevails yet again. By a standard backward
induction argument, the same is true for a finite horizon game structure.
If there are no additional obstacles impeding cooperation in repeated games, the re-
peated game perspective reproduces the Oates guideline iﬀ stage game equilibrium
policies prove the appropriate prediction, i.e. if representatives attach a high weight
to short-run considerations. Otherwise, the Oates guideline is reversed. Our results,
therefore, certainly highlight the importance of considering the dynamics of political
interaction in more detail.
Recalling proposition 1, the Oates guideline likewise deals with assigning public good
policies contingent on interregional heterogeneity. The next chapter, therefore, applies
the present framework to a setting with asymmetric regional preferences and scrutinizes
the respective guidelines in a repeated game perspective.
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3.A.1 Public Good Surplus and Paretian Analysis
The Pareto-program for the economic environment of section 3.2 can be described by
choosing an allocation of x1, x2, g1, and g2 so as to maximize U1 = β ln [g1 + φg2] + x1
subject to the constraints
U2 = β ln [g2 + φg1] + x2 ≥ U¯2, (3.35)
i.e. utility in region 2 must not fall short of an assigned reservation utility, and
ω1 + ω2 = x1 + x2 + p (g1 + g2) , (3.36)
stating that overall expenditures for private good consumption and public good supply
must not surpass aggregate income. The corresponding Lagrange-program can be
expressed as
max
x1,x2,g1,g2,λ,γ
L = U1 + λ
£
U2 − U¯2
¤
+ γ [ω1 + ω2 − x1 − x2 − p (g1 + g2)] (3.37)
The familiar first-order conditions for private good consumption read as
∂L
∂x1
=
∂U1
∂x1
− γ = 0 and ∂L
∂x2
= λ
∂U2
∂x2
− γ = 0. (3.38)
For quasi-linear utility, the marginal utility for private good consumption ∂Ui∂xi is simply
1, implying that both Lagrange-multipliers in (3.38) take a value of 1. Consequently,
the maximand in (3.37) can be expressed as
β ln [g1 + φg2] + β ln [g2 + φg1]− p (g1 + g2)− U¯2 + ω1 + ω2 (3.39)
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Dropping the constant income and reservation utility terms, this expression represents
the aggregate public good surplus. For quasi-linear utility, Paretian analysis and max-
imization of aggregate public good surplus, therefore, both yield the eﬃcient level of
public good supply.
3.A.2 Derivation of Conditions (3.20) and (3.29)
Derivation of condition (3.20): Cooperation entails discounted payoﬀs
Π∗ =
∞X
t=0
δtπ∗ =
1
1− δπ
∗. (3.40)
A defecting agenda setter receives discounted payoﬀs
Πd = πa + δπ¬a + δ2πa + δ3π¬a + . . . = πa
∞X
t=0
δ2t + δπ¬a
∞X
t=0
δ2t (3.41)
=
1
1− δ2
πa +
δ
1− δ2
π¬a.
Cooperation can then be sustained if
Π∗ ≥ Πd ⇔ 1
1− δπ
∗ ≥ 1
1− δ2
πa +
δ
1− δ2
π¬a ⇔ (1 + δ)π∗ ≥ πa + δπ¬a (3.42)
⇔ δ [π∗ − π¬a] ≥ πa − π∗
holds.
Derivation of condition (3.29): According to (3.40), cooperation entails discounted
payoﬀs Π∗ = 1
1−δπ
∗. A defecting representative rather receives discounted payoﬀs
Πd = πd +
∞X
t=1
δtπe = πd +
δ
1 + δ
πe. (3.43)
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Cooperation can then be sustained if
Π∗ ≥ Πd ⇔ 1
1− δπ
∗ ≥ πd + δ
1− δπ
e ⇔ δ
1− δ [π
∗ − πe] ≥ πd − π∗.
3.A.3 Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. Let us first consider part (i). It is readily established that limφ→0 δC = 0 (the
numerator of δC converges to ln 2, and the denominator converges to infinity), where
δ > 0 holds by assumption. Turning to part (ii), observe that
∂δC
∂φ
=
1+φ
2
−2
(1+φ)2
ln 1+φ
2φ −
2φ
1+φ
2φ−2(1+φ)
(2φ)2
ln 2
1+φ³
ln 1+φ
2φ
´2 = ln 21+φ − φ ln 1+φ2φ
φ (1 + φ)
³
ln 1+φ
2φ
´2 (3.44)
which is positive if A˜ := ln 2
1+φ − φ ln
1+φ
2φ > 0. We now establish that A˜ is positive for
all values of φ. Observe that limφ→0 A˜ = ln 2 > 0 and limφ→1 A˜ = 0. Finally,
A˜φ =
1 + φ
2
−2
(1 + φ)2
−
µ
ln
1 + φ
2φ
+ φ
2φ
1 + φ
2φ− 2 (1 + φ)
(2φ)2
¶
= ln
2φ
1 + φ
< 0. (3.45)
For part (iii), consider limφ→1 δC. In this case, both the numerator and the denominator
converge to 0. Yet, applying de L’Hôpital’s rule56, the limit can be calculated by
lim
φ→1
[NUM
¡
δC
¢
]0
[DEN
¡
δC
¢
]0
= lim
φ→1
− 1
1+φ
− 1φ(1+φ)
= lim
φ→1
φ = 1, (3.46)
where δ < 1 holds by assumption.
56See, e.g. Chiang (1984), pp. 429, for an introduction to de L’Hôpital’s rule.
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3.A.4 Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. Note that
∂δD
∂φ
=
³
1− 1
1+φ
´
φ2
1+φ − [φ− ln (1 + φ)]
2φ(1+φ)−φ2
(1+φ)2³
φ2
1+φ
´2 = ln (1 + φ)− 2φ2+φφ3
2+φ
(3.47)
which is positive if B˜ := ln (1 + φ) − 2φ
2+φ > 0. We now establish that B˜ is positive
for all values of φ. To this end, note that limφ→0 B˜ = 0 and limφ→1 B˜ = ln 2− 23 > 0.
Finally,
B˜φ =
1
1 + φ
− 2 (2 + φ)− 2φ
(2 + φ)2
=
φ2
(1 + φ) (2 + φ)2
> 0. (3.48)
Turning to the limit values, consider limφ→0 δ
D. In this case, both the numerator and
the denominator of δD converge to 0. Yet, applying de L’Hôpital’s rule, the limit can
be calculated by
lim
φ→0
[NUM
¡
δD
¢
]0
[DEN
¡
δD
¢
]0
= lim
φ→0
φ
1+φ
φ(2+φ)
(1+φ)2
= lim
φ→0
1 + φ
2 + φ
=
1
2
. (3.49)
It is readily established that limφ→1 δ
D = 2 (1− ln 2) as the numerator converges to
1− ln 2 whereas the denominator converges to 1
2
.
4. Interregional Heterogeneity
4.1 Introduction Chapter 4
The Oates approach is, certainly, most famous for its decentralization theorem. Yet,
Oates’ results, as laid out in proposition 1, furthermore assign public good policies
contingent on interregional heterogeneity. Recall that the central (decentral) layer
fails to account for interregional preference heterogeneity (spillovers). In the polar
case of pure local public goods, there are no externalities and thus no drawback from
decentralization. Hence, no-spillover policies should be assigned to a decentralized
regime. Yet, Oates’ results establish a positive correlation between heterogeneity and
the optimal degree of decentralization.57
Whereas the decentralization theorem is widely accepted as a thorough argument
against centralizing public services, the Oates model yields a less noted — and pos-
sibly less intended — vice versa result when it comes to assigning pure public good
policies. The respective guideline might be dubbed ‘centralization theorem’ as, follow-
ing the Oates logic, “the administration of nonexcludable goods should be centralized”.58
The intuitive reason behind this result is that whenever there is inherent uniformity
of consumption, accounting for regional tastes on the basis of average regional pref-
erences is first best (see e.g. Samuelson (1954)). Hence, restricting the benevolent
central decision maker to uniform policies does not lead to any ineﬃciencies whereas
decentralization’s free-riding externality still emerges.
57Panizza (1999) measures heterogeneity by the degree of ethnic fractionalization. In his empirical
analysis, he finds a negative correlation between heterogeneity and the degree of fiscal centralization.
58Casella and Frey (1992), p. 643.
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Yet, the Oates approach has been criticized for neglecting political economy consid-
erations. On behalf of the respective literature, Inman and Rubinfeld (1997) argue
that a specific shortcoming of the Oates approach “has been to advocate the central
government as the only institution best able to provide pure public goods” (pp. 47-48)
whereas one should rather “explicitly recognize the potential failings of central govern-
ment policy-making” (p. 48). In this line of critique, Ellingsen (1998) builds on a
political economy based pure public goods model and refutes the above Oates result.
He rather shows that decentralization has its normative virtues for large interregional
heterogeneity.
The purpose for the present chapter is to scrutinize the ‘centralization theorem’ in
a repeated game setting. Following the static/repeated game structure presented in
chapter 3, centralized (decentralized) public good provision results from an agenda (a
voluntary provision) game played among regional representatives. We introduce in-
terregional preference heterogeneity in a pure public goods framework and find that
eﬃcient public good policies can neither be sustained under a centralized nor decentral-
ized regime in case of substantial heterogeneity. Whereas the high-preference region
can credibly commit to cooperation under both regimes, the low-preference region can
neither resist the temptation to abuse agenda power in a federal legislature nor oppose
the temptation to free-ride in the decentralized setting. Hence, cooperation necessarily
breaks down for substantial heterogeneity. In other words, substantial preference het-
erogeneity renders the stage game perspective relevant. As our stage game perspective
basically entails the same implications as Ellingsen (1998), we support his rejection of
the ‘centralization theorem’ from a repeated game perspective.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 presents the basic
heterogeneity framework and derives the benchmark of eﬃcient public good provision.
Section 4.3 introduces the centralized and decentralized setting and analyzes the rela-
tive merits with respect to heterogeneity in a static setting. Like in chapter 3, regional
representatives play an agenda game and a voluntary provision game under the central-
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ized and decentralized regime, respectively. Section 4.4 extends both one-shot games to
an infinite horizon and analyzes the respective conditions for maintaining cooperation.
Section 4.5 concludes.
4.2 Economic Environment
Throughout this chapter, the economy is divided into two distinct regions indexed
by i ∈ {1, 2}. Immobile regional populations are normalized to 1, respectively. The
preferences for an individual in region i are represented by utility
Ui (G, xi) =
(
β lnG+ xi i = 1
(1− σ)β lnG+ xi i = 2
. (4.1)
We assume 0 < β and 0 < σ < 1, i.e. public good demand is always positive and
higher in region 1. We shall, therefore, label region 1 (2) the high- (low-) preference
region. The parameter σ measures the degree of heterogeneity among regional public
good preferences. For values of σ close to 1 (0), there is large preference disparity
(similarity). Prices for the pure public good G and the private good x are set to p
and 1, respectively. Again, residents are endowed with suﬃcient income ω to allow for
positive private good consumption.
4.2.1 Eﬃciency Benchmark
As the utility in (4.1) represents quasi-linear preferences, the maximization of aggregate
public good surplus is, once more, equivalent to a Paretian analysis. Hence, the eﬃcient
allocation calls to choose the level of G in a way to maximize the overall public good
surplus
S+ = (2− σ)β lnG− pG. (4.2)
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Diﬀerentiate (4.2) with respect to G to obtain a standard Samuelson-condition
(2− σ)β
G∗
= p. (4.3)
Condition (4.3) implies to choose the level of public goods that equates the aggregate
marginal willingness to pay for the public good and the marginal costs of public good
provision. This Samuelson-condition entails the eﬃcient quantity
G∗ =
(2− σ)β
p
. (4.4)
Note that the aggregate marginal willingness to pay for the public good is essentially
measured by the average regional public good preference. Whereas providing uniform
public good provision according to the average regional preference turns out to harm
eﬃciency in a setting with local public goods (see chapter 2), there are no such eﬃciency
losses in a pure public goods setting. As was argued before, the intuitive reason is that
whenever there is inherent uniformity of consumption, as is the case for pure public
goods, there is no need for the optimal allocation to diﬀerentiate regional quantities.
As regional preferences merely pertain to the overall provision level, an allocation
according to the overall average of preferences is eﬃcient.59
Having derived the benchmark solution, the next section analyzes the static perspective
of policy-making. We shall start with the decentralized regime of public good provision.
59Decomposing the aggregate marginal willingness to pay for the public good, condition (4.3) can be
expressed as 2
1
2 (1+1−σ)
G∗ β = p. The latter representation stresses the fact that the optimal allocation
of pure public goods accounts for the average regional public good preference (see the discussion of
Oates’ results for pure public goods in section 4.1).
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4.3 Static Heterogeneity Setting
4.3.1 Decentralized Regime
In the decentralized setting, regional representatives play a non-cooperative voluntary
contribution game, i.e. a representative divides the endowment ω between private
consumption and the regional contribution gi to the pure public good. The total
amount of the public good then reads as G = g1+ g2. Accordingly, the regional public
good surplus under the decentralized regime is represented by
SiD =
(
β lnG− pg1 i = 1
(1− σ)β lnG− pg2 i = 2 .
(4.5)
As both representatives are assumed to choose their contributions simultaneously, the
stage game Nash-equilibrium of the decentralized contribution game is characterized
by
gei = argmaxgi≥0
SiD
¡
gi, ge−i
¢
. (4.6)
If both regions were to make positive contributions, the corresponding quantities were
to satisfy the first-order conditions and reaction functions
β
g1 + g2
= p⇔ g1 =
β
p
− g2 (4.7)
(1− σ)β
g1 + g2
= p⇔ g2 =
(1− σ)β
p
− g1
for the high-preference and the low-preference region, respectively. In equilibrium,
though, only one of the conditions in (4.7) holds as a strict equality. As Varian (1994),
4.3 Static Heterogeneity Setting 73
pp. 167, shows for a two-agent simultaneous-move game with quasi-linear utility, only
the individual with the higher marginal willingness to pay will contribute whereas the
other individual free-rides completely.60 The intuition for this result is that, given
the stand-alone contribution by the individual with the higher preference, the other
individual’s marginal willingness to pay for an additional unit of the public good is
lower than its respective marginal costs.
We can immediately apply the above logic. In our setting, the stand-alone (zero)
contribution by the region with the higher (lower) aggregate preference are mutually
best responses.61
Figure 4.1 illustrates the reaction functions (4.7) for region 1 (solid line) and region 2
(dashed line), as well as the Nash-equilibrium.
g2
g1
Figure 4.1: Reaction curves and Nash-equilibrium for the voluntary contribution game
(adapted from Varian (1994), p. 167)
According to figure 4.1, region i responds to a one-unit increase of g−i by decreasing
60Bergstrom et al. (1986), pp. 32., provide the formal proof of uniqueness and existence of Nash-
equilibria in voluntary contribution games for a general class of utility.
61In our model, both regions contain an equal share of residents. Our result is, therefore, a special
case of the results derived in Ellingsen (1998), pp. 256-257. He extends the Varian (1994) result to
a setting with interregional preference and population disparity and shows that only the region with
the higher aggregate marginal willingness to pay for the public good will contribute at all.
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gi by the same amount (the reaction curves are sloped by −1 and thus run parallel
in R2+), i.e.regional contributions are strategic substitutes. The Nash-equilibrium is
characterized by the intersection of both reaction functions, as marked by the circle.
It is readily checked that the high-preference region 1 is the stand-alone contributor
whereas the low-preference region 2 contributes nothing. The reaction functions in
(4.7) imply that the equilibrium public good provision in the decentral stage game is
characterized by contributions
{ge1 = Ge, ge2} =
½
β
p
, 0
¾
, (4.8)
where Ge denotes the aggregate public good quantity in the stage game equilibrium. A
comparison of (4.8) and (4.4) reveals the well-known feature of underprovision in the
decentral stage game equilibrium. Furthermore, the degree of underprovision G∗ −Ge
decreases in σ. Intuitively, the free-riding problem in terms of lost public good surplus
is worst for similar preferences and least if the free-riding region has a low preference
relative to the contributing region.
For reference purposes in subsection 4.3.3, insert (4.8) into (4.2) to obtain the public
good surplus under a decentralized regime
S+D = S
+ (Ge) = (2− σ)β ln β
p
− β. (4.9)
Let us now turn to the centralized regime.
4.3.2 Centralized Regime
The centralized regime is basically adapted from the static agenda model, as intro-
duced in subsection 3.3.1. As there is preference asymmetry, representatives are likely
to induce asymmetric stage game equilibrium policies. This is due to the fact that the
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aggregate public good quantity and, therefore, the aggregate public good surplus de-
pend on who is actually assigned agenda power. At this point, the random assignment
of agenda power is helpful as it allows us to carry out the subsequent regime ranking
on a basis of average overall surplus.
Following the model in subsection 3.3.1, centralized public good provision is financed
via standard head taxes
τ iC =
p
2
G. (4.10)
Accordingly, the region-specific public good surplus under a centralized regime can be
expressed as
SiC =
(
β lnG− p
2
G i = 1
(1− σ)β lnG− p
2
G i = 2
. (4.11)
Again, the status quo policy entails no public good provision at all. Given the utility-
function in (4.1), this fact implies that, once agenda power has been assigned, an agenda
setter from region i can propose a level of G that maximizes her region’s surplus in
(4.11). Hence, the corresponding stage game equilibrium levels of G read as
{Ga1, Ga2} =
½
2β
p
,
2 (1− σ)β
p
¾
. (4.12)
Inserting these quantities into (4.2) and recalling the random allocation of agenda
power, the average surplus S+C under a regime of centralized public good provision can
be expressed as
S+C =
S+ (Ga1) + S
+ (Ga2)
2
= (2− σ)β
·
ln
2
√
1− σβ
p
− 1
¸
. (4.13)
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We shall now carry out the regime ranking for the static setting.
4.3.3 Regime Ranking in the Static Heterogeneity Setting
For the regime ranking, we shall compare the aggregate public good surplus under
a centralized regime S+C to the aggregate public good surplus under a decentralized
regime S+D. For which degrees of preference heterogeneity should a specific regime then
be assigned the right to exercise public goods policies?
Proposition 6 In the static setting, there exists a critical level of heterogeneity σˆ in a
way that a centralized (decentralized) regime is surplus-superior for heterogeneity levels
lesser (greater) than σˆ.
Proof. Subtracting (4.9) from (4.13), the surplus gap can be expressed as
S+C − S+D = β
·
2− σ
2
ln 4 (1− σ)− (1− σ)
¸
. (4.14)
Observe that (4.14) converges to β (ln 4− 1) for σ → 0 and to −∞ for σ → 1. Hence,
the surplus gap is positive for low heterogeneity and negative for high heterogeneity.
Next, define σˆ so that S+C (σˆ) = S
+
D (σˆ). Finally, diﬀerentiate (4.14) with respect to
σ to obtain
∂(S+C−S
+
D)
∂σ = −
β
2
£
ln 4 (1− σ) + σ
1−σ
¤
which is strictly negative because of
lim
σ→0
∂(S+C−S
+
D)
∂σ = −β ln 2 < 0 and
∂2(S+C−S
+
D)
∂σ2 = −
βσ
2(1−σ)2 < 0.
Similar to section 3.3, there are fundamental and regime-specific ineﬃciencies driving
the results in proposition 6. Centralization induces a distortion because the agenda
equilibrium merely reflects the agenda setter’s preference for the public good. The
respective distortion in terms of deviation from the eﬃcient allocation is obviously
zero for identical regional tastes. Vice versa, the eﬃciency loss turns out increasingly
severe as heterogeneity increases.
On the other hand, the decentralized regime suﬀers from free-riding by the low-preference
region. The eﬃciency losses associated with the respective underprovision are utmost
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severe for small heterogeneity. In this case, the decentral equilibrium does not account
for a relatively large additional preference for the public good. By an analogous ar-
gument, the externality decreases in heterogeneity and vanishes in the limiting case of
maximum heterogeneity.
Figure 4.2 illustrates the results in proposition 6 by depicting (4.14) for β = 1.
0
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
SC-SD
++
s
Figure 4.2: Surplus gap in the static heterogeneity setting
Bringing together the two types of ineﬃciencies, our static setting challenges the ‘cen-
tralization theorem’ à la Oates. In particular, the central layer should not be assigned
the right to execute pure public good policies if there is substantial interregional pref-
erence heterogeneity. Recall, though, that the results in the spillover setting of chapter
3 were reversed in the transition from the static to the dynamic perspective. The fol-
lowing section, therefore, scrutinizes the ‘centralization theorem’ in a repeated game
setting.
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4.4 The Repeated Heterogeneity Setting
In the repeated setting, representatives play the respective stage games, as described in
subsections 4.3.1 and 4.3.2, over an infinite horizon. As in section 3.4, representatives
have a common discount factor 0 < δ < 1, and there is perfect recall with regard to
the game’s history. Again, binding contracts are not possible.
4.4.1 The Dynamics of Decentralization
Due to the asymmetry of stage game payoﬀs, the eﬃcient contribution scheme for the
decentralized setting requires some elaboration. Let us first of all review the free-riding
problem that emerges in the static perspective. Figure 4.3 illustrates the marginal will-
ingness to pay for the public good in the low-preference region (lower solid line), the
high-preference region (upper solid line), the aggregate demand (dashed line), and the
marginal costs of public good provision (dotted line) for σ = 0.5 and β = p = 1.
0
1
2
1 2 G
D1
D2
D1+D2
Figure 4.3: Regional and aggregate demand for the public good
In the stage game equilibrium, the high-preference region provides Ge = 1 whereas the
surplus-maximizing provision amounts to G∗ = 1.5. Hence, there is some additional
aggregate surplus at stake that might be absorbed by the regions. In figure 4.3, this
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surplus amounts to the area that is bordered by the aggregate demand curve, the mar-
ginal cost curve, the equilibrium public good quantity, and the eﬃcient quantity. Yet,
given the stand-alone contribution by the high-preference region, the low-preference
region has no incentive to exercise any additional contributio as it faces additional
costs of 1 whereas its willingness to pay for an additional public good quantity merely
amounts to 0.5. On the other hand, the high-preference region is, obviously, not willing
to bear the complete costs for extending the provision.
Building on these considerations, the problem of sustaining eﬃcient policies in the
repeated decentralized game can be described as follows. Find a contribution scheme
{g∗1, g∗2} that (i) eliminates the underprovision G∗ −Ge, (ii) leaves both regions better
oﬀ compared to the stage game equilibrium, and (iii) is self-enforcing in a sense that all
parties adhere to cooperation on a voluntary basis. Obviously, there are many ways to
meet (i) and (ii) simultaneously. There may even be solutions that allocate the whole
additional surplus to just one region. Yet, such a polar split is likely to imply the
violation of (iii) for the region that is passed over as there is no gain from cooperation
for this region.62
An intuitive way to meet (i) and (ii) for both regions is to agree on providing G∗−Ge
according to a Lindahl-like scheme, i.e. a region contributes to the provision gap
according to its willingness to pay for the additional public good quantity.63 Accord-
ingly, region 1 provides Ge and, furthermore, incurs a fraction 1
2−σ of the provision
gap whereas region 2 bears a share 1−σ
2−σ of the additional quantity. Contrasting the
results in the symmetric setting of chapter 3, cooperation now necessarily entails dif-
ferent regional tax burdens as the region that free-rides in the stage game equilibrium
would never agree to an equal share of overall costs pG∗. The optimal Lindahl-like
62If binding contracts were possible, the regions were able to ignore the restriction in (iii) and
actually stipulate any split of the additional surplus. Yet, as we are interested in self-enforcing
solutions, we explicitly recognize (iii).
63Lindahl (1919) discussed the possibility of decentralizing an optimal provision of public goods.
His basic idea was to assign financing shares according to the willingness to pay for the public good.
Cullis and Jones (1998), pp. 55-57, present a comprehensive analysis of the genuine Lindahl solution.
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contribution scheme reads as
{g∗1, g∗2} =
½
Ge +
1
2− σ (G
∗ −Ge) , 1− σ
2− σ (G
∗ −Ge)
¾
(4.15)
=
(
3− 2σ
2− σ
β
p
,
(1− σ)2
2− σ
β
p
)
.
If both representatives adhere to the above contribution scheme, the respective peri-
odical payoﬀs can be expressed as
{π∗1, π∗2} = {S1D (g∗1, g∗2) , S2D (g∗1, g∗2)} (4.16)
=
(
β ln
(2− σ) β
p
− (3− 2σ)β
2− σ , (1− σ)β ln
(2− σ) β
p
− (1− σ)
2 β
2− σ
)
.
Turning to requirement (iii), suppose that both representatives employ trigger-strategies
gi =



g∗i if t = 1
g∗i if t > 1 ∧ ht =
©
(g∗1, g
∗
2)1 , . . . , (g
∗
1, g
∗
2)t−1
ª
gei else
(4.17)
in order to overcome the mutual short-run incentives to deviate from the cooperative
contribution scheme in (4.15). When do the strategies in (4.17) yield self-enforcing
cooperation? Consider a representative that chooses to defect from (4.15). Her optimal
contribution gdi is characterized by
gdi = argmaxgi≥0
SiD
¡
gi, g∗−i
¢
. (4.18)
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Due to the interregional preference heterogeneity, these quantities are certainly not
symmetric. A representative from region 2 anticipates g∗1, and chooses to fully withdraw
her contribution. As contributing nothing is already her best response to ge1, it is also
her best response to g∗1 > g
e
1. On the other hand, a defecting representative from region
1 anticipates g∗2 < g
e
1 but rather prefers a larger quantity of public goods. Recalling
figure 4.1, she chooses gd1 in a way to close the gap g
e
1− g∗2. Accordingly, the respective
quantities under unilateral defection read as
©
gd1 , g
d
2
ª
=
½
1 + σ − σ2
2− σ
β
p
, 0
¾
. (4.19)
Inserting (4.19) and (4.15) into (4.5), a representative reaps payoﬀs
©
πd1, π
d
2
ª
=
©
S1D
¡
gd1 , g
∗
2
¢
, S2D
¡
g∗1, g
d
2
¢ª
(4.20)
=
½
β ln
β
p
− 1 + σ − σ
2
2− σ β, (1− σ) β ln
3− 2σ
2− σ
β
p
¾
in the period of defection. Yet, she induces infinite Nash-reversion, and representatives
earn stage game equilibrium payoﬀs
{πe1, πe2} = {S1D (ge1, ge2) , S2D (ge1, ge2)} (4.21)
=
½
β ln
β
p
− β, (1− σ)β ln β
p
¾
in all subsequent periods.
How can cooperation be sustained under the decentralized regime? Building on the
analysis of the voluntary provision game in subsection (3.4.2), we now obtain region-
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specific critical discounting parameters. Insert (4.16), (4.20), and (4.21) into (3.30),
and simplify the resulting expression to obtain
©
δD1 , δ
D
2
ª
=
(
ln 1
2−σ + 1− σ
(1−σ)2
2−σ
,
ln 3−2σ
(2−σ)2 +
1−σ
2−σ
ln 3−2σ
2−σ
)
. (4.22)
Again, cooperation can be maintained if the necessary condition for maintaining coop-
eration is satisfied for both representatives. As the critical discounting parameters are
now region-specific, cooperation can be maintained if δ ≥ max
©
δD1 , δ
D
2
ª
holds.
What does (4.22) say about cooperation in the decentralized setting?
Proposition 7 In the decentralized setting, cooperation cannot be sustained for suﬃ-
cient preference heterogeneity.
Proof. Proposition 7 requires that, for suﬃcient preference heterogeneity, at least one
representative will defect from cooperation. Considering limσ→1 δD2 , both the numerator
and the denominator converge to 0. Yet, applying de L’Hôpital’s rule, the limit can be
calculated by limσ→1
[NUM (δD2 )]0
[DEN (δD2 )]0
= limσ→1
2(1−σ)
(3−2σ)(2−σ)−
1
(2−σ)2
− 1
2−σ
= 1, where δ < 1 holds by
assumption.
Accordingly, the representative from the low-preference region cannot commit to co-
operation. Interestingly, the representative from the high-preference region can always
commit to cooperation (observe that limσ→1 δD1 = 0).
What leads to this result? For the representative from the low-preference region, the
gain from defection, as measured by πd2 − π∗2, decreases in heterogeneity. This is due
to the fact that the cooperative contribution scheme accounts for an increased degree
of heterogeneity by decreasing the tax burden for the low-preference region. In the
limiting case, the cooperative contribution scheme demands no contribution at all
from the low-preference region. On the other hand, the costs of defection, π∗2 − πe2,
likewise decrease for the low-preference region. This is due to the fact that the degree
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of underprovision decreases in heterogeneity and disappears in the limiting case of
maximum heterogeneity. This latter eﬀect mitigates the consequences of free-riding,
and thus proves welfare-enhancing in the static setting (see proposition 6). In the
repeated setting it rather hampers eﬃciency. In the limit, there are virtually no costs
from defection for the low-preference region, and cooperation cannot be sustained.
Let us now analyze whether there are admissible values of the discount parameter
in a way that cooperation among heterogeneous regions can be sustained under the
centralized regime.
4.4.2 The Dynamics of Centralization
For the repeated game of centralized decision-making, we build on the model intro-
duced in subsection (3.4.1), i.e. agenda power rotates among representatives, and
the latter employ trigger-strategies in order to maintain cooperative outcomes. For a
representative from region i, these trigger-strategies now read as
propose G∗ if i = a ∧ t = 1
propose G∗ if i = a ∧ t > 1 ∧ ht =
¡{G∗}1 , . . . , {G∗}t−1¢
propose Gai if i = a ∧ t > 1 ∧ ht 6=
¡{G∗}1 , . . . , {G∗}t−1¢
accept proposal if SPRiC ≥ S
SQ
iC .
(4.23)
Again, the superscripts PR and SQ represent the proposal and the status quo, respec-
tively. Under a cooperative legislature, agenda setters perpetually propose the eﬃcient
public good quantity G∗. As, contrasting the setting in chapter 3, both representatives
now value public goods diﬀerently, the corresponding cooperative payoﬀs are no longer
symmetric but rather read as
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{π∗1, π∗2} = {S1C (G∗) , S2C (G∗)} (4.24)
=
½
β ln
(2− σ)β
p
− (2− σ)β
2
, (1− σ)β ln (2− σ)β
p
− (2− σ)β
2
¾
.
In case of a defection, there is infinite Nash-reversion, and agenda setters propose the
respective stage equilibrium quantities (4.12) in all subsequent periods. Inserting (4.12)
into (4.11), the payoﬀs for the representative from region i read as
{πa1, πa2} = {S1C (Ga1) , S2C (Ga2)} (4.25)
=
½
β ln
2β
p
− β, (1− σ)β ln 2 (1− σ)β
p
− (1− σ)β
¾
in periods she holds and abuses agenda power. On the other hand, she receives
{π¬a1 , π¬a2 } = {S1C (Ga2) , S2C (Ga1)} (4.26)
=
½
β ln
2 (1− σ)β
p
− (1− σ)β, (1− σ)β ln 2β
p
− β
¾
in case she is exposed to agenda power. When can cooperation be maintained in the
centralized setting?
Just like in subsection 3.4.1, the individual payoﬀs are ranked by πai > π
∗
i > π
¬a
i . As
both repeated agenda games, furthermore, exhibit the same general structure, we can
refer to the general necessary condition for maintaining cooperation under a central-
ized regime (3.20) and, in particular, to the general critical discounting parameter, as
presented in (3.21). Due to the fact that heterogeneity induces a payoﬀ asymmetry, we
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now obtain region-specific critical discounting parameters. Inserting (4.24), (4.25), and
(4.26) into (3.21) and simplifying the resulting expressions, the latter can be expressed
as
©
δC1 , δ
C
2
ª
=
(
ln 2
2−σ −
σ
2
ln 2−σ
2(1−σ) −
σ
2
,
(1− σ) ln 2−2σ
2−σ +
σ
2
(1− σ) ln 2−σ
2
+ σ
2
)
. (4.27)
Again, cooperation can be maintained if the necessary condition for maintaining coop-
eration is satisfied for both representatives. As the critical discounting parameters are
now region-specific, cooperation can be maintained if δ ≥ max
©
δC1 , δ
C
2
ª
holds.
What can we now say about eﬃciency-sustaining cooperation and heterogeneity? We
have the following proposition.64
Proposition 8 In the centralized setting, cooperation cannot be sustained for suﬃ-
ciently large heterogeneity.
Proof. Proposition 8 requires that, for suﬃcient preference heterogeneity, at least one
representative will choose to defect from cooperation. Observe that limσ→1 δ
C
2 = 1
(1− σ dominates the respective logarithmic terms in the limit), where δ < 1 holds by
assumption.
In other words, there are no admissible values of the discounting parameter so that co-
operation is self-enforcing for the representative from the low-preference region. Again,
the representative from the high-preference region can always commit to cooperation
(observe that limσ→1 δC1 = 0).
What drives the above results? Let us start with the high-preference representative.
Her favored agenda quantity does not depend on the degree of heterogeneity. At
the same time, even for utmost heterogenous preferences, the cooperative solution
64Proposition 8 likewise emerges, if agenda power is assigned randomly with equal probability at
the beginning of each stage game.
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still accounts for the positive preference of the high-preference region and, therefore,
induces a positive public good quantity. The high-preference representative, therefore,
obtains a finite gain from defection, πa1 − π∗1. On the other hand, she suﬀers duly from
the narrow agenda quantity implemented by the low-preference representative whereas
she merely perceives the cooperative quantity as ‘too low’. In the limit, she rather
faces infinite costs of defection, π∗1−π¬a1 , i.e. the high-preference representative is then
willing to succumb to cooperation.
This result can be attributed to the concept of consumption smoothing, as mentioned in
chapter 3. Under an uncooperative legislature, large preference heterogeneity induces
a large dispersion of public good quantities that is particularly unpleasant for the
high-preference representative. As the average level of public goods in the agenda
equilibrium equals the cooperative level of public goods, her preference for consumption
smoothing over time particularly fosters her adherence to cooperation in the case of
substantial heterogeneity.
Vice versa, the low-preference representative completely lacks any preference for the
public good in the limiting case of large preference heterogeneity.65 Disregarding the
fact that she actually does not receive any benefits from public good provision, she is
due to contribute means. As she prefers zero provision, she evaluates her strategies
according to the mere costs associated with public good provision.
Following this argument, recall that the average level of public goods in the agenda
equilibrium equals the cooperative level of public goods. Compared to cooperation,
the contribution she saves by using agenda power, therefore, exactly corresponds to
the additional means she is due to contribute in case she is exposed to agenda power.
Consequently, she prefers to put the gains from defection first, irrespective of her degree
of impatience.
Let us compare the results in propositions 7 and 8. Which regime should be assigned
65The same is true for her preference for consumption smoothing over time.
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the right to execute pure public good policies in the case of substantial interregional
preference heterogeneity? At first glance, there seems to be no clear-cut answer to this
question as both regimes fail to sustain the eﬃcient public good quantities. Yet, the
latter fact implies that the stage game policies are due to emerge for high preference
heterogeneity. Building on the results in proposition 6, we can, therefore, conclude
that pure public good provision should be assigned to the decentral layer in case of
substantial heterogeneity. Although both regimes fail to yield eﬃcient outcomes, the
consequences of falling back to the stage game equilibrium are much less severe under
the decentral regime.
4.5 Conclusion Chapter 4
This chapter has addressed the question whether a centralized or a decentralized regime
should be assigned the right to exercise pure public good policies if there is substantial
preference heterogeneity among regions. Recent contributions to the literature of fiscal
federalism (e.g. Inman and Rubinfeld (1997)) have criticized the Oates ‘centralization
theorem’, i.e. the call for general assignment of pure public good policies to the central
layer, for leaving out political economy considerations. We capture this critique by
extending the basic models of centralized and decentralized decision-making, as intro-
duced in chapter 3, to a framework with pure public goods and interregional preference
heterogeneity.
Our static results show that the decentralized regime has its virtues for large hetero-
geneity as the distortion from free-riding is then less severe than the distortion from
policy variance under the centralized regime. In the repeated game perspective, we an-
alyzed whether a centralized or a decentralized regime is more likely to yield eﬃcient
outcomes. Our results are driven by the eﬀect of heterogeneity on the payoﬀs πa, π¬a,
and π∗ in the centralized setting and on the payoﬀs π∗, πd, and πe in the decentralized
setting. We find that eﬃcient public good policies are neither sustainable under the
centralized nor under the decentralized regime. This result stems from the fact that
4.5 Conclusion Chapter 4 88
the low-preference region can neither resist the temptation to overemphasize its pref-
erence by exploiting political power in a federal legislature nor resist the temptation to
free-ride in the decentralized setting. Falling back to the stage game equilibria, the case
for decentralization, therefore, arises for substantial heterogeneity. Hence, we extend
the critique of the ‘centralization theorem’ to a repeated game setting.
Of course, we do not find general results as we restrict the analysis to specific tax-
ation schemes. In particular, the results for the decentralized setting are valid only
for the Lindahl-like taxation scheme. Whereas the resulting cooperative contribution
scheme is certainly cogent, proposition 7 does not imply that there exists no cost-
sharing arrangement that enables cooperation for large heterogeneity and suﬃciently
patient representatives. Yet, all we say is that the decentralized regime is preferred
for substantial heterogeneity. This claim is even more viable in case there exist cost
sharing arrangements in a way that cooperation can be sustained under the decentral
regime.
5. Enlargements
5.1 Introduction Chapter 5
The two previous chapters introduced a dynamic perspective of centralized and decen-
tralized public good provision. We have, hitherto, analyzed the impact of spillovers
and heterogeneity on the regime-specific ability to yield eﬃcient public good policies
in a setting with 2 regions. The purpose for this chapter is to extend such an analysis
to the case of multiple regions. In particular, we are interested in analyzing the eﬀect
enlargements induce on the ability to maintain cooperation.
Our analysis is in a way complimentary to a contribution by Pecorino (1999). He an-
alyzes the impact of group size on the ability to sustain eﬃciency in a decentralized
repeated game of voluntary contribution to a pure public good. Yet, we interpret his
model in a way that regional governments aim at overcoming the well-known underpro-
vision problem. Unfortunately, Pecorino (1999) does not find a clear-cut correlation
between the size of a group/federation and the ability to yield eﬃcient outcomes.
Specifically, his critical discounting parameters do not vary monotonically in the num-
ber of individuals/regions. Yet, his central results show that cooperation does not
necessarily break down in a ‘decentralized setting’ if the number of individuals/regions
increases. In particular, as the critical discounting parameter converges to some value
strictly smaller than unity, there are admissible values of δ in a way that cooperation
can be maintained in the limit. Complementary to Pecorino’s analysis, the basic puzzle
for this chapter is whether or not eﬃcient public good policies are harder to sustain in
federal legislatures if the number of federal member states increases.
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In the context of legislature enlargements, a large branch of the literature concludes that
large legislatures tend to lack mechanisms for eﬃcient decision-making. Heterogeneity
among representatives may induce substantial costs of policy implementation in large
legislatures, e.g. due to protracted negotiations.66 Yet, as ‘agreement costs’ are a well-
understood source for legislative ineﬃciencies, our framework for centralized policy-
making, as introduced in subsection 3.3.1, abstracts from the former by employing
closed-rule voting procedures.
As Weingast (1979) shows, the issue of legislative eﬃciency is closely related to cooper-
ation among members of the legislature. Yet, political power exerted by self-interested
minimum winning coalitions (e.g. Riker and Ordeshook (1973)) or agenda setters (e.g.
Baron and Ferejohn (1989)) usually prevents legislatures from achieving an eﬃcient
allocation of public goods in static settings, even if there are no costs of employing a
decision-making apparatus. As there is generally no eﬃciency-sustaining cooperative
behavior in non-cooperative one-shot models with rational representatives, the prob-
lem of sustaining eﬃciency can only be addressed in a repeated game. Following the
logic applied in previous chapters, we shall analyze the correlation between the size
of a legislature and legislative eﬃciency with respect to public good provision. Fur-
thermore, we shall compare the respective findings to results of repeated decentralized
public good provision, as analyzed in Pecorino (1999).
The remainder of this chapter67 is organized as follows. Section 5.2 presents a gener-
alized version of the repeated agenda model employed in chapters 3 and 4 and derives
a general necessary condition for sustaining cooperative outcomes in an economy with
n regions. Section 5.3 applies the basic n-region agenda model to the problem of cen-
tralized administration of spillover policies, as introduced in subsection 3.3.1. As a
central result, cooperation necessarily breaks down in large legislatures. The latter
66The formalized literature traces back to Buchanan and Tullock (1962), cha. 8. In this line,
Baldwin et al. (2001) analyze obstacles for eﬃcient decision-making in an enlarged European Union.
67Parts of this chapter are based on Koppel (2004a).
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result carries over to section 5.4 and the local public goods setting analyzed there. In
this section, public goods are provided subject to a fixed aggregate budget. Although
individual risk-aversion and patience can be shown to facilitate cooperation among
representatives, cooperation, once more, breaks down in large legislatures. Section 5.5
extends the local public goods analysis to endogenous tax revenues. Just like in the
two previous sections, there exists a critical upper threshold of legislature size. Section
5.6 concludes.
5.2 Basic Model
Throughout this chapter, the economy consists of i = 1, . . . , n geographically distinct
regions with n ≥ 2. Immobile regional populations are normalized to 1. Public good
policies are decided in a federal legislature with each region being represented by an
outcome-motivated delegate. The legislature is presided over for one period by each
region in turn.
The presidency is assigned the right to confront the legislature with a take-it-or-leave-
it vote over any vector (g1, . . . , gn) of non-negative public good policies satisfying the
section-specific budget restrictions. Furthermore, a proposal requires unanimous ap-
proval in order to be adopted. The status quo policies imply no public good provision
at all. Like in the previous chapters, we assume that indiﬀerent representatives approve
the proposal.
Representatives interact over an infinite horizon, share perfect recall, and have a com-
mon discount factor 0 < δ < 1. Again, we abstract from polar (im)patience and
the possibility of binding contracts and assume that representatives employ trigger-
strategies in order to maintain the cooperative outcomes. In line with previous chap-
ters, we shall explore the allocation of public goods. As our analysis is restricted to
symmetric regions, the general trigger-strategy for a representative from region i reads
as
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propose g∗ for all regions if i = a ∧ t = 1
propose g∗ for all regions if i = a ∧ t > 1 ∧ ht =
µn−→
g∗
o
1
, . . . ,
n−→
g∗
o
t−1
¶
propose ga, g¬a if i = a ∧ t > 1 ∧ ht 6=
µn−→
g∗
o
1
, . . . ,
n−→
g∗
o
t−1
¶
accept proposal if UPRi ≥ U
SQ
i .
(5.1)
Once more, the superscripts PR and SQ denote proposal and status quo policies,
respectively. Furthermore, g∗, ga, and g¬a represent the eﬃcient public good quanti-
ties as well as quantities agenda setters propose for their own and remaining regions,
respectively.
Turning to the general distribution of legislative benefits, let a denote the presidency’s
region, and consider the case of cooperative legislative behavior. Representatives then
earn cooperative periodical payoﬀs π∗ that amount to the familiar discounted payoﬀs
Π∗ =
1
1− δπ
∗. (5.2)
Under an uncooperative legislature, presidencies rather use agenda power in a way to
favour their own regions. Hence, a representative earns payoﬀs πa every nth period
that she is assigned agenda power and payoﬀs π¬a in periods she is exposed to agenda
power exerted by other regions’ presidencies. Her discounted payoﬀs, therefore, read
as68
Πd =
1
1− δnπ
a +
1
1− δ
δ − δn
1− δnπ
¬a. (5.3)
Again, cooperation can be sustained if the discounted cooperative payoﬀs Π∗ outweigh
68The relevant algebra for this section is relegated to appendix 5.A.1.
5.3 Spillovers 93
the discounted payoﬀs Πd from an uncooperative legislature. After some straightfor-
ward computations, the general necessary condition for maintaining cooperation in the
repeated game can be expressed as
δ − δn
1− δn ≥
πa − π∗
πa − π¬a . (5.4)
Note that, for n = 2, this condition corresponds to condition (3.20). To meet condition
(5.4), the payoﬀ ranking must, once more, satisfy πa > π∗ > π¬a.69
Let us apply the basic model to a specific problem of public good provision.
5.3 Spillovers
This section represents a synthesis of the frameworks in chapters 3 and 5 as it analyzes
the impact of federal enlargements and spillovers on the ability to maintain cooperation
in a unified framework. Let N represent the set of regions 1, . . . , n. In this section, an
individual in region i is assumed to be represented by utility
Ui = β ln

gi + φ
X
j∈N\{i}
gj

+ xi i = 1, . . . , n. (5.5)
Like in chapter 3, higher values of φ indicate that an individual in region i can enjoy
public good provision in regions j 6= i to a higher degree. Again, we assume 0 < β and
0 < φ < 1, i.e. demand for regional public goods is positive and includes a home bias.
Furthermore, individuals are endowed with suﬃcient income ω to allow for positive
private goods consumption, and prices for public (private) goods are set to p(1).
69Indeed, this ranking is satisfied for the upcoming applications in sections 5.3 - 5.5, respectively.
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5.3.1 Eﬃciency Benchmark
The eﬃcient public good quantities maximize the aggregate public good surplus
S+ = β
nX
i=1
ln

gi + φ
X
j∈N\{i}
gj

− p
X
j∈N
gj. (5.6)
Diﬀerentiate (5.6) with respect to regional public good quantities, and rearrange the
resulting first-order conditions to obtain the eﬃcient quantities70
g∗ =
β
p
. (5.7)
The next two subsections follow the logic presented in subsections 3.3.1 and 3.3.2.
5.3.2 Centralized Regime
Under the centralized regime, public good provision is financed via identical head taxes
τ i =
p
n
X
j∈N
gj. (5.8)
Given the taxation scheme (5.8), the public good surplus in region i read as
SiC = β ln

gi + φ
X
j∈N\{i}
gj

− p
n
X
j∈N
gj. (5.9)
Inserting the eﬃcient quantities (5.7) into (5.9), the cooperative periodical payoﬀs read
as
70See appendix 5.A.2 for the explicit derivation.
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π∗ = β ln
[1 + (n− 1)φ]β
p
− β. (5.10)
An uncooperative presidency rather proposes public goods quantities
{ga, g¬a} =
½
nβ
p
, 0
¾
(5.11)
for her region and remaining regions, respectively. Remaining regions accept this pro-
posal as it leaves them better oﬀ then the status quo. Hence, the stage game payoﬀs
for a regional representative read as
πa = β ln
nβ
p
− β (5.12)
in case she is the agenda setter whereas she earns
π¬a = β ln
φnβ
p
− β (5.13)
in case she is exposed to agenda power. What kind of eﬀects do enlargements and
spillovers now have on cooperation in the centralized setting?
Substituting (5.10), (5.12), and (5.13) into condition (5.4), the latter can be expressed
as
δ − δn
1− δn ≥
ln n
1+(n−1)φ
ln 1φ
(5.14)
for the spillover setting. Starting with the enlargement eﬀect, we have the following
proposition.
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Proposition 9 In the centralized spillover setting, cooperation cannot be sustained in
large federations.
Proof. Observe that ∂LHS (5.14)∂n =
−(1−δn)δn ln δ−(δ−δn)δn ln δ
(1−δn)2 =
− ln δ(1−δ)δn
(1−δn)2 > 0. Fur-
thermore, ∂RHS (5.14)∂n = −
1−φ
n[1+(n−1)φ]
1
lnφ > 0, i.e. both the LHS and the RHS of
(5.14) increase monotonically in n. Finally, observe that limn→∞RHS (5.14) = 1 and
limn→∞LHS (5.14) = δ, where δ < 1 holds by assumption.
There are two interesting eﬀects regarding the correlation between the size of the leg-
islature and the possibility of cooperation. For a representative, enlargements increase
the time gap between her own presidencies, thus reducing the opportunities to harvest
agenda gains. This frequency eﬀect induces a positive impact by fostering the legisla-
ture’s ability to maintain cooperation. The positive frequency eﬀect can be depicted
by the fact that ∂LHS (5.14)∂n > 0. On the other hand, enlargements alter the gain and
costs of defection. Referring to its impact on cooperation in the present setting, we
shall call this payoﬀ eﬀect negative. The negative payoﬀ eﬀect can be depicted by the
fact that ∂RHS (5.14)∂n > 0.
Although (5.10), (5.12), and (5.13) increase in legislature size, respectively, there are
clear-cut eﬀects that explain why the payoﬀ eﬀect is negative. For a representative,
the payoﬀ diﬀerence between the two states of agenda power does not depend on the
number of regions. If she is (not) assigned agenda power, there is (no) public good
provision in her region. As the aggregate level of provision is the same in both states,
the diﬀerence πa − π¬a is merely due to the degree of spillovers, i.e. to the extent to
which a region may enjoy public goods that are provided in other regions.
On the other hand, πa − π∗ increases in n because benefits from additional regions
entering the federation are higher for an uncooperative representative using agenda
power than for a representative under cooperation. The basic reason for this result
is that a presidency is always better oﬀ channeling the lion’s share of additional tax
revenues to her own region than sharing additional tax revenues with other regions.
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Accordingly, enlargements induce opposing eﬀects on the ability to maintain coopera-
tion in the spillover setting. Yet, the cooperation-deteriorating payoﬀ eﬀect outweighs
the cooperation-enhancing frequency eﬀect for suﬃciently large n.
Before we discuss the implications of proposition 9, let us consider the correlation
between spillovers and cooperation. The below lemma is needed for the proofs of
propositions 11 and 13. Yet, as it is likewise helpful for understanding some of the
below results, we state it in the main part of this chapter.
Lemma 10 The ability to sustain cooperation increases in δ.
Proof. We show that the LHS of (5.4) increases in δ for all values of n. Note that
∂LHS (5.14)
∂δ =
(1−nδn−1)(1−δn)+nδn−1(δ−δn)
(1−δn)2 =
1+δn−1[δ(n−1)−n]
(1−δn)2 which is positive if C˜ := 1 +
δn−1 [δ (n− 1)− n] > 0. We now establish that C˜ is positive for all values of n and δ. To
this end, note that limδ→1 C˜ = 0 and C˜δ = δn−1 (n− 1)+ [δ (n− 1)− n] (n− 1) δn−2 =
− (n− 1) δn−2n [1− δ] < 0.
In essence, this lemma implies that cooperation is most (least) likely sustainable with
(im)patient representatives. Indeed, the lemma comes to no surprise as patience is
well-understood to foster cooperation in repeated games.71
Turning to the spillover eﬀect, the following proposition emerges.
Proposition 11 For any δ and n, (i) cooperation can be sustained for suﬃciently
small spillovers, (ii) the ability to sustain cooperation decreases in spillovers, and (iii)
cooperation cannot be sustained for suﬃciently large spillovers.
Proof. (i): Observe that limφ→0RHS (5.14) = 0, where LHS (5.14) > 0 holds for the
restrictions imposed on δ and n. (ii): Note that ∂RHS (5.14)∂φ =
1
φ ln
n
1+(n−1)φ−
n−1
1+(n−1)φ ln
1
φ
(ln 1φ)
2 =
1+(n−1)φ
φ ln
n
1+(n−1)φ−(n−1) ln
1
φ
[1+(n−1)φ](ln 1φ)
2 which is positive if D˜ :=
1+(n−1)φ
φ ln
n
1+(n−1)φ − (n− 1) ln
1
φ >
0. We now establish that D˜ is positive for all values of φ. To this end, observe
71A reexamination of this point is relegated to chapter 6.
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that limφ→1 D˜ = 0 and ∂D˜∂φ =
(n−1)φ−[1+(n−1)φ]
φ2
ln n
1+(n−1)φ −
1+(n−1)φ
φ
1+(n−1)φ
n
(n−1)n
[1+(n−1)φ]2 +
(n− 1)φ 1
φ2
= − 1
φ2
ln n
1+(n−1)φ < 0. Part (iii) requires that, for large values of φ,
(5.14) is violated for all δ and n. According to lemma 10, condition (5.14) is most
likely satisfied for large values of δ. Finally, observe that (by de L’Hôpital’s rule)
limδ→1RHS (5.14) = limφ→1LHS (5.14) = n−1n , where δ < 1 holds by assumption.
In essence, this proposition extends the realm of proposition 3 to an economy with n
regions. As the underlying intuition is the same as in the 2-region economy, we refer
to chapter 3 and the interpretation developed there.
Let us now consider the implications of proposition 9 in more detail. This proposi-
tion implies that if cooperation can be maintained in small legislatures, then there
exists a critical level of legislature size in a way that cooperation breaks down in larger
legislatures. We shall identify this critical size for legislatures and analyze its charac-
teristics.72 Define nˆ in a way that condition (5.14) is satisfied as a strict equality. Due
to the complexity of (5.14), there is no closed form solution for nˆ. We, therefore, rely
on simulations and apply the Newton method in order to determine nˆ. The respective
procedures are relegated to appendix 5.A.3 and summarized in figure 5.1.
For selected values of the discount parameter δ, this figure depicts the critical legis-
lature size nˆ as a function of the spillover φ. In legislatures with less (more) than nˆ
representatives, cooperation is (not) sustainable. The following results can be depicted.
For high spillovers and/or impatient representatives, cooperation cannot be sustained
at all. Proposition 11 (iii) and lemma 10 already gave a hint at this result. Otherwise,
there exists an admissible nˆ ≥ 2. Observe that the critical legislature size decreases
monotonically in φ. Hence, there is a clear-cut trade-oﬀ between legislature size and
the normative aspects of centralized public good provision. Increasing a federation
implies that cooperation can never be preserved for a larger range of public good poli-
cies compared to the pre-enlargement status. In fact, on the verge of breaking down,
72Calculations furthermore show that if cooperation cannot be sustained in small legislatures, it
cannot be sustained in large legislatures, either. See appendix 5.A.4.
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Figure 5.1: Critical legislature sizes for the spillover setting
cooperation can only be maintained for a strictly smaller set of policies. Note that nˆ
furthermore increases in δ, i.e. maintaining cooperation in small legislatures requires
less patience from legislators. This is an interesting implication of the familiar result
we had in lemma 10.
Summarizing the results, eﬃcient centralized public good provision is more (less) likely
sustainable in small (large) legislatures, with (im-)patient representatives, and small
(large) interregional policy externalities. Let us now analyze the correlation between
federal enlargements and cooperation for a decentralized regime.
5.3.3 Decentralized Regime
The basic structure of the voluntary contribution game is the very same as in chapter
3. In particular, the critical discounting parameter for maintaining cooperation in the
repeated game exhibits the same structure like the one in condition (3.30). The mere
purpose for the first part of this subsection is to derive the various payoﬀ measures
for the n-region economy. We present the respective final results whereas the explicit
derivation is relegated to appendix 5.A.2.
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Under the decentralized regime, public goods are, once more, financed at the regional
layer. The public good surplus in region i, therefore, read as
SiD = β ln

gi + φ
X
j∈N\{i}
gj

− pgi. (5.15)
The cooperative quantities and payoﬀs can be depicted by (5.7) and (5.10), respectively.
In the stage game equilibrium, representatives contribute quantities
ge =
1
1 + (n− 1)φ
β
p
(5.16)
that amount to stage game equilibrium payoﬀs
πe = β ln
β
p
− β
1 + (n− 1)φ . (5.17)
Anticipating her counterparts’ cooperative contributions, a defecting representative
contributes
gd = max {1− (n− 1)φ, 0} β
p
(5.18)
and reaps payoﬀs
πd = β ln
µ
max {1, (n− 1)φ}β
p
¶
−max {1− (n− 1)φ, 0}β. (5.19)
Recall that a defecting representative still contributes a positive quantity in the 2-region
economy, as described in chapter 3, whereas she fully withdraws her contribution in
the n-region economy in case of a suﬃciently large number of regions.
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Inserting (5.10), (5.17), and (5.19) into (3.30), the critical discounting parameter under
the decentralized regime can be expressed as
δD =
lnmax
n
1
1+(n−1)φ ,
(n−1)φ
1+(n−1)φ
o
−max {1− (n− 1)φ, 0}+ 1
lnmax {1, (n− 1)φ}−max {1− (n− 1)φ, 0}+ 1
1+(n−1)φ
. (5.20)
What can we say about the enlargement eﬀect in the decentralized setting?
Proposition 12 In the decentralized spillover setting, cooperation can be sustained in
large federations.
Proof. It is readily checked that limn→∞ δD = 0 as the numerator (denominator) of
(5.20) converges to 1 (∞) for n→∞.
Proposition 12 is similar to result 2 in Pecorino (1999). Yet, Pecorino applies a more
general type of quasi-linear utility but restricts his analysis to pure public goods. We
assume a more specific type of utility and allow for various degrees of interregional
spillovers.
The result in proposition 12 is due to the following logic. As the number of regions
(and thus the number of contributors) increases, a defecting representative more and
more retains her contribution whereas the individual cooperative contribution is fixed.
Eventually, a defecting representative fully withdraws her contribution. Hence, the gain
from defection, as measured by πd−π∗, increases only for small n but is bounded above
for large n. Oﬀsetting this eﬀect, the individual stage game equilibrium contribution
strictly decreases in n, implying a monotonically increasing gain from cooperation
π∗ − πe. In the limiting case of n → ∞, the gain from defection is, therefore, fixed
whereas the gain from cooperation converges to infinity. Hence, eﬃcient decentralized
public good provision is possible in suﬃciently large federations.
Unfortunately, this limit result is about all we can say about the correlation between
the number of regions and the ability to maintain cooperation in the decentralized
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setting. As Pecorino acknowledges for his specifications, “there are no monotonicity
results for the eﬀect of n on δ∗ (the derivative of δ∗ with respect to n is generally
indeterminate).”73 Suﬀering from the very same problem, we cannot derive a clear-cut
correlation in our decentralized setting. Compared to the centralized setting, spillovers
and the number federal member states now induce an ambiguous eﬀect on the ability to
sustain cooperation. Although our genuine results for the centralized setting show clear-
cut correlations, a comparison between both regimes can, therefore, yield only limited
results, and we abstract from a regime ranking subsection. Yet, some implications can
be derived.
It is obvious that the result in proposition 12 is at odds with the result in proposition
9. Comparing these results, public goods should be provided at the decentral layer
whenever the size of the federation is suﬃciently large. Furthermore, eﬃcient policies
are always easier to sustain under a decentralized (centralized) regime for goods entail-
ing significant (negligible) spillovers. Note that the latter results carry over from the
2-region economy of chapter 3.
Generally speaking, proposition 9 sends a discouraging signal concerning centralized
public good provision in large federations. We shall now scrutinize the robustness of
this result by allowing for diﬀerent public good settings.
5.4 Dividing-the-pie
Let us return to the basic n-region model of centralized public good provision, as
introduced in section 5.2. For the remainder of the present section, an individual in
region i is represented by utility
Ui = β
(gi)
1−α
1− α (5.21)
73Pecorino (1999), p. 129. In his paper, δ∗ is the analog to our δD. He finds that the lack of
monotonicity emerges for Cobb-Douglas utility, too.
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with 0 < α < 1 and 0 < β.74 Again, gi denotes a local public good provided in region
i. Furthermore, let T represent an exogenous budget to be spent on public goods at
costs of p per unit gi.75 The presidency may now propose any vector (g1, . . . , gn) of
non-negative regional public good quantities satisfying the budget constraint
p
nX
i=1
gi ≤ T . (5.22)
Employing the familiar closed-rule unanimity voting procedures, the proposal becomes
implemented if no representative vetoes its implementation.
Let us now turn to the distribution of legislative benefits under a cooperative legisla-
ture. Given the regional utility (5.21) and the budget constraint (5.22), cooperative
presidencies allocate the surplus-maximizing public good quantities
g∗ =
T
np
(5.23)
to each region, i.e. each region enjoys an equal share of the pie. Substituting (5.23)
into (5.21), representatives receive periodical payoﬀs
π∗ = β
³
T
np
´1−α
1− α , (5.24)
in case the legislature pursues cooperation. If, on the other hand, presidencies merely
benefit their own regions, the presidency’s proposal allocates public good quantities
74Specified as a Bernoulli function, this type of utility exhibits constant relative risk-aversion. It
is, therefore, known as CRRA-utility. The parameter α measures the degree of risk-aversion. See
Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green (1995), p. 194.
75The genuine notion dividing-the-pie refers to the problem of allocating a fixed amount of benefits
among a fixed number of recipients. See, e.g. Baron and Ferejohn (1989).
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{ga, g¬a} =
½
T
p
, 0
¾
. (5.25)
Remaining regions accept this proposal as it leaves them indiﬀerent to the status quo
of no public good provision. Substitute (5.25) into (5.21). Under an uncooperative
legislature, a representative then earns payoﬀs
πa = β
³
T
p
´1−α
1− α (5.26)
every nth period that she is assigned agenda power whereas she reaps payoﬀs
π¬a = 0 (5.27)
in case she is exposed to agenda power. Inserting the above expressions for π∗, πa,
and π¬a into (5.4), the condition for maintaining cooperation in the dividing-the-pie
setting can be expressed as
δ − δn
1− δn ≥ 1−
µ
1
n
¶1−α
. (5.28)
Before we get to the eﬀects of enlarging the federation, we shall state the correlation
between individual risk-aversion and cooperation in the following proposition.
Proposition 13 For any δ and n, (i) cooperation can be sustained for suﬃciently
high risk-aversion, (ii) the ability to sustain cooperation increases in the degree of risk-
aversion, and (iii) cooperation cannot be sustained for suﬃciently low risk-aversion.
Proof. (i): Lemma 10 implies that condition (5.28) is most likely violated for small
values of δ. Observe that limδ→0LHS (5.28) = limα→1RHS (5.28) = 0, where δ > 0
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holds by assumption. (ii): Note that ∂RHS (5.28)∂α =
¡
1
n
¢1−α
ln 1n < 0. (iii): Lemma 10
implies that condition (5.28) is most likely satisfied for large values of δ. Observe that
(by de L’Hôpital’s rule) limδ→1LHS (5.28) = limα→0RHS (5.28) = n−1n , where δ < 1
holds by assumption.
Why does risk-aversion induce a positive impact on the legislature’s ability to sustain
cooperative outcomes? This result is due to the fact that uncooperative legislative
behavior entails unpleasant benefit volatility. Whereas the parameter α is usually in-
terpreted as a measure for individual risk-aversion, we can interpret α as the individual
preference for consumption smoothing over time for the problem at hand. For αs close
to 1, representatives perceive an exclusion from legislative benefits utmost unpleasant.
As a consequence, any incentives to harvest agenda gains vanish. The vice versa result
is obtained for small αs. In this case, representatives do not care about the volatility of
legislative benefits, and any incentives to abstain from using agenda power disappear.
The findings in proposition 13, once more, bear an interesting analogy to results from
the universalism literature of distributive politics. Again, narrow pursuit of self-interest
is the only equilibrium prediction if we look at our model from a one-shot perspective.
Yet, we show that if there is suﬃcient fear concerning the consequences of being ex-
cluded from legislative benefits, the repetition inherent in legislative interaction may
yield ex-post-viable incentives for cooperative behavior, i.e. legislators may cooperate
even once political power has been assigned.
Let us now turn to the correlation between federal enlargements and cooperation. The
following proposition is readily established.
Proposition 14 In the dividing-the-pie setting, cooperation cannot be sustained in
large legislatures.
Proof. Recall that δ−δ
n
1−δn increases monotonically in n. Furthermore,
∂RHS (5.28)
∂n =
1−α
n2−α > 0, i.e. both the LHS and the RHS of (5.28) increase monotonically in n.
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Finally, observe that limn→∞RHS (5.28) = 1 and limn→∞LHS (5.28) = δ, where δ < 1
holds by assumption.
Note that this is the very same result as in proposition 9. Yet, the underlying intuition
is a diﬀerent one. Proposition 14 can be explained by the fact that an uncooperative
presidency always allocates the whole pie of benefits to her own region. Hence, the
payoﬀs πa and π¬a do not depend on the size of the federation. Maintaining cooperation
in an enlarged legislature implies, though, that a fixed pie is divided among a larger
number of beneficiaries. Payoﬀs π∗, therefore, decrease in n and converge towards π¬a
for large federations. Accordingly, the gain from cooperation, π∗ − π¬a, decreases in
the number of regions and even vanishes for suﬃciently large federations whereas the
gain from defection, πa−π∗, even increases in n. Hence, the payoﬀ eﬀect is, once more,
negative and eventually outweighs the positive frequency eﬀect for suﬃciently large n.
Proposition 14 furthermore implies that if cooperation can be maintained in small leg-
islatures, then there exists a critical level of legislature size nˆ in a way that cooperation
breaks down for n > nˆ. Like in the spillover setting, there is no closed form solution
for nˆ, and we rely on simulations, i.e. we determine nˆ via the Newton method. The
results are summarized in figure 5.2.76
For selected values of the discount parameter δ, this figure depicts the critical legis-
lature size nˆ as a function of individual risk-aversion α. Like in the previous section,
cooperation can be sustained for n ≤ nˆ. Note that nˆ again increases in δ. Due to the
logic underlying proposition 13, nˆ increases in α whereas an admissible nˆ ≥ 2 does
not exist for small αs. The prospects of eﬃcient centralized public good provision are,
therefore, rather limited. If at all, eﬃciency is sustainable in small legislatures and/or
with pretty risk-averse representatives, but provision necessarily entails ineﬃciencies
in large legislatures.
76The corresponding procedures can be found in appendix 5.A.3. Again, if cooperation cannot be
sustained in small legislatures, it cannot be sustained in large legislatures, either (see appendix 5.A.4).
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Figure 5.2: Critical legislature sizes for the dividing-the-pie setting
Let us confront these results with a decentralized regime. Recall that the problem at
hand is an allocation of pure local public goods, i.e. a decentralized regime already
yields first best results from a static perspective. From a static point of view, we already
know that centralizing low-spillover policies usually entails eﬃciency losses (see, e.g.
proposition 2). Yet, as propositions 3 (i) and 11 (i) show, the respective eﬃciency
losses may be avoided in a dynamic setting. Putting this optimistic evaluation of the
centralized regime into perspective, proposition 13 indicates that the results may be
supported by a sizable degree of risk-aversion.77 Anyway, the results in this section
question the case for centralizing pure local public good policies as the centralized
regime can never do better than the decentralized regime.
The ineﬃciencies associated with an enlargement are due to the dominant eﬀect leg-
islature enlargements induce on the cooperative payoﬀs π∗. As this eﬀect is related
to the fixed-budget structure of the allocation problem, the next section, furthermore,
allows for additional regions to contribute additional means to the aggregate public
77Recall that we employ logarithmic utility in the various spillover settings, and observe that
lim
α→1
(gi)1−α
1−α = ln gi. See Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green (1995), p. 211.
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good budget.
5.5 Endogenous Budget
Again, let us build on the basic n-region model of centralized public good provision,
as introduced in section 5.2. For the present section, let individual preferences be
represented by utility
Ui = βΨ (gi) + xi, (5.29)
and let individuals be endowed with suﬃcient income to allow for positive consumption
of the private good x. We impose the usual restrictions Ψ0 > 0,Ψ00 < 0, i.e. the mar-
ginal public good utility is positive and decreasing. Furthermore, we assume Ψ (0) = 0.
Again, let N represent the set of regions 1, . . . , n.
Public goods are financed via identical head taxes τ i =
p
n
P
j∈N gj. Given this taxation
scheme, the regional public good surplus reads as
Si = βΨ (gi)−
p
n
X
j∈N
gj. (5.30)
Once more, cooperative agenda setters propose eﬃcient policies. These eﬃcient policies
maximize the aggregate public good surplus, implying
g∗i = argmaxgi≥0
(
β
X
j∈N
Ψ (gj)− p
X
j∈N
gj
)
. (5.31)
as well as the resulting regional Samuelson-conditions
βΨ0 (g∗i ) = p. (5.32)
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According to (5.32), the eﬃcient public good quantity does not depend on n. Con-
trasting the results of the previous 2 sections, payoﬀs π∗ do not depend on the number
of regions anymore.
An uncooperative agenda setter maximizes (5.29) subject to both the taxation con-
straint and the constraint of unanimous approval for her policy proposal.78 The latter
constraint implies that
βΨ (gi)−
p
n
X
j∈N
gj ≥ 0 (5.33)
must be satisfied for all regions, i.e. the respective regional public good surplus must not
fall short of the (zero) surplus associated with status quo policies. Standard reasoning
implies that the presidency’s proposal satisfies (5.33) with equality for all remaining
regions. If (5.33) did not bind for a specific remaining region, the presidency could
reduce provision in that region without loosing support for her proposal. Such a re-
duction is clearly in the presidency’s interest since she is due to contribute means to
public good provision in other regions whereas she does not enjoy benefits from the
latter. In this setting, the presidency faces a lower bound when trying to reduce public
good provision in remaining regions. This lower bound is implicitly characterized by
(5.33) being satisfied as a strict equality. In equilibrium, (5.33) is satisfied as a strict
equality for all remaining regions. The latter, therefore, receive identical public good
quantities g¬a and merely obtain fixed default payoﬀs. These payoﬀs may diﬀer in the
amount of exogenous income. Yet, they do not vary in n.
In equilibrium, the presidency’s approval constraint is certainly not satisfied as a strict
equality as she can use agenda power to provide her region with a quantity ga > g¬a.
Consider now a legislature enlargement, and suppose that the presidency continues
78Persson (1998), pp. 315, instructively derives a minimum winning coalitions equilibrium for local
public goods in a one-shot setting. His reasoning is readily applied to our unanimity setting.
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to propose quantities ga and g¬a. The quantity g¬a allocated to the new region then
lowers average provision and, hence, regional tax burdens. An agenda setter could,
therefore, easily allocate some additional tax revenue to increase ga without losing
support for her proposal.79 Hence, the payoﬀs πa increase monotonically in n whereas
the payoﬀs π∗ and π¬a represent fixed values. Like in sections 5.3 and 5.4, the payoﬀ
eﬀect is negative, the section-specific term representing the RHS of (5.4), therefore,
increases monotonically in n, converging to unity for n → ∞. At the same time, the
LHS converges to δ < 1. These results motivate the following proposition.
Proposition 15 In the endogenous budget setting, cooperation cannot be sustained in
large legislatures.
Note that proposition 15 confirms the respective results in propositions 9 and 14.
The current proposition is essentially driven by the presidency’s ability to channel tax
revenue, in particular the one that is generated in additional regions, to her own region.
5.5.1 Numerical Example
We shall now illustrate the above results by restricting the utility in (5.29) to Ψ (gi) =
2
√
gi. The regional public good surplus in (5.30) then reads as
Si = 2β
√
gi −
p
n
X
j∈N
gj. (5.34)
According to (5.32), cooperation now entails regional quantities
g∗ =
µ
β
p
¶2
. (5.35)
Inserting (5.35) into (5.34), representatives reap cooperative payoﬀs
79This is not to say that she will optimally behave this way but rather illustrates that she can always
receive higher payoﬀs in larger federations. As the example in subsection 5.5.1 shows, the presidency
may rather optimally adjust her proposal by increasing both ga and g¬a.
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π∗ =
β2
p
. (5.36)
A deviating presidency rather proposes quantities that maximize (5.34) subject to the
regional approval constraints. The corresponding Lagrange-program can be expressed
as
max
ga,g¬a
L = Sa + λ {S¬a − 0} (5.37)
= 2β
√
ga − p
n
[ga + (n− 1) g¬a] + λ
n
2β
√
g¬a − p
n
[ga + (n− 1) g¬a]
o
.
Solving (5.37)80, the presidency proposes quantities
{ga, g¬a} =
(
nβ2
p2
,
nβ2
(
√
n+ 1)2 p2
)
. (5.38)
Note that both ga and g¬a increase in n, i.e. average public good provision is higher in
large federations.81 This is due to the fact that a region’s approval is easier to obtain
by (marginally) increasing provision in that region than by (marginally) reducing that
region’s tax share. Substituting (5.38) into (5.34), an uncooperative presidency reaps
payoﬀs
πa =
2n√
n+ 1
β2
p
(5.39)
whereas representatives exposed to agenda power earn payoﬀs
80See appendix 5.A.5 for the corresponding algebra.
81Recalling our literature survey, Persson and Tabellini (1994) find that the level of regional public
goods is always higher under a centralized regime. The authors, furthermore, show that regional
provision under a centralized regime increases in the number of federal member regions.
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π¬a = 0. (5.40)
Substituting (5.36), (5.39), and (5.40) into condition (5.4), the necessary condition for
maintaining cooperation in the endogenous budget setting can be expressed as
δ − δn
1− δn ≥ 1−
1
2
√
n
− 1
2n
. (5.41)
Illustrating proposition 15, it is readily checked that the RHS of (5.41) increases
monotonically in n and converges to 1 for n → ∞ whereas the LHS of (5.41) does
not exceed δ. Following the logic from the two previous sections, a critical legislature
size nˆ exists in a way that cooperation breaks down for n > nˆ. Again, we rely on
simulations and determine the critical legislature size via the Newton method.82 The
simulations are relegated to appendix 5.A.3 and summarized in figure 5.3.
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Figure 5.3: Critical legislature sizes for the endogenous budget setting
This figure depicts the critical legislature size nˆ as a function of the discount parameter
82Once more, if cooperation cannot be sustained for n = 2, it cannot be sustained for n > 2, either
(see appendix 5.A.4).
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δ.83 Whereas cooperation cannot be sustained at all for small and medium values of
δ, an admissible nˆ ≥ 2 exists for large values of δ. Furthermore, nˆ increases in δ, i.e.
maintaining cooperation in large legislatures requires a higher degree of patience from
legislators.
Just like in section 5.4, the ranking of regimes is readily established. As the latter are
confronted with the problem of allocating pure local public goods, the decentralized
allocation is already first best in the one-shot setting whereas centralization entails in-
eﬃciencies. Although the latter may be overcome in the repeated game, the centralized
regime can never do better than the decentralized regime. In particular, centraliza-
tion is likely to entail ineﬃciencies in large federations. Hence, pure local public good
policies should be assigned to the decentral layer.
5.6 Conclusion Chapter 5
Depending on the number of regions adhering to a federation, should public good poli-
cies be centralized or rather assigned to the decentral layer? This chapter has analyzed
the impact of enlargements on the regime-specific ability to yield eﬃcient outcomes. In
section 5.3, public good policies induce interregional spillovers. In this case, centralized
public good provision necessarily entails ineﬃciencies in large federations. Precisely, if
cooperation is possible in small legislatures, then it breaks down in large legislatures.
On the other hand, eﬃciency can rather be sustained in large federations if regions
contribute on a voluntary basis. Eﬃcient public good policies are, therefore, more
likely to emerge from decentralization in case a federation consists of many members.
Sections 5.4 and 5.5, furthermore, confirm the negative correlation between the number
of member states and cooperation at the federal layer for local public good frameworks.
In these sections, there likewise exists a critical number of member-regions in a way that
83Note that nˆ now merely depends on δ whereas the critical legislature size was characterized by
two arguments in the two previous sections, respectively.
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centralized public good provision necessarily entails ineﬃciencies in larger federations.
Sections 5.4 identifies individual risk-aversion as being an eﬃciency-facilitating element
of centralized public good provision.
Of course, we do not find completely general results as we do not deal with completely
general preferences. Although the negative correlation between a federation’s number
of participants and the likeliness of centralized eﬃciency proves robust in all our frame-
works, we do not generalize this result. There might be payoﬀ structures in a way that
the RHS of (5.4) decreases in n, i.e. enlargements dilute payoﬀ-based incentives to
abuse agenda power. In such a setting, cooperation becomes even easier to sustain as
the size of the federation increases. And even if enlargements induce a negative payoﬀ
eﬀect, the positive frequency eﬀect might still prevail. Considering the driving forces
characterizing the respective payoﬀ eﬀects in sections 5.3, 5.4, and 5.5, this possibility
is, though, anything but obvious.
We have, so far, analyzed the impact of three diﬀerent determinants on the regime-
specific ability to sustain cooperative public good policies. In these settings, the re-
spective ability is determined both by the payoﬀ structure of the underlying game
as well as by the degree of patience associated with decision makers. The respective
payoﬀs depend on strategy choices and may, therefore, be considered endogenous. On
the other hand, discounting is exogenous in the sense that the individual discounting
parameter is fixed. Whereas this is certainly the natural framework for outcome-
motivated decision makers, discounting is rather unlikely to be exogenous if decision
makers are oﬃce-motivated. In this case, the latter may act in a way to foster their
chances for another term in oﬃce, i.e. strategy choices may most importantly aﬀect
an representative’s likeliness to ‘make it to the next stage’ of the repeated game. Con-
cluding our analysis of determinants for cooperative public good provision, the next
section, therefore, endogenizes the formerly exogenous degree of patience by allowing
for strategy-contingent discounting.
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5.A Appendix Chapter 5
5.A.1 Derivation of (5.3) and (5.4)
As shown in previous chapters, cooperation entails discounted payoﬀs Π∗ = 1
1−δπ
∗.
Defection entails discounted payoﬀs
Πd = πa + δπ− + . . .+ δn−1π¬a + δnπa + . . .+ δn+1π¬a (5.42)
=
∞X
t=0
δntπa +
¡
δ + . . .+ δn−1
¢ ∞X
t=0
δntπ¬a =
1
1− δnπ
a +
δ − δn
1− δ
1
1− δnπ
¬a.
Cooperation can be sustained if
Π∗ ≥ Πd ⇔ 1
1− δπ
∗ ≥ 1
1− δnπ
a +
1
1− δ
δ − δn
1− δnπ
¬a (5.43)
⇔
µ
δ − 1
1− δn + 1
¶
πa − δ − δ
n
1− δnπ
¬a ≥ πa − π∗ ⇔ δ − δ
n
1− δn ≥
πa − π∗
πa − π¬a .
5.A.2 Derivation of g∗, ge, and gd
LetN represent the set of regions 1, . . . , n. The regional utility in the n-region economy
is characterized by
Ui = β ln

gi + φ
X
j∈N\{i}
gj

+ xi. (5.44)
This utility implies an aggregate public good surplus
S+ = β
nX
i=1
ln

gi + φ
X
j∈N\{i}
gj

− p
X
j∈N
gj. (5.45)
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Derivation of g∗: The eﬃcient public good quantities obey the regional Samuelson-
conditions. Hence, diﬀerentiate (5.45) with respect to gi to obtain
∂S+
∂gi
=
β
g∗i + φ
P
j∈N\{i} g
∗
j
+
X
j∈N\{i}
βφ
g∗j + φ
P
h∈N\{j} g
∗
h
= p i = 1, . . . , n. (5.46)
Equate the Samuelson-conditions in (5.46) for any two regions k and l to obtain
β
g∗k + φ
P
j∈N\{k} g
∗
j
+
X
j∈N\{k}
βφ
g∗j + φ
P
h∈N\{j} g
∗
h
(5.47)
=
β
g∗l + φ
P
j∈N\{l} g
∗
j
+
X
j∈N\{l}
βφ
g∗j + φ
P
h∈N\{j} g
∗
h
.
Note that n−2 terms on both sides of the equation are identical. Equation (5.47) can,
therefore, be simplified to
(1− φ)β
g∗k + φ
P
j∈N\{k} g
∗
j
=
(1− φ)β
g∗l + φ
P
j∈N\{l} g
∗
j
⇔ g∗k + φg∗l = g∗l + φg∗k ⇔ g∗k = g∗l = g∗.
(5.48)
Insertion into (5.46) finally yields
β
g∗ + (n− 1)φg∗ + (n− 1)
βφ
g∗ + (n− 1)φg∗ − p = 0 (5.49)
⇔ pg∗ [1 + (n− 1)φ] = β [1 + (n− 1)φ]⇔ g∗ = β
p
.
These quantities represent the eﬃcient quantities in (3.4) and (5.7), respectively.
Derivation of ge: Under a decentralized regime, the regional public good surplus
reads as
SiD = β ln

gi + φ
X
j∈N\{i}
gj

− pgi i = 1, . . . , n. (5.50)
Diﬀerentiate (5.50) with regard to gi to obtain the reaction functions. In equilibrium,
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these reaction functions satisfy
β
gei + φ
P
j∈N\{i} g
e
j
− p = 0 i = 1, . . . , n. (5.51)
Again, equate these equations for any two regions k and l to obtain
β
gek + φ
P
j∈N\{k} g
e
j
=
β
gel + φ
P
j∈N\{l} g
e
j
⇔ gek + φgel = gel + φgek ⇔ gek = gel = ge.
(5.52)
Insertion into (5.51) yields ge = 1
1+(n−1)φ
β
p . The quantities in (3.15) correspond to
ge|n=2.
Derivation of gd: Recall that cooperative representatives provide g∗ = βp . A defecting
representative, therefore, chooses her contribution gdi in a way that
gdi = argmaxgi≥0
{β ln [gi + (n− 1)φg∗]− pgi} . (5.53)
Diﬀerentiate the maximand in (5.53) with respect to gi. As the representative does not
necessarily contribute a positive quantity, the optimal contribution is characterized by
β
gdi + (n− 1)φβp
− p ≤ 0. (5.54)
Obeying the non-negativity constraint, a defecting representative, therefore, contributes
gd = max
n
β
p [1− (n− 1)φ] , 0
o
. The quantities in (3.28) correspond to gd
¯¯
n=2
.
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5.A.3 Calculating nˆ
Section 5.3: Determining the critical legislature size in the spillover setting, we use
the Newton iteration method (10-digit precision) to solve the strict equality of
δ − δn
1− δn −
ln n
1+(n−1)φ
ln 1φ
≥ 0 (5.55)
for n ≥ 2. Columns 2− 5 of table 5.1 show the values of nˆ for selected configurations
of φ and δ. A (−) indicates that there exists no admissible nˆ ≥ 2 for the respective
combination of φ and δ.
φ δ = 0.3 δ = 0.5 δ = 0.7 δ = 0.9
0.01 4 11 33 169
0.05 2 5 13 54
0.09 − 4 9 36
0.13 − 3 7 28
0.17 − 3 6 23
0.21 − 2 5 19
0.25 − − 4 16
0.29 − − 4 14
0.33 − − 3 12
0.37 − − 3 11
0.41 − − 3 10
0.45 − − 2 8
0.49 − − − 7
0.53 − − − 6
0.57 − − − 6
0.61 − − − 5
0.65 − − − 4
0.69 − − − 4
0.73 − − − 3
0.77 − − − 2
0.81 − − − −
Table 5.1: Critical legislature sizes for the spillover setting
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Section 5.4: Determining the critical legislature size in the dividing-the-pie setting,
we use the Newton iteration method (10-digit precision) to solve the strict equality of
δ − δn
1− δn − 1 + (1/n)
1−α ≥ 0 (5.56)
for n ≥ 2. Columns 2 − 5 of table 5.2 show values of nˆ for selected configurations
of α and δ. A (−) indicates that there exists no admissible nˆ ≥ 2 for the respective
combination of α and δ.
α δ = 0.3 δ = 0.5 δ = 0.7 δ = 0.9
0.07 − − − −
0.11 − − − 4
0.15 − − − 7
0.19 − − − 10
0.23 − − − 14
0.27 − − 3 19
0.31 − − 4 25
0.35 − − 5 33
0.39 − − 6 43
0.43 − 2 7 57
0.47 − 3 9 77
0.51 − 3 11 110
0.55 − 4 14 167
0.59 − 5 19 275
0.63 2 6 26 504
0.67 3 8 38 1072
0.71 3 11 64 2807
0.75 4 16 123 1.0 ∗ 104
0.79 5 27 309 5.7 ∗ 104
0.83 8 59 1191 7.6 ∗ 105
0.87 16 207 1.0 ∗ 104 4.9 ∗ 107
0.91 53 2212 6.4 ∗ 105 1.2 ∗ 1011
0.95 1253 1.0 ∗ 106 2.8 ∗ 1010 1.0 ∗ 1020
Table 5.2: Critical legislature sizes for the dividing-the-pie setting
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Section 5.5: Determining the critical legislature size in the endogenous budget setting,
we use the Newton iteration method (10-digit precision) to solve the strict equality of
δ − δn
1− δn − 1 +
1
2
√
n
+
1
2n
≥ 0 (5.57)
for n ≥ 2. The rows 2 and 4 of table 5.3 show values of nˆ for selected values of δ. A
(−) indicates that there exists no admissible nˆ for the respective values of δ.
δ < 0.66 0.67 0.69 0.71 0.73 0.75 0.77 0.79 0.81
nˆ − 2 3 3 4 5 6 7 9
δ 0.83 0.85 0.87 0.89 0.91 0.93 0.95 0.97 0.99
nˆ 11 15 19 27 39 63 119 310 2600
Table 5.3: Critical legislature sizes for the endogenous budget setting
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5.A.4 Non-existence of nˆ
Claim 16 If cooperation cannot be sustained for n = 2, it cannot be sustained for
n > 2, either.
Claim 16 applies to sections 5.3 - 5.5 as, according to condition
(5.55), (5.56), (5.57),
cooperation cannot be sustained if δ−δ
n
1−δn <
ln n
1+(n−1)φ
ln 1φ
. 1− (1/n)1−α. 1− 1
2
√
n −
1
2n .
Hence, cooperation cannot be sustained for n = 2 if δ
1+δ <
ln 2
1+φ
ln 1φ
. 1− (1/2)1−α. 3−
√
2
4
.
Claim 16 then holds if, for
δ <
ln 2
1+φ
ln 1+φ
2φ
=: δ1, δ < 21−α − 1 =: δ2, δ < 3−
√
2
1+
√
2
=: δ3,
condition
(5.55) (5.56) (5.57)
is likewise violated for
n > 2 and all φ. n > 2 and all α. n > 2.
As condition
(5.55) (5.56) (5.57)
is most likely satisfied for large δs (see lemma 10), consider limδ→δi
δ−δn
1−δn =
ln 2
1+φ
ln 1φ
−
Ã
ln 2
1+φ
ln 1φ
!n
1−
Ã
ln 2
1+φ
ln 1φ
!n . 1 + 21−α−21−(21−α−1)n . 1 + 4
√
2−6
1−(4
√
2−5)
n .
Figure 5.4 depicts the strict equality of condition
(5.55) (5.56) (5.57)
for the respective limit-value of δ−δ
n
1−δn as well as for
n ≤ 103 and 0 < α < 1. n ≤ 103. n ≤ 103 and 0 < φ < 1.
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Figure 5.4: No cooperation
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As the respective functions are negative, claim 16 holds for all 3 settings.
5.A.5 Derivation of ga and g¬a in the Endogenous Budget Setting
Recall that the Lagrange-program in (5.37) was stated as
max
ga,g¬a
L = 2β
√
ga − p
n
[ga + (n− 1) g¬a] + λ
n
2β
√
g¬a − p
n
[ga + (n− 1) g¬a]
o
The first-order conditions for this program read as
∂L
∂ga
=
β
√
ga
− (1 + λ) p
n
= 0, (5.58)
∂L
∂g¬a
= λ
β√
g¬a
− (1 + λ) p
n
(n− 1) = 0, and (5.59)
∂L
∂λ
= 2β
√
g¬a − p
n
[ga + (n− 1) g¬a] = 0. (5.60)
Dividing (5.59) by (5.58) and eliminating the Lagrange-multiplier yields
β√
ga
=
µ
1 +
(n− 1)√g¬a√
ga
¶
p
n
⇔ ga =
·
nβ
p
− (n− 1)
√
g¬a
¸2
(5.61)
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Substitution into (5.60) yields
2β
√
g¬a =
p
n
(·
nβ
p
− (n− 1)
√
g¬a
¸2
+ (n− 1) g¬a
)
(5.62)
⇔ (n− 1)ng¬a −
µ
2nβ (n− 1)
p
+
2nβ
p
¶√
g¬a = −n
2β2
p2
⇔ g¬a =
·
(n±√n)β
(n− 1) p
¸2
.
In equilibrium, an agenda setter proposes the lowest possible quantities for remaining
regions, i.e.
g¬a =
·
(n−
√
n)β
(n− 1) p
¸2
=
· √
n (
√
n− 1)β
(
√
n+ 1) (
√
n− 1) p
¸2
=
nβ2
(
√
n+ 1)2 p2
. (5.63)
Re-insertion into (5.61) yields
ga =
·
nβ
p
− (n− 1)
√
nβ
(
√
n+ 1) p
¸2
=
nβ2
p2
. (5.64)
Finally, inserting (5.64) and (5.63) into (5.30), payoﬀs for the agenda setter amount to
πa = 2β
s
nβ2
p2
− p
n
"
nβ2
p2
+ (n− 1) nβ
2
(
√
n+ 1)2 p2
#
(5.65)
=
β2
p
·
2
√
n− 1−
√
n− 1√
n+ 1
¸
=
2n√
n+ 1
β2
p
whereas representatives from remaining regions receive
πa = 2β
s
nβ2
(
√
n+ 1)2 p2
− p
n
"
nβ2
p2
+ (n− 1) nβ
2
(
√
n+ 1)2 p2
#
(5.66)
=
β2
p
·
2
√
n√
n+ 1
− 1−
√
n− 1√
n+ 1
¸
= 0.
6. Strategy-contingent Reappointment
6.1 Introduction Chapter 6
Following the standard literature on repeated games, we have hitherto considered an
agent’s discounting parameter exogenous. In standard repeated games with infinitely-
lived agents perpetually playing the same stage games, this view has prevailed for a
simple reason. An agent’s degree of patience is certainly an idiosyncratic characteristic
and is, therefore, not subject to parameters of the respective game.
A standard result for games with exogenous discounting and infinitely-lived agents
shows a positive correlation between the agents’ degree of patience, as measured by
the discount parameter δ, and the likeliness to sustain cooperation.84 Well-known folk
theorems, for example the exposition of the classical folk theorem in Fudenberg and
Maskin (1986), put forward that if agents put suﬃcient weight on future payoﬀs, co-
operation can be maintained by employing strategies that eﬀectively punish deviation.
In a complementary approach, Abreu, Milgrom and Pearce (1991) show that reducing
the interval between two consecutive stage games, i.e. between agents’ interactions,
has the same positive eﬀect on the ability to maintain cooperation as increasing the
exogenous discount parameter.85 Intuitively, agents are more likely to resist the temp-
tation to defect if there is prompt reward for cooperation. In this line, Neilson and
Winter (1996) show that agents may even be able to sustain cooperation by deciding
on appropriate interaction intervals.
84See, e.g. lemma 10.
85The authors go on to show that this equivalence does not necessarily hold in games with imperfect
monitoring.
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We argue that taking an agent’s degree of patience as exogenous is an appropriate way
of capturing discounting in repeated games with outcome-motivated agents. Yet, the
degree of patience is no longer exogenous in case agents are rather oﬃce-motivated.
Our argument follows the idea that a political decision maker is reappointed for another
term in oﬃce iﬀ her voters are prone to prolong her incumbency. Under a democratic
regime, the latter circumstance is closely related to the degree of satisfaction voters
associate with the incumbent’s performance.86 Accordingly, the degree of discounting in
the sense of ‘continuing the game’ may depend on the agents’ strategy choices, turning
discounting into an endogenous determinant of cooperation. The purpose for this
chapter is, therefore, to develop a framework that introduces endogenous discounting
in the sense that the likeliness to reach the next stage of the repeated game varies in
actual strategy choices.
As an inspiration for our analysis, Axelrod (1984) cites a halving of the fluctuation
ratio within the US Congress in the course of the 20th century. Pointing to the fact
that many political decisions show the structure of a prisoner’s dilemma, he acclaims
this development by stating that “[t]he very possibility of achieving stable mutual co-
operation depends upon there being a good chance of a continuing interaction” (p. 16).
We, rather literally, interpret this argument in a way that the probability of interacting
at all in the future may be crucial for cooperation.
Our below framework endogenizes the latter probability by allowing for strategy-
contingent reappointment. In this chapter, we assume that agents are oﬃce-motivated
and actually face a prisoner’s dilemma situation, such as a voluntary contribution game.
As a major result, our framework shows that cooperation is possible if agents are quite
optimistic about interacting again in the future. On the other hand, an agent may be
tempted to pursue short-run interests in case she faces generally low chances of reap-
86By a similar argument, a company’s decision maker may be dismissed if her company fails to meet
certain profit yardsticks imposed by shareholders. In this case, she may actually choose strategies in
a way to foster the renewal of her employment contract.
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pointment because defection may promise to be her only chance of being reappointed at
least once. Anticipating this incentive, other agents pursue ineﬃcient short-run strate-
gies, too, as they are reluctant to unilaterally harm their chances for another term in
oﬃce. We essentially suggest that in a framework with oﬃce-motivated agents, strat-
egy choices and discounting rather aﬀect one another. Referring to the above Axelrod
quote, we show that cooperation is in fact likely to emerge from small fluctuation ratios,
i.e. from a high probability of interacting again in the next term.87
The remainder of this chapter88 is organized as follows. Section 6.2 introduces the
concept of strategy-contingent discounting in a general prisoner’s dilemma framework
with oﬃce-motivated agents. In the one-shot setting of subsection 6.2.1, agents are
restricted to one reappointment at most. Subsection 6.2.2 relaxes the latter restriction
and analyzes the necessary condition for sustaining cooperation in the repeated game.
Sections 6.3 and 6.4 apply the general framework to the voluntary contribution game of
subsection 4.3.1 and to a standard Cournot duopol, respectively. Section 6.5 concludes.
6.2 Basic Model
6.2.1 Static Setting
Before we get into details of the general model, we shall first lay out a brief structure.
Although there is strategic interaction only at one point, we lay out the stage game in
three steps. Consider a game that is played among two oﬃce-motivated agents i = 1, 2.
At point 0, agents simultaneously choose their respective strategies in a way that fosters
their chances for another term in oﬃce. At point 1, agents are reappointed for another
term in oﬃce and receive a respective benefit if the outcome that results from their
strategy choices meets a certain reappointment yardstick. Due to specific outcome
shocks occurring at point 1/2, information is noised with regard to the actual strategies
87Fluctuation per se does not occur in standard repeated games as agents are modelled infinitely-
lived and, in particular, infinitely-acting.
88Parts of this chapter are based on Koppel (2004c).
6.2 Basic Model 127
implemented at point 0. Hence, reappointment can merely be made contingent on
realized outcome. This structure is summarized in figure 6.1.
1/20 1
Agents choose
    strategies
Incumbents for next  term
   emerge; reap benefits
Shocks are realized  
Figure 6.1: Game structure (one-shot)
The time span in this figure comprises one period. The details of the intraperiod
process are as follows.
At point 0, agents simultaneously choose their strategies si from respective strategy sets
{C,D}. Strategy choices result in outcomes ρi (si, s−i). These outcomes are assumed
to be ranked by
ρdi := ρi (D,C) > ρ
∗
i =: ρi (C,C) > ρ
e
i := ρi (D,D) > ρ
b
i := ρi (C,D) . (6.1)
In a standard prisoner’s dilemma, a) ρdi , b) ρ
∗
i , c) ρ
e
i , and d) ρ
b
i immediately represent
payoﬀs for agent i in case a) agent i defects whereas agent −i cooperates, b) both
agents cooperate, c) both agents defect (the standard prisoner’s dilemma stage game
equilibrium), and d) agent i cooperates whereas agent −i defects. In our model, agent
i is, though, rather interested in reappointment and faces a reappointment probability
Pi that essentially depends on ρi (see below for details on Pi).
At point 1, agent i is reappointed iﬀ the outcome ρi, net of a specific and additive
shock ε˜i, exceeds an exogenous reappointment yardstick ρ¯i.
89 Hence, reappointment
ensues iﬀ
89In the upcoming sections, these shocks represent utility shocks (section 6.3) and profit shocks
(section 6.4), respectively.
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ρi − ε˜i ≥ ρ¯i (6.2)
holds.90 Reappointed for another term in oﬃce, agents obtain a fixed benefit r whereas
their payoﬀs are normalized to 0 in case they are dismissed from oﬃce. These benefits
can either be interpreted as material benefits, such as actual rents (e.g. Buchanan
(1980)), or as ego-rents (e.g. Persson and Tabellini (1999)), i.e. immaterial spoils
associated with filling a certain position. We shall stick to the latter interpretation as
it allows us to ignore additional financing constraints.
The shocks ε˜i are assumed to be distributed uniformly with density
f =
1
θh − θl
(6.3)
on support [θl, θh].91 Accordingly, an agent’s probability of reappointment Pi is just
equal to the cumulative distribution of ε˜i evaluated at ρi − ρ¯i, yielding
Pi = min
½
max
½
ρi − ρ¯i − θl
θh − θl
, 0
¾
, 1
¾
. (6.4)
We assume that agents are risk-neutral. Hence, they choose strategies in a way to
maximize the expected benefits from oﬃce. The interval of ρ¯i is restricted to
ρ¯mini := ρ
∗
i − θh < ρ¯i < ρei − θl =: ρ¯maxi . (6.5)
90Seabright (1996) introduces such a re-election apparatus for oﬃce-motivated politicians. In his
model, ai and a¯i represent the constituency’s utility and the utility the constituency associates with a
rival contender, respectively. Contrasting our framework, the approach in Seabright (1996) does not
comprise strategical interaction.
91See, e.g. Mood, Graybill and Boes (1974), pp. 105-107, for an introduction to the uniform
distribution.
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These restrictions ensure a positive reappointment probability in the stage game equi-
librium and, furthermore, preserve the prisoner’s dilemma structure by yielding proper
incentives to deviate from cooperation in the one-shot game.92 For ρ¯i ≤ ρ¯mini , an agent
might be reappointed with probability 1 even if she was confronted with the shock’s
‘worst-case’ realization θh. In this case, playing the cooperative strategies might like-
wise constitute a stage game Nash-equilibrium. On the other hand, for ρ¯i ≥ ρ¯maxi ,
an agent might be dismissed from oﬃce even if she faced the ‘best-case’ realization
θl. As we shall be concerned with repeated interaction in the next section, we rule
out the latter situation and assume that choosing strategy D always yields a positive
reappointment probability.
Following the notion of outcomes in (6.1), let P ∗i denote an agent’s reappointment
probability in case both representatives adhere to cooperation. Unilateral defection by
agent i increases her reappointment probability to P di . Furthermore, let P
e
i and P
b
i
denote the stage game equilibrium reappointment probability and the reappointment
probability in case a cooperating agent is ‘betrayed’ by her counterpart. The resulting
payoﬀ structure for the stage game is summarized in table 6.1. Following the standard
presentation of PD-games93, agent 1 is the row-player, and agent 2 acts as the column-
player.
C D
C P ∗1 r, P
∗
2 r P
b
1r, P
d
2 r
D P d1 r, P
b
2r P
e
1 r, P
e
2 r
Table 6.1: Expected benefits in the prisoner’s dilemma stage game
Given the ranking of outcomes in (6.1) as well as the restrictions in (6.5), we have
92For low reappointment yardsticks, the restrictions in (6.5) do not rule out that agents can secure
reappointment (P di = 1) by defecting successfully.
93See, e.g. Varian (1992), pp. 261-262.
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1 ≥ P di > P ∗i > P ei > P bi . (6.6)
The ranking in (6.6) implies that (i) (D,D) is always the stage game equilibrium and
(ii) (D,D) is Pareto-inferior to (C,C). Due to the stage game structure, (C,C) can,
though, never constitute an equilibrium of the one-shot game. Following the logic of
the previous chapters, we shall now extend the game’s horizon and derive a necessary
condition for sustaining cooperation in a repeated game.
6.2.2 Repeated Setting
In the repeated game, the basic stage game of subsection 6.2.1 is played over an infinite
horizon. Yet, agents are due to be reappointed at the end of each period. This feature
implies that specific agents potentially interact over several periods.94 Like in the
previous chapters, we assume perfect recall. Agents in period t can, therefore, choose
their actions contingent on the game’s history ht. The former will consider the impact
of their current actions on their current and future reappointment probabilities.
Recall that, in the stage game, both agents do better under a regime of mutual co-
operation. As was argued in previous chapters, the well-known trigger-strategy may
resolve these ineﬃciencies in repeated prisoner’s dilemma games. We extend the gen-
uine trigger-strategy (Friedman (1971)) by an index t in order to allow for fluctuation
among agents in the course of the repeated game. The corresponding trigger-strategy
for an agent in period t is characterized by
94Exemplifying this point, a ‘lucky’/‘unlucky’ agent may be dismissed after her tenth/first term in
oﬃce. Anyway, an agent is certain to be dismissed from oﬃce at some stage of the repeated game. As
apparent from the below analysis, this is due to the fact that her average probability of reappointment
is strictly smaller than unity.
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sit =



C if t = 1
C if t > 1 ∧ ht =
©
(C,C)1 , . . . , (C,C)t−1
ª
D else .
(6.7)
Employing these strategies, agents choose to cooperate in the repeated game’s first
period. Agents appointed for subsequent periods, possibly replacing their predecessors,
choose to cooperate if all agents cooperated in all previous periods. Otherwise, there
is infinite Nash-reversion, and agents play the stage game equilibrium from that point
on. A dismissal from oﬃce is normalized to entail no further payoﬀs in subsequent
periods.
Let us address the necessary condition for maintaining cooperation in the repeated
game. If both agents cooperate, they are reappointed with the respective probability
P ∗i at the end of each term. The discounted payoﬀs, in terms of expected benefits,
from mutual cooperation then read as95
Π∗i =
P ∗i
1− P ∗i
r. (6.8)
In case of a defection from cooperation, the defecting agent is reappointed with proba-
bility P di at the end of the period of defection. Yet, she triggers Nash-reversion and is,
therefore, merely reappointed with probability P ei at the end of subsequent periods.
96
Accordingly, defection yields expected benefits
Πdi =
P di
1− P ei
r. (6.9)
The strategies in (6.7) constitute a subgame perfect equilibrium of the repeated game if
95The algebra is relegated to appendix 6.A.1.
96As in standard repeated games, any defection will be carried out in the first period. See appendix
6.A.2 for the corresponding proof.
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the expected benefits from cooperation outweigh benefits from defection. The necessary
condition for maintaining cooperation in the repeated game can, therefore, be expressed
as
1− P ei
1− P ∗i
≥ P
d
i
P ∗i
. (6.10)
The RHS of (6.10) measures the short-term gain from defection, i.e. the one-time
increase of reappointment probability from P ∗i to P
d
i . In order to maintain cooperation,
this gain must not surpass the long-term costs from defection. These costs are captured
by the LHS of (6.10) and measured by the permanent increase of dismissal probability
from 1 − P ∗i to 1 − P ei in periods subsequent to defection. According to condition
(6.10), the case for cooperation depends on the agents’ estimation of their respective
strategy-contingent reappointment probabilities.
What drives the ability to maintain cooperation?
Proposition 17 Cooperation (i) can be sustained for mutually small reappointment
yardsticks. (ii) The ability to maintain cooperation decreases in reappointment yard-
sticks.
Proof. (i) Recall (6.4) and (6.6). Inspection reveals that limρ¯i→ρ¯mini LHS (6.10) = ∞
whereas limρ¯i→ρ¯mini RHS (6.10) = 1. As P
∗
i converges to 1, there are infinite costs from
defection whereas the gain from defection vanishes. (ii) Observe that ∂LHS (6.10)∂ρ¯i < 0
and ∂RHS (6.10)∂ρ¯i > 0, i.e. the costs (gain) from defection decrease (increases) in ρ¯i. Both
facts render defection more attractive.
There is an appealing intuition underlying the results in proposition 17. In case of low
reappointment yardsticks, there is not much of a gain from defection. The reason is
that, cooperating or defecting, an agent is rather certain to be reappointed anyway. On
the other hand, the marginal extra benefit gained from defection comes at the expense
of (severely) jeopardizing further reappointments.
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Increasing the reappointment yardstick, all three strategy-contingent reappointment
probabilities decrease by the same absolute amount. Yet, as both the gain and costs
from defection are measured in relative terms, part (ii) of proposition arises. For high
reappointment yardsticks, P ei converges to 0, i.e. an agent is rather certain to be
dismissed in the stage game equilibrium. According to (6.10), cooperation is then still
sustainable if P di P
∗
i ≥ P di − P ∗i holds for ρ¯i → ρ¯maxi . Otherwise, there exists a critical
value ρ¯+i in a way that cooperation breaks down for ρ¯i > ρ¯
+
i .
We derived the above results for a general prisoner’s dilemma structure. The next two
sections exemplify the results in proposition 17 for typical dilemma games.
6.3 Decentralized Public Good Provision
6.3.1 Stage Game
This example follows the presentation of the basic model, as laid out in section 6.2. In
the current scenario, we come back to the asymmetric game of voluntary public good
provision, as presented in subsection 4.3.1. The diﬀerence is that regional politicians
are now oﬃce-motivated, i.e. they choose regional public good quantities to foster their
chances for another term in oﬃce. Adapting the notation, quantities gi now refer to
strategy choices si, and regional public good surplus SiD refers to outcome ρi.
At the end of the legislative period, a regional incumbent is re-elected if the surplus
SiD in that region, net of a region-specific utility shock ε˜i, exceeds an exogenous reap-
pointment yardstick S¯iD. Following Seabright (1996), we interpret S¯iD as the surplus
regional voters expect from a rival party. Hence, a politician in region i is re-elected iﬀ
SiD − ε˜i ≥ S¯iD (6.11)
holds. For an incumbent, the shock ε˜i implies that her voters cannot appropriately
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link realized surpluses to actual contribution choices {g1, g2}. Following (6.4), an in-
cumbent’s probability of re-election is now just equal to
Pi = min
½
max
½
Si − S¯i − θl
θh − θl
, 0
¾
, 1
¾
. (6.12)
For a possible interpretation, think of θ as a measure of quality associated with the rival
party’s leader. Values of θ close to θl (θh) then imply that regional voters perceive the
contender as fairly weak (strong) with this fact improving (worsening) the incumbent’s
chances of re-election.
As the strategy set in the voluntary contribution game of subsection 4.3.1 is continuous,
we allow for continuous non-negative contribution levels in the current example as
well.97 Hence, the stage game Nash-equilibrium is characterized by
gei = argmaxgi≥0
Pi
¡
gi, ge−i
¢
r. (6.13)
Following the reasoning presented for condition (6.5), the interval of regional reservation
surplus S¯i is restricted to
S¯miniD := S
∗
iD − θh < S¯iD < SeiD − θl =: S¯maxiD . (6.14)
In this regard, S∗iD and S
e
iD denote the cooperative regional public good surpluses (4.2)
and the stage game equilibrium surpluses (4.9), respectively. Given these restrictions,
the first-order conditions emerging from (6.13) read as
f
¡
SiD − S¯iD
¢ ∂SiD
∂gi
r = 0. (6.15)
97As illustrated below, allowing for continuous strategy spaces does not alter the payoﬀ relation.
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In this condition, f
¡
SiD − S¯iD
¢
is simply the density of the shock evaluated at SiD −
S¯iD. Accordingly, politicians choose their region’s contribution to the public good in a
way that the marginal re-election benefit, in terms of additional re-election probability
multiplied by the marginal increase of their region’s utility multiplied by the benefit
from holding oﬃce, equals 0.
Note that the first and third factor on the LHS of (6.15) are constants. Hence, the first-
order conditions reduce to ∂SiD∂gi = 0, yielding the very same reaction functions and stage
game equilibrium quantities as in (4.7) and (4.8), respectively. From (4.16), (4.20), and
(4.21), recall that SdiD > S
∗
iD > S
e
iD. For both politicians, this fact implies that the
stage game equilibrium re-election probabilities P ei are ineﬃciently small compared to
the cooperative re-election probabilities P ∗i .
6.3.2 Repeated Game and Numerical Example
Resolving the ineﬃciencies induced by the stage game dilemma now requires that rep-
resentatives abstain from (partially) withdrawing their cooperative public good contri-
butions. The trigger-strategy for an incumbent from region i in period t is, therefore,
characterized by
git =



g∗i if t = 1
g∗i if t > 1 ∧ ht =
©
(g∗1, g
∗
2)1 , . . . , (g
∗
1, g
∗
2)t−1
ª
gei else
. (6.16)
Following the familiar notion, g∗i and g
e
i denote the cooperative quantities (4.15) and
stage game equilibrium quantities (4.8), respectively.
Let us illustrate the results in proposition 17 for specified parameters. We assign values
σ = 0.5, β = 10, p = 1, θl = 0, and θh = 5. (6.17)
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Insertion into (4.16), (4.20), (4.21), and (6.14) then yields the surplus measures depicted
in table 6.2.
Region 1 Region 2
S∗1D = 13.75 S
∗
2D = 11.87
Sd1D = 14.70 S
d
2D = 12.95
Se1D = 13.03 S
e
2D = 11.51
S¯min1 = 8.75 S¯
min
2 = 6.87
S¯max1 = 13.03 S¯
max
2 = 11.51
Table 6.2: Regional surplus measures
Recall that proposition 17 is based on the impact of reappointment yardsticks on the
strategy-contingent reappointment probabilities. Columns 1 and 7 of table 6.3, there-
fore, start in the neighborhood of S¯mini and increase the region-specific reappointment
yardstick by 1
10
¡
S¯maxi − S¯mini
¢
at a time. Inserting these values of S¯i, the parame-
ter specifications according to (6.17), and the surplus measures of table 6.2 into (6.12)
yields the strategy-contingent reappointment probabilities, as depicted in columns 2−4
and 8− 10. Finally, columns 5− 6 and 11− 12 present the respective LHS- and RHS-
values of condition (6.10).
S¯1 P ∗1 P
e
1 P
d
1 LHS1 RHS1 S¯2 P
∗
2 P
e
2 P
d
2 LHS2 RHS2
9.0 0.96 0.81 1.00 4.37 1.04 7.1 0.95 0.88 1.00 2.55 1.05
9.4 0.87 0.73 1.00 2.12 1.15 7.6 0.86 0.79 1, 00 1.52 1.16
9.8 0.79 0.64 0.98 1.67 1.24 8.0 0.77 0.70 0.98 1.31 1.28
10.2 0.70 0.56 0.89 1.48 1.27 8.5 0.68 0.60 0.89 1.22 1.32
10.7 0.61 0.47 0.80 1.37 1.31 9.0 0.58 0.51 0.80 1.17 1.37
11.1 0.53 0.39 0.72 1.31 1.36 9.4 0.49 0.42 0.71 1.14 1.44
11.5 0.44 0.30 0.63 1.26 1.43 9.9 0.40 0.32 0.61 1.12 1.54
12.0 0.36 0.21 0.55 1.22 1.53 10.4 0.30 0.23 0.52 1.10 1.71
12.4 0.27 0.13 0.46 1.20 1.69 10.8 0.21 0.14 0.43 1.09 2.02
12.8 0.19 0.04 0.38 1.18 2.01 11.3 0.12 0.05 0.33 1.08 2.82
Table 6.3: Impact of the reappointment yardstick in the voluntary contribution game
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Figure 6.2 depicts the columns 5− 6 and 11− 12 of table 6.3, i.e. the respective costs
and gain from defection. Illustrating part (i) of proposition 17, this figure shows that
cooperation can be sustained for mutually small reappointment yardsticks as the costs
from defection surpass the gain from defection in this case. Yet, the respective costs
(gain) from defection decrease (increases) in the reappointment yardstick, as laid out
in part (ii) of proposition 17. In this example, there exists a region-specific critical
reappointment yardstick S¯+i so that cooperation cannot be sustained for S¯i > S¯
+
i .
98
Figure 6.2: Defection’s costs and gain in the public good example
1,0
1,5
2,0
2,5
reappointment yardstick region 1
defection's costs defection's gain
(a) Incumbent region 1
1,0
1,5
2,0
2,5
reappointment yardstick region 2
defection's costs defection's gain
(b) Incumbent region 2
In case of high yardsticks, cooperation now breaks down because of too little reward for
long-term cooperation. Cooperating or defecting, an agent anticipates to be ejected
soon anyway, and defection promises to be her only substantial chance to become
reappointed at least once.
98Intuitively, the same quality of results emerges if we apply the present framework to the symmetric
voluntary contribution game of subsection 3.3.2.
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6.4 Cournot Duopol Example
For the present example, we build on a standard Cournot duopol with two companies,
linear demand, and costless production.99 This example follows exactly the structure
developed in section 6.2 and exemplified in section 6.3. We therefore widely constrain
the formal presentation.
Adapting the notation of the basic model, company-specific output quantities qi now
refer to strategy choices si and company profits µi refer to outcomes ρi. Companies
face linear demand
p (q1, q2) = 1− q1 − q2. (6.18)
In our modification of the standard duopol game, a business manager — say a chief
executive oﬃcer (CEO) — decides on her company’s output quantity qi. Again, we
allow for continuous strategy spaces.
In order to stay in charge, CEOs are due to meet certain profit yardsticks, as denoted
by µ¯i. The yardstick µ¯i might represent a level of profit shareholders associate with an-
other CEO-candidate. Let company profits be aﬀected by specific demand shocks and
shareholders make the renewal of employment contracts contingent on realized profits.
Hence, a CEO chooses the output quantity qi in a way to foster the renewal of her
employment contract. Accordingly, the adapted version of the general reappointment
condition (6.2) reads as
µi − ε˜i ≥ µ¯i. (6.19)
For the standard Cournot duopol, the outcomes a) µ∗i , b) µ
e
i , c) µ
d
i , and d) µ
b
i repre-
99We refer to a standard duopol game, as developed in Shy (1995), pp. 115-117. He explicitly
derives all the below quantities and payoﬀs for an infinitely repeated duopol game. Referring to the
above source, we, therefore, abstain from an explicit derivation of these measures.
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sent profits for company i in case a) both companies share the monopoly quantity, b)
produce the stage game equilibrium quantities, c) company i ‘cheats’ on the cooper-
ating partner, and d) company i cooperates but is ‘betrayed’ by the other company,
respectively.
In the cooperative situation, CEOs agree to collude, i.e. they choose identical output
quantities q∗ = 1
4
in a way that their companies earn an equal share µ∗ = 1
8
of the mar-
ket’s monopoly rent, respectively.100 Yet, as CEOs cannot commit to output discipline
in the one-shot setting, each of them faces an incentive to produce more output than
in the cooperative situation. In the stage game Cournot-equilibrium, each company,
therefore, rather produces output qe = 1
3
and earns profits µe = 1
9
. A CEO defecting
from cooperation expects her counterpart to choose q∗ = 1
4
. Her best response is to
set qd = 3
8
, thus generating profits µd = 9
64
for her company. Adapting condition (6.5),
profit yardsticks are restricted to
µ¯min := µ∗ − θh < µ¯i < µe − θl =: µ¯max. (6.20)
In order to sustain collusion, CEOs now employ trigger-strategies
qit =



1
4
if t = 1
1
4
if t > 1 ∧ ht =
©
(q∗, q∗)1 , . . . , (q
∗, q∗)t−1
ª
1
3
else
(6.21)
in the repeated game. Of course, all the formulae of section 6.2 have their adapted
pendants in the duopol example. We shall, though, abstract from a detailed presen-
tation and turn to a graphical analysis instead. Recall that we aim to illustrate the
results in proposition 17.
100Due to the symmetry, we drop the index i.
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For the numerical example, as laid out in table 6.4, we set θl to 0 and θh to 0.1. From
(6.20), we then obtain µ¯min = 0.025 and µ¯max = 0.111. Following the reasoning intro-
duced in the previous section, column 1 of table 6.4 starts in the neighborhood of µ¯min
and increases the reappointment yardstick by 1
10
¡
µ¯max − µ¯min
¢
at a time. Inserting
these values of µ¯ as well as the above profit measures µ∗, µd, and µe into the adapted
version of (6.4) yields the strategy-contingent reappointment probabilities. These prob-
abilities are presented in columns 2−4. Finally, columns 5 and 6 present the respective
costs and gain from defection, as represented by the LHS and RHS of condition (6.10).
µ¯ P ∗ P d P e LHS RHS
0.029 0.91 1.00 0.78 2.61 1.09
0.038 0.83 0.98 0.69 1.81 1.19
0.047 0.74 0.90 0.60 1.54 1.21
0.055 0.66 0.81 0.52 1.40 1.24
0.064 0.57 0.73 0.43 1.32 1.27
0.072 0.48 0.64 0.34 1.27 1.32
0.081 0.40 0.55 0.26 1.23 1.39
0.090 0.31 0.47 0.17 1.20 1.50
0.098 0.27 0.13 0.42 1.19 1.58
0.107 0.18 0.34 0.04 1.17 1.86
Table 6.4: Impact of the reappointment yardstick in the Cournot duopol
The last two columns of table 6.4 are depicted in figure 6.3. Again, we find graphical
support for proposition 17 as cooperation can be sustained for mutually small reap-
pointment yardsticks whereas the gain (costs) from defection increases (decrease) in
the reappointment yardstick. Like in the example of section 6.3, there exists a critical
reappointment yardstick µ¯+. This implies that cooperation cannot be sustained for
µ¯i > µ¯
+. The basic finding for this section is, therefore, that CEOs find it easier to
implement tacit collusion if they are generally quite optimistic about meeting profit
yardsticks, and thus being reappointed.
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2,0
reappointment yardstick
defection's costs defection's gain
Figure 6.3: Defection’s costs and gain in the duopol example
6.5 Conclusion Chapter 6
This chapter introduces a concept of endogenous discounting for repeated games. Dis-
counting is endogenous in the sense that the likeliness to reach the next stage of
the game depends on the agents’ strategy choices. Agents face strategy-contingent
reappointment probabilities and find it harder to implement cooperation with high
reappointment yardsticks. On the other hand, cooperation can be sustained for low
yardsticks. As the applications in sections 6.3 and 6.4 demonstrate, high reappoint-
ment yardsticks may impede cooperation. Hence, the endogenous degree of discounting
proves to be yet another determinant for cooperative public good provision.
Our concept can be applied to various standard PD-games. Consider the free riding
problem arising for decentralized public good provision, as laid out in section 6.3. If
regional politicians choose voluntary contributions in a way to foster their re-election,
tough political pressure, in terms of strong challengers running for incumbency, may
inhibit eﬃcient provision levels.101 Alternatively, section 6.4 interprets the basic prob-
101Building on a similar conceptual framework, Koppel (2003) shows that substantial lobbying costs
sustain cooperative outcomes in a dynamic perspective of centralized policy making. A preliminary
version of that paper was presented at the conferences “Lobbying and Institutional Structure of Policy
Making” (September, 26-27, 2002, Rome) and “METU International Conference in Economics VI”
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lem as duopolistic rent absorption. If shareholders make the renewal of employment
contracts contingent on realized profits, managers find it harder to implement tacit
collusion in case they face high profit yardsticks.
Our findings support Axelrod’s (1984) argument concerning the negative correlation
between fluctuation ratios and cooperation, as laid out in the introduction to this
chapter. In our framework, high reappointment probabilities go hand in hand with low
incentives to deviate from cooperation. We argue that cooperative strategy patterns
may emerge if agents are rewarded less — in terms of reappointment probability — for
pressing home an advantage than for repeatedly settling things cooperatively.
We employ modified, yet in a way standard trigger-strategies. An appealing modifica-
tion of this strategy might advise agents to punish deviants until the latter are ejected
from oﬃce and negotiate a return to cooperation with their successors.
In our basic framework, agents receive the same benefit for reaching the next round
of the repeated game whereas the respective likeliness is strategy-contingent. An ex-
tension of our basic model might consider strategy-contingent benefits from reaching
the next stage, such as profit-contingent salaries for company managers. This type
of benefits adds a reward term to condition (6.10) that might have some interesting
implications for the ability to maintain cooperation.
(September, 11-14, 2002, Ankara).
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6.A Appendix Chapter 6
6.A.1 Calculating Π∗i and Πdi
Under a regime of mutual cooperation, an agent is reappointed with probability P ∗i at
the end of each period. Her expected benefits from cooperation, therefore, amount to
Π∗i =
£
P ∗i + (P
∗
i )
2 + (P ∗i )
3 + . . .
¤
r = P ∗i
∞X
t=0
(P ∗i )
t r =
P ∗i
1− P ∗i
r. (6.22)
In case an agent defects in the first period of the repeated game, she is reappointed
with probability P di at the end of that period. Due to infinite Nash-reversion, she is,
though, reappointed only with probability P ei at the end of subsequent periods. Her
expected benefits from immediate defection, therefore, read as
Πdi =
£
P di + P
d
i P
e
i + P
d
i (P
e
i )
2 + . . .
¤
r = P di
∞X
t=0
(P ei )
t r =
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1− P ei
r. (6.23)
6.A.2 Defecting Agents Prefer Immediate Defection
From (6.22) and (6.23), we have Π∗i =
P∗i
1−P∗i
r and Πdi =
Pdi
1−P ei
r. Let Πd,ti denote expected
benefits from defection in period t > 1. We then have
Π
d,t
i =
£
P ∗i + . . .+ (P
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Accordingly, the payoﬀ diﬀerence between defection in period t + 1 and defection in
period t can be expressed as
Π
d,t+1
i −Π
d,t
i =
"
P ∗i − (P ∗i )
t+1
1− P ∗i
+
(P ∗i )
t P di
1− P ei
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∗
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t
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∗
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t−1 P di
1− P ei
#
r(6.25)
=
"
(P ∗i )
t − (P ∗i )
t+1
1− P ∗i
−
P di
¡
(P ∗i )
t−1 − (P ∗i )
t¢
1− P ei
#
r
=
£
(P ∗i )
t−1 − (P ∗i )
t¤| {z }
>0
µ
P ∗i
1− P ∗i
− P
d
i
1− P ei
¶
r| {z }
Π∗i−Πdi
.
This equation shows that any defection will be carried out in the first period. If
defection is not worthwhile in the first period, i.e. if Π∗i > Π
d
i , it is not worthwhile in
any subsequent period. If defection is worthwhile in the first period
¡
Π∗i < Π
d
i
¢
, it is
not as worthwhile in subsequent periods.
7. Conclusion
This thesis has introduced a dynamic perspective of fiscal federalism. Our analysis
has compared the relative pros and cons of policy-making at a central and decentral
layer of a federation in repeated game frameworks. In essence, we have analyzed the
impact of public good spillovers (chapter 3), interregional preference heterogeneity
(chapter 4), the number of federal member states (chapter 5), and reappointment
yardsticks (chapter 6) on the regimes’ ability to yield eﬃciency-sustaining cooperative
public good provision. Building on the determinant-specific correlation, we were able
to derive guidelines for assigning public good policies in a dynamic framework.
The repeated game analysis of fiscal federalism helps to explain cooperative public good
provision at both the central and decentral layer of a federal system from a theoretical
point of view. Our central results can be summarized as follows. In a dynamic perspec-
tive, an eﬃcient allocation of local public good policies entailing significant (negligible)
externalities on other regions is more likely sustainable at a decentral (central) layer.
This finding implies a guideline for policy assignment that stands at odds with the
prevailing opinion promoted by the existing static fiscal federalism literature in the
tradition of Oates (1972). Our results are driven by the fact that, in a dynamic per-
spective of polic-making at the federal layer, a credible threat of future exclusion from
legislative benefits may serve as a mechanism for inducing a cooperative distribution
of benefits. Whereas such a threat is viable for public goods entailing locally con-
centrated benefits, the non-excludability characteristic of pure public goods impedes
eﬃciency-sustaining cooperation among legislators.
Substantial interregional preference heterogeneity impedes eﬃcient provision of pure
public goods both at the federal and decentral layer. The reason is that low-preference
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regions can neither resist to opt for an ineﬃciently low level of public good provision
at the federal layer nor overcome short-run incentives to free-ride under the decen-
tralized regime. Rendering the stage game perspective relevant, there are only minor
ineﬃciencies associated with underprovision under the decentralized regime in case of
substantial heterogeneity, and the latter should be assigned the provision of pure public
goods.
Our predominant result concerning public good provision at the federal layer can
be summarized in a way that the repetition inherent in the political process along
with volatility of political power may induce representatives to comply with a norm of
eﬃciency-sustaining cooperative benefit distribution. At the federal layer, an eﬃcient
distribution of benefits is, though, supposed to be observed only in small legislatures,
i.e. with a limited number of federal member states. Eﬃciency can be attained only
for an ever smaller set of public good policies if the size of the federation is increased.
Indeed, a critical number of federal member states can be shown to exist in a way
that cooperation breaks down in the course of a further enlargement. Eventually, a
centralized adminstration of public good policies proves to entail ineﬃciencies in large
federations for all types of public goods. On the other hand, there are particularly
viable prospects for attaining decentral cooperation in large federations.
Adding to the above determinants of cooperative public good provision, we finally
developed the concept of strategy-contingent discounting in order to endogenize the
very impact of repeated interaction on the ability to attain cooperative outcomes in
repeated dilemma games. Applying the general framework to a fiscal federalism prob-
lem, our findings predict that oﬃce-motivated politicians are prone to pursue ineﬃcient
short-run interests when facing significant risks of a dismissal from oﬃce, as induced
by tough political competition. Our results can be interpreted in way that cooperation
is likely to emerge if politicians face good prospects of being reappointed for another
term in oﬃce.
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Generally speaking, our results challenge the estimation that unanimity voting at the
federal layer necessarily entails a cooperative distribution of legislative benefits. Indeed,
we show that there may rather result an utmost uncooperative allocation of legislative
benefits even if the legislature employs a unanimity rule for policy adoption. Standard
results of legislative policy-making (e.g. Bednar, Ferejohn and Garrett (1996), p. 283,
proposition 1) exhibit a negative correlation between quorum size and agenda power.
Hence, agenda power is utmost restricted under a unanimity rule, i.e. whenever an
agenda setter is able to implement her favored policy under a unanimity rule, she can
implement her favored policy under any lower quorum, too. This conclusion implies
that our results of centralized decision-making immediately extend to various other
rules like (qualified) majority voting.102
In the absence of legislative decision-making costs, the standard wisdom emerging from
a static political economy analysis states that a reduction in quorum size increases the
disparity of legislative benefits. At the expense of an increasing minority, benefits
are predicted to be concentrated in a fewer number of regions. Our results rather
indicate that, in a dynamic perspective, the increased risk of being excluded from
legislative benefits under a majority rule may rather serve as an eﬃciency-sustaining
element. Further research concerning the impact of legislative rules on the prospects for
sustaining legislative cooperation in dynamic frameworks may, therefore, yield valuable
insights.
Summarizing our repeated game analysis of fiscal federalism models, our findings cer-
tainly highlight the importance of considering dynamic aspects of policy-making for
deriving feasible policy guidelines.
102See section 5.5 for an exception. In that section, adopting policies according to a majority rule
furthermore biases the distribution of legislative benefits in favor of the agenda setter’s region.
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